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Abstract  
Zhanping Hu 
Socio-economic drivers of agricultural production in a transition 
economy: a case study of Hu Village, Sichuan Province, China. 
 
  
Contemporary global agriculture has been undergoing transition towards different 
pathways. In developed countries, a shift from productivist agriculture to 
multifunctional agriculture has begun since the 1980s (Wilson, 2007). In the 
developing world, agricultural modernisation is still the primary strategy for 
agricultural development, and driven by urbanisation and industrialisation, 
deagrarianisation of rural society has been widely identified (Bryceson, 1996; Rigg, 
2006a).  As the largest developing country in the world, China embarked on market 
reform three decades ago and has ever since experienced dramatic socio-economic 
transition towards modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation. Significant levels 
of academic attention have focused on empirically identifying economic and policy 
drivers of Chinese agricultural production from a structuralist standpoint, largely 
neglecting the agency of smallholders and sociocultural factors. To address the 
resulting literature gap, this thesis adopts an approach that combines political 
economy and cultural analysis through an in-depth case study of a rural community 
in southwest China. A multi-methods approach is used to collect data, including 
questionnaires, in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation and the 
analysis of secondary data.   
The results suggest that Chinese smallholder agriculture has been dramatically 
transformed by an array of socio-economic forces. The “intensive, sustainable, 
diverse” Chinese smallholder agriculture which Netting (1993) portrayed, has been 
progressively shifted towards extensive, unsustainable and less diverse pathways. It 
suggests that the “perfunctory agriculture” performed by Chinese smallholders is the 
outcome of interactions and negotiations between various political, socio-economic 
and institutional constraints and farmers’ agency. Another key finding is that moving 
out of agriculture is becoming the norm in Chinese rural society. Most smallholders 
show willingness to rent out agricultural land and to enter into a capitalist relationship 
 
 
with employees, rather than primarily being cultivators of their land. Land transfer 
markets have become increasingly buoyant at the local level, and large-scale 
capitalist agriculture seems to be the desired future of Chinese smallholder 
agriculture for both the Chinese government and smallholders. Besides, based on 
the case of Hu Village, this thesis discusses the convergences and divergences 
between the road of Chinese agricultural development and that of developed 
countries and other emerging BRIC economies. Lastly, based on the findings of this 
research, four policy implications are proposed including sponsoring agricultural 
mutual aid groups, strengthening agricultural extension services, enhancing farmers’ 
negotiation power through laws, and initiating comprehensive socio-economic 
reforms to facilitate farmers’ pursuit of non-farm employments.    
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
Agriculture is the source of the most fundamental resource for the population 
of the planet: food. In recent decades agricultural production has grown much 
faster than the population, fuelled by modern plant breeding, improved 
agronomy and the development of chemical fertilizers and pesticides (Evans, 
1998). Quantitatively, global agricultural production has risen considerably so 
that the entire world population can be fed with sufficient food at prices that 
have never been so low (Mitchell and Ingco, 1995; Hazell and Wood, 2008). 
Simultaneously, accompanied by comprehensive socio-economic transitions 
(e.g. Fordism to post-Fordism, demographic, technological and 
environmentalist transitions), global agriculture has been experiencing spatio-
temporal, non-linear, heterogeneous and globally complex transitions (Wilson, 
2007). Agriculture is driven by multi-faceted factors. At the global level, 
agricultural development can be driven by: economic growth; energy prices 
(von Braun, 2007; Hazell and Wood, 2008); international trade and the 
globalisation of markets; world prices for agricultural products; climate 
change; and the globalisation and privatisation of agricultural science (Hazell 
and Wood, 2008). At the local level, different agricultural patterns are also 
driven by diverse elements, and are shaped by various social, economic, and 
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political forces according to different social and geographical contexts 
(Marsden, 2003). Furthermore, the drivers do not function separately.  
Instead, they interact and are entangled with each other to push global 
agriculture in new directions.   
In the contemporary world, the rising power of Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China has aroused increasing attention, noted in the international use of the 
buzzword, BRICs. With fast growing economic strength, the BRICs’ role in the 
global economy is increasingly significant, as is the geopolitical importance of 
their regions in the world (Georgieva, 2006), particularly as these countries 
account for nearly half of the global population. Agricultural production from 
the BRICs is of vital importance to world food security (Haq and Meilke, 2009). 
Although with impressive economic growth, especially China and India in 
recent years, the BRIC countries have exhibited considerabe differentials in 
the development of their agricultural sector, which has been driven by different 
forces in different countries (see for example: Schnepf et al., 2001; Valdes, 
2006 and Fuller et al., 2000 for Brazilian agriculture; Brooks, 1991, 2004; 
Johnson, 1994; Wegren, 1998, 2005; Ioffe, 2005 for Russian agriculture; 
Landes and Gulati, 2003; Gulati et al., 2005 for Indian agriculture). However, 
comparative studies of agricultural production between the BRICs can hardly 
be found at all in the literature.  This study will situate the Chinese case within 
the international context of BRICs to shed light on broader debates of agrarian 
transition.  
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China initiated rural reform in 1978, with the implementation of the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS). The HRS is a two-tier land tenure 
system (Dong, 1996), which means that land is owned by the collective but 
use rights and production decisions are decentralised from the production 
teams to individual households. Farmers were at liberty to decide what to 
cultivate and had the autonomy to sell any surplus in the market after they met 
the state quotas, which were set at around 15–20% of output (Yao, 2007). As 
an important milestone for the Chinese agrarian transition, the HRS reform 
has greatly changed farmers’ investment behaviour and all aspects of 
agricultural production (Lin, 1992; Yao, 1995, 1998; Wen, 1995; Li et al., 1998; 
Brandt et al., 2002). To date, the HRS has been a fundamental “structure” for 
Chinese agriculture. 
Due to overwhelming levels of state-led urbanisation and 
industrialisation since the 1980s, agricultural demography has been 
dramatically altered.  From the 1990s, rural-urban migration has become the 
most fundamental pathway for farmers to seek off-farm economic activities 
(de Brauw et al., 2002). Large-scale rural-urban migration in China has 
progressively pushed the most agricultural productive labourers into other 
sectors, leaving women, the elderly and children behind in the countryside (Ye 
and Pan, 2008; Ye and He, 2008; Ye and Wu, 2008). According to the Sixth 
National Population Census in 2010, more than two hundred million migrants 
are shuttling between cities and original villages. In addition, the dual structure 
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of rural-urban and “Hukou1” systems have hindered rural migrants’ capacity to 
become permanent residents in cities, as most of them have to return to their 
hometown yearly or quarterly. The seasonal migrants support original 
communities through remittance, which has become the largest share of rural 
family income. The relative absence of labour in rural communities, coupled 
with reliance on remittances from cities, has affected agricultural cultivation 
significantly and differentially. Both negative links, between migration and 
investment, and positive links, between migration and households’ 
consumption, have been found by researchers (for example Rozelle et al., 
1999; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2003). Rozelle et al. (1999) found the direct 
effect of migration on yields is significant and negative, as yields fall sharply 
when each family member leaves. However, positive correlations have also 
been found between migration and agricultural production (Taylor et al., 2003). 
Evidently, rural-urban temporary migration has become another “structure” 
affecting China’s agriculture.  
From 2004, with concerns about national food security, the central 
government of China began to cancel the longstanding policy of taxing farm 
household and instead began to provide farmers with subsidies to incentivise 
grain cultivation. Although a recent study found that there is no evidence that 
grain subsidies are effective in encouraging farmers’ cultivation incentives 
                                                             
1 As an instrument of social stability in planned economy,  the Hukou system was established 
in cities in 1951 and extended to the rural areas in 1955 in China. In mainland China, all 
nationals’ personal Hukou status is classified by two related parts: one by residential location 
and one by socio-economic eligibility (often called “agricultural”/”non-agricultural”). By the 
classification, the state separates the society into two parts, and imposes huge barriers for 
people with agricultural Hukou to convert their Hukou status (Chan and Li, 1999). 
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(Huang et al., 2011), farming without compulsory taxes from the state is a new 
“structure” of China’s agriculture.  
Apart from state policies, agricultural markets have also made remarkable 
progress in the transition period. Especially since the 1990s, albeit that 
China’s leaders were employing a cautious and gradual approach to reform 
markets, agricultural commodity markets have become robust and agricultural 
production has been largely organised and integrated across space (Huang 
and Rozelle, 2006). Besides domestic markets, Chinese agriculture has been 
progressively integrated with international markets, and agricultural prices 
within China have been closely interconnected with those from international 
markets (Yang et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2010). The progress of international 
integration has been further strengthened by China’s accession to WTO in 
2001 (Anderson et al., 2004). In addition, although under the HRS agricultural 
land was not allowed to be traded among farmers, land transfer (or lease) 
markets have achieved impressive rates of development (Yao, 2000; Jin and 
Deininger, 2009).  These have been especially driven by increasing rural off-
farm employment and government promotions in recent years (Kung, 2002; 
Huang et al., 2012). Moreover, various market players (corporations, 
cooperatives, local entrepreneurs and so forth) have participated in 
contemporary Chinese smallholder agriculture bringing about diverse forms of 
agricultural production, for instance, contract farming (Zhang, 2012). Thus, the 
market has been a fundamental force that shapes China’s smallholder 
   
6 
 
agriculture.   
Alongside the course of modernisation, Chinese rural society has also 
undergone dramatic socio-cultural transformations at all levels of society: 
individual, family and community (Yan, 1997, 2006, 2010; He, 2010). The 
repercussions of the socio-cultural changes for agricultural production have 
however, been paid little academic attention. This project aims to investigate 
the socio-economic drivers of contemporary Chinese agriculture under the 
context of China’s dramatic socio-economic and cultural transition by focusing 
on a rural community in southwest China.  
1.2 The literature gap 
Within the voluminous studies on factors which influence agricultural 
production, there are both convergences and divergences; however, it can be 
observed that most of them concentrate on one or two factors (e.g. 
technological improvements, land tenure system, infrastructure construction, 
rural-urban migration), neglecting some other important factors and possible 
interplays between them. For instance, de Brauw and Rozelle (2003) only 
examined the relationships between rural-urban migration and farmers’ 
investment behaviours, and only used absence of labour and remittances to 
explain farmers’ preferences in consumption instead of investment, without 
considering other influential factors of farmers’ behaviours, such as livelihood 
changes, community cultural changes and so forth. Similar gaps can also be 
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found in other studies (e.g. McMillan et al. 1989 for agricultural production and 
HRS; Huang and Rozelle, 1996 for technological improvements; Rozelle et 
al., 1999 for migration and agricultural production; Huang et al., 2011 for 
subsidy policy and farmers’ cultivation behaviour changes). Rural society is a 
complex entity, in which agriculture or farming is embedded, therefore, any 
sole driver can never explain agricultural change comprehensively. 
Furthermore, agriculture is a process organised socially (Ploeg, 2006), during 
which economic variables, social structure changes and farmers’ agency 
interact with each other to create new possibilities. This project aims to 
explore multiple factors of agricultural production and the interactions between 
them in an attempt to explain how different forces function in respect of 
agricultural production. 
Another research gap is that many studies try to explain and interpret the 
causality between factors of agricultural production according to a linear 
analysis and therefore produce homogeneous conclusions (e.g. Yao, 1995, 
1998; Wen, 1995 for land tenure; Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw and Rozelle, 
2003 for migration and productive investment). For instance, by quantitatively 
analysing a national sample, de Brauw and Rozelle (2003) found no evidence 
of a link between migration and farmers’ productive investment in China and 
in poorer areas migration increased consumptive investment by nearly 
20%. Yao (1998) and Wen (1995) both found a negative relationship between 
land tenure and agricultural production, which they attribute to uncertainty of 
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land properties. Admittedly, these are indeed straightforward and strong 
conclusions; however, they lose sight of non-linear processes and the 
heterogeneous nature of reality. As other analysts show (e.g. Taylor et al., 
2003; Oseni and Winters, 2009), migration and remittances definitely can 
facilitate agricultural production through farmers’ productive investment. 
Consequently, to more comprehensively interpret the effects of different socio-
economic drivers on agricultural production, the pivotal issue is to explore the 
processes and mechanisms through which differential factors affect 
agricultural production. These are frequently temporal, non-linear and spatially 
heterogeneous, limiting the possibility to abstract simple conclusions. This 
project will particularly explore the underlying processes and mechanisms 
behind numerical data.    
The third gap is about methodology. Many of the studies on agricultural 
production are quantitatively analysed with aggregate statistics or very big 
samples, and engage with high-level views or macro-level standpoints in 
terms of straightforward conclusions (e.g. McMillan et al., 1989; Lin 1992; 
Huang and Rozelle, 1996; Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw et al., 2002; Huang 
et al., 2011). First of all, this approach often neglects to note the inequality and 
heterogeneity of farmers in rural society. Besides, this approach is often 
unable to explain the “reasons” for questions. As Rigg (2007: 8) has argued: 
“Overarching perspectives and grand studies often shield from view the 
eddies of difference that are so central to building explanation”, instead, 
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through micro-level study “we can shed light on many of the critically 
important ‘why’ questions”. Furthermore, “the social, environmental, political 
and economic micro-processes and micro-dynamics often provide not just a 
more finely detailed understanding of change, but a different view” (Rigg, 
2007:8). Therefore, by using more micro-level studies and perspectives, we 
may become more capable of understanding and revealing hidden processes 
and mechanisms.  
 The final vacuum in respect of research on Chinese agricultural 
production is that many studies focus on factors (such as technological 
improvements, agricultural policies and institutions or migration), and 
conclude with general and structural judgments, while very little concern is 
shown for farmers’ agency (e.g. Lin 1992; Yao, 1995, 1998; Wen, 1995; 
Huang and Rozelle, 1996; Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw et al., 2002; de 
Brauw and Rozelle, 2003; Huang et al., 2011). For instance, Rozelle et al. 
(1999) found a negative relationship between migration and agricultural 
production, but did not pay attention to farmers’ decision-making and agency. 
This is in essence a kind of “structuralist view”, as the underpinning 
assumptions of these structure-centred studies are that the data and reality 
are linear and consistent, and the general conclusions abstracted from all 
kinds of data can interpret the dynamic and heterogeneous rural reality. 
However, by accentuating external forces and institutions, this approach 
cannot fully explain the complicated social world. Admittedly, to merely 
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emphasise the agency and overlook social forces also weakens arguments. 
Therefore, we have to apply an alternative which can reconcile structure with 
agency. According to Giddens’ structuration theory (1984), actors have the 
ability to alter structures, and meanwhile, these structures are actually the 
medium of people’s action, thus providing a useful framework for 
understanding actors’ agency. According to this perspective, social structures 
and human agency are connected in a cyclical relationship. Encouraged by 
this approach, this project, on the premise of exploring how socio-economic 
forces are influencing Chinese agriculture, will particularly pay attention to 
how farmers’ agency is interacting with these external forces and thereby 
shaping their farming practices. 
Overall, the literature of agricultural production in China is mainly 
constituted by agricultural economics and analysis of agricultural policies, 
such as institutional change (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992), agricultural 
technological progresses (Huang and Rozelle, 1996), labour markets and 
rural-urban migration (Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw et al., 2002; Rozelle et 
al., 2003), which emphasise the empirical evidence of how “structural” factors 
improve or impair agricultural production. Little attention has been paid to 
investigating agricultural production by combining macro-political economy 
with the analysis of local farmers’ strategies. This research attempts to fill this 
lacuna. 
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1.3 Research questions and objectives 
This research is to analyse the socio-economic drivers of agricultural 
production in a Chinese community. Using a case study of one village, the 
project attempts to assess how these drivers influence everyday farming 
practices. Although the study will take place at the micro-level, it will try to 
translate the main findings to the macro-level whilst equally paying 
considerable attention to overall macro-micro interactions (Schatzki et al., 
2001; Berard, 2005). This research will focus on elements and factors that 
motivate or demotivate farmers’ farming practices, and will reveal the internal 
logic of farmers’ behavioural activities under such drivers and constraints.  
Based on the rationale stated above, the research questions of this 
project are as follows:  
 What are the socio-economic and policy “structures” that Chinese 
smallholder agriculture is embedded in at present? Are they consistent 
at different administrative levels?  
 Who is farming in contemporary China? What are the characteristics of 
the farming population?  
 What economic factors are changing or influencing agricultural 
production in China? How do these factors function and what 
influences do they bring to agricultural production? 
 What social and cultural factors are changing or influencing agricultural 
production in China? How do these factors function and what 
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influences do they bring to agricultural production? 
Based on these research questions, this study will specifically achieve four 
objectives2: 
(a) To illustrate the fundamental “structures” that contemporary Chinese 
agriculture is facing through outlining the macro-socio-economic 
transformation and policy framework from the national level to the local 
level.  
(b) To demonstrate the demographic characteristics of the farmers involved 
in agricultural production under the transitional background and to 
reveal demographic changes taking place in rural communities, as well 
as the implications of demography for agricultural production.  
(c) To identify economic drivers of agricultural production in the research 
village and how farmers react to the drivers strategically, as well as the 
possible influences on agricultural production.  
(d) To reveal socio-cultural drivers of agricultural production in the research 
village and how farmers interact with these drivers, as well as the 
possible influences on agricultural production.   
For Objective (a), the investigation embraces the general socio-
economic transformation that has occurred throughout China since the reform, 
which sets the backdrop in which agricultural production in contemporary rural 
China is embedded. The investigation also introduces agricultural policies and 
                                                             
2
 It is worthy to mention here that political drivers cannot be investigated in this research due 
to methodological and ethical reasons.  
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development strategies that China and local regions have adopted. These 
policy frameworks at macro-level are the “structures” that define how farmers 
act at the micro-level.  
With regard to Objective (b), with increasing rural-urban migration and 
rapid development of other off-farm economic activities, the rural Chinese 
population has changed greatly and so have the agricultural actors. First of all, 
the study will describe basic demographic characteristics of the village 
population (e.g. age, gender, family structures, family types, educational level, 
family labour division, migrant family or not, off-farm activities). Secondly, the 
study will reveal the demography of farming populations to analyse who is 
farming in the village. Lastly, the study will further investigate different farmer 
types based on amount of time spent on farming, for instance, full time, part-
time and non-farming farmers.   
With regard to Objective (c), the study will investigate economic drivers 
through three aspects that affect agricultural production at the local level. 
First, as economic diversification has become the most significant feature of 
transitional rural China, as well as other developing countries (Ellis, 1998), 
how the livelihood diversification of rural households affects agricultural 
production will be examined, including influences on agricultural productivity, 
agricultural structures, diversity, technology adoption and so on. Secondly, the 
study will investigate how the market exerts an impact on contemporary 
smallholder agriculture, including agricultural input and output markets, land 
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transfer markets and external market actors, like agricultural enterprises, 
contract farming and so on. Lastly, this section of the research will examine 
the effectiveness of various government policies and projects regarding 
agricultural production. The Chinese government has been issuing a number 
of policies to encourage farmers to undertake agricultural production, like 
grain subsidy, agricultural machinery subsidy, and micro-credit and so on. This 
research will examine the role of these policies to scrutinise whether these 
policies are encouraging farmers as the government claims or not.   
To achieve Objective (d), three socio-cultural aspects of the village will 
be investigated. Firstly the mentality of rural residents towards agriculture will 
be examined, as studies often suggest that farmers view agriculture as a low 
status occupation (e.g. Croll and Huang, 1997). Secondly, this section will 
examine how the structure of rural family relations and intra-household labour 
divisions affect agricultural practices, including discussions about agricultural 
feminisation, geriatrification and so on. Lastly, community culture provides the 
cultural background for agricultural production, and this research will 
investigate how community values influence agricultural production, for 
example, modernity, consumerism, community cohesion and so forth.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review, which includes a detailed discussion of 
theoretical approaches of human geography especially related with rural 
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studies and livelihood diversification. From the background of transitional 
economies in the Third World generally and Chinese smallholders particularly, 
agrarian changes of BRICs under the transition background and the 
theoretical socio-economic drivers of agricultural production are the focus of 
this review. Chapter 2 also discusses the socio-economic drivers in China’s 
context and finally deepens and details the research gaps which merit the 
undertaking of this project. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies and specific techniques used 
for this research project. First of all, a discussion about general 
methodological approaches (quantitative, qualitative and multi-method 
approaches) is provided to justify multi-methods as the research approach for 
this study. Moreover, why the case-study is an important approach is 
particularly discussed, and Hu village as the study site is justified for several 
reasons. For the data-collection tools: questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, focus group interviews, participant observation methods and 
secondary data sources will be introduced. How these techniques are used in 
this study is discussed later in detail.  
Chapter 4 addresses Objective (a) because this research takes as a 
starting point the understanding that human agency takes place in specific 
political, economic and social contexts, which act as a medium for individuals’ 
actions. These various levels and contexts are of great importance to 
understanding the processes and changes taking place in Hu village. 
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Therefore, this chapter will begin with the basic backgrounds of agricultural 
development of China, and then Sichuan Province, Qingshen County and 
finally Hu village.  
Chapter 5 mainly focuses on Objective (b). Through analysing the data 
from questionnaires, interviews and secondary data, the demographic 
features of Hu village can be identified. After presenting the population of Hu 
Village, the implications of this demography for agricultural production will be 
discussed in later chapters. 
Chapter 6 focuses on Objective (c), the economic drivers of agricultural 
production in Hu village. Three broad aspects: economic diversification; 
agricultural markets and agricultural policies will be discussed. The analysis of 
economic diversification of rural households includes agricultural productivity, 
agricultural structures and levels of technology adoption. Agricultural markets 
embrace agricultural input and output markets, land transfer markets and 
newly emergent market actors. Agricultural policies include subsidy policies, 
development projects and rural infrastructure construction. In discussion of 
this chapter, farmers’ agency is intertwined with various drivers, shaping 
contemporary Chinese smallholder agriculture into distinct forms. The data of 
Hu Village is extensively linked to macro-level national data and international 
studies, to broaden the finding of the case study.    
Chapter 7 targets Objective (d), the socio-cultural drivers of agricultural 
production in Hu village. The mentality towards agriculture, emphasis on 
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education, family labour division and life course, community values, changes 
and cohesion will be analysed in this chapter. Farmers’ agency will be 
particularly highlighted.  It will show that various socio-cultural changes at the 
individual, family and community levels affect agricultural production often in 
indirect fashions, perhaps explaining the underlying reasons that agriculture 
has been marginalised in the livelihood structure of households in rural China. 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion chapter for the whole study. Firstly, an 
extensive discussion links Chinese agricultural practices of Hu Village with 
broader global contexts: the global North and the BRIC countries. Through the 
comparison, a better understanding of contemporary Chinese smallholder 
agriculture will be gained. Secondly, the whole findings and analyses of this 
research will be summarised in a concise manner. Thirdly, this chapter will 
propose several policy implications based on the findings. Lastly, some 
recommendations for future research directions will be proposed.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter sets out the contextual literature for this research project. The 
first three sections discuss the theoretical approaches the research adopts, 
from philosophical debates in human geography research to specific 
theoretical approaches in agricultural or rural geography. The fourth section 
reviews livelihoods diversification in the Third World and in the Chinese 
context. The fifth section is about broad contexts of agrarian changes in 
BRICs, and the sixth section reviews differential drivers of agricultural 
production through the perspectives of classic theory and specific practices, 
particularly in the Chinese context. The last section concludes this chapter.  
2.1 Philosophical approaches behind human 
geography research 
Any academic research is grounded on specific philosophical assumptions or 
standpoints, as Graham (1997:8) commented, “philosophy is to research as 
grammar is to language, whether we immediately recognise it or not”. A 
number of philosophies have been developed in social sciences; however it is 
impractical to present them here at length. For human geography research 
specifically, three philosophical approaches can be identified: positivist, 
humanist, and structuralist approaches, and so these will be discussed. After 
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the brief discussion, the approach that this study will adopt will be outlined.  
2.1.1 Positivist approaches 
It is widely believed that positivism initially was developed by Auguste Comte, 
a French social philosopher in the nineteenth century. According to Johnston 
(1986), Comte believed in the supremacy of science as the unique method of 
research. “To him, the study of science led to the understanding of natural 
laws, and this understanding allowed society, guided by scientists, to modify 
nature” (Johnston, 1986: 11).  This implies that:  
First, natural laws can be developed in social sciences; second, these 
natural laws provide the basis for foresight – i.e. the basis for 
predictions; and third, the realization of these predictions can be 
modified by manipulating the casual variables, to change the nature of 
the society (Johnston, 1986: 11).  
And Neuman (1999) commented,  
Positivism sees social sciences as an organized method for combining 
deductive logic with precise empirical observations of individual 
behaviour in order to discover and confirm a set of probabilistic causal 
laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human activity 
(Neuman, 1999: 65).  
For positivists, the conception of science is based on empirical hypotheses so 
that the core feature of science is to test the hypotheses through conducting 
experiments, which is methodologically named hypothetico-deductive 
(Johnston, 1986; David and Sutton, 2004). Kitchin and Tate (2000) 
commented that positivists believe, “by carefully and objectively collecting 
data regarding social phenomena, we can determine laws to predict and 
explain human behaviour in terms of cause and effect” (2000:7). Based on the 
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verification principle, positivism has a specific methodology which includes 
three procedures: classification of phenomena, the derivation of hypotheses 
and hypothesis-testing (Johnston, 1986). Initiated from theories, positivist 
research ends with revision of theories through a deductive process of 
collecting data and testing hypotheses (Johnston, 1986; Bryman, 2008). 
Methodologically, the deductive research is often associated with the 
application of a quantitative approach. Positivist research has been adapted in 
social science for a long time based on the premise of naturalism, which holds 
the standpoint that social research is in nature and is thus the same as that in 
natural sciences (Johnston, 1986; Graham, 1997).  
Positivism has been criticised for a number of reasons. For example, 
according to Gregory (2004), the critique of positivism involves four aspects: 
empiricism (problematic relationship between observation statements and 
theoretical statements), exclusivity (extending objective method into social 
sciences), autonomy (science is assumed to be “neutral” and “value-free”), 
and universality (but knowledge is “context-dependent”) (Gregory, 2000a: 607-
608).  
2.1.2 Humanist approaches 
Humanism emphasises the human awareness and human agency of 
individuals. As Graham (1997:23) argued, according to the humanist view, 
“people are capable of being creative (or destructive), reflective (or not) and, 
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above all, they are moral beings”. Generally, consciousness and intentionality 
are core features of human behaviour, which is active agency rather than 
being determined by external structures (Graham, 1997). For humanists, the 
main subject of social sciences is “the subjectivity of both observer and 
observed” (Johnston, 1986: 55), as humans behave with meanings and 
values, resulting in the interpretation of meaning having been widely 
researched in social sciences. This is associated with another concept: 
hermeneutics, which refers to the study of interpretation and meaning (Kitchin 
and Tate, 2000; Hoggart et al., 2002). Bryman (2008: 15) defined the term 
“interpretivism” as “a contrasting epistemology to positivism”. In research 
practice, hermeneutic interpretation involves a researcher’s reflection on 
his/her judgementalism and preconception, which is rightly explained by 
Duncan and Ley (1993:4):  
Rather than setting up a model of a universal, value-neutral researcher 
whose task is to proceed  in such a manner that s/he is converted into a 
cipher, this approach recognizes that interpretation is a dialogue 
between one’s data—other places and other people—and the 
researcher who is embedded within a particular intellectual and 
institutional context. 
In contrast to positivism, interpretive research is mostly exploratory and 
inductive. As Kitchin and Tate (2000: 19) commented, “at a basic level, using 
inductive reasoning means that the research comes before the theory”. 
Generally the inductive research procedures include: perceptual experiences 
→ unordered facts → definition, classification, measurements → ordered facts 
→ inductive generalisation → laws and theory construction → explanation 
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(Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 23). Methodologically, inductive research involves a 
number of qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviewing, discourse 
analysis and ethnography (Hoggart et al., 2002; David and Sutton, 2004).  
Humanist (or interpretive) research has been criticised from various 
angles. For instance, some have sought to displace the “human subject” from 
the core position in social sciences. The two most prominent critiques come 
from structuralism and post-structuralism (Gregory, 2000b). 
2.1.3 Structuralist approaches 
The binary nature of “structure-agency” has been discussed for a long time 
across the whole of the social sciences. Different from a humanist approach, 
which emphasises human agency and meanings of human behaviour, 
structuralist approaches hold:  
An axiom that explanations for observed phenomena must be sought in 
general structures which underpin all phenomena but are not identifiable 
within them; the explanation cannot be produced through empirical study 
of the phenomena alone (Johnston, 1986: 97).  
The “structure” can refer to different social actualities according to different 
splits of “structuralism”. The most prominent one is Marxism’s historical 
materialism which takes material conditions of human existence as the 
starting point. According to Marxism, the basic structure of a society is the 
“mode of production” which is the “(organized) means that people employ to 
sustain and perpetuate themselves” (Graham, 1997:20), so all the dimensions 
of society are ultimately determined by the economic base. As for a historical 
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perspective, Marxism treats the structure of society as a process (Johnston, 
1986), which indicates that: 
In order to understand the current state of any society (and predict future 
states), we need detailed knowledge of the past stages of development 
of that society. The present can only be understood in terms of the past. 
Further, it is the transformations in modes of production which are the 
key to understanding all other aspects of social change and these 
transformations or revolutions result from internal contradictions in the 
economic base as the struggle between classes in a society is played 
out (Graham, 1997:21).  
Apart from the structure as process, Johnston (1986) also argued for a 
perspective of structure as a “construct” which is “a belief that cultural 
phenomena are in fact transformations of a few basic structures which are 
universal to the human mind” (Johnston, 1986: 98). Structuralists contend that 
basic structures deeply underlie the presentational phenomena and 
behaviour, so that they need to be uncovered by researchers. Structuralism 
has been extensively critiqued on its ignoring human agency and structuralist 
research emphasises too much on the grand structures, without taking social 
life into account (Cloke et al. 1991).    
2.1.4 Bridging the “structure-agency” dichotomy 
As indicated above, whether using positivist, humanist or structuralist 
approaches, researchers have come to understand or approach the social 
world in extreme ways: emphasising either structure or agency. The binary of 
“structure-agency” has been reflected by human geographers. As summarised 
by Rigg (2007:25), structure-centred approaches frequently: 
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Tend towards determinism, place emphasis on the scientific and 
empirical, are often mechanistic and instrumentalist, overlook essential 
differences between societies and contexts, undervalue the subjective, 
focus on rules, and tend towards a static view of society. 
Agency-centred approaches then,  
Have no predictive power, eschew scientific explanation, place emphasis 
on the idiosyncratic, subjective and individualistic, tend towards 
atheoretical interpretations and ahistorical interpretations, overlook 
broader social forces, tend towards micro-level perspectives (Rigg, 
2007:25).  
Social scientists have dealt with how to bridge the dichotomy of 
“structure-agency”. One particularly prominent approach is the theory of 
structuration developed by Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984). Structuration 
theory emphasises that human agency takes place in structural contexts and 
that there is a: 
 Duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive 
character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of 
structure and agency… the structural properties of social systems are 
both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those 
systems (Giddens, 1979: 69).  
Therefore, according to Giddens, human agency and the structures within 
which such agency is played out are interactive and reciprocal. Human agents 
are constrained by social structure and meanwhile actively shape the outcome 
of the interaction between agency and structures. Methodologically, Giddens 
changed the extreme approaches and methods proposed by positivism, and 
especially by structuralism and humanism. As Johnston (1986: 114) 
commented, “the aim of Giddens’s work is to fuse structuralist approaches to 
society, with their focus on the constraints to behaviour, to humanistic 
approaches, whose foci are the intentional acts of human agency”.  
   
25 
 
As far as this research is concerned, the structure and agency will both 
be considered. Broader socio-economic contexts (economic policies and 
developments, social and cultural values, etc.) provide the structural 
background for farmers’ agrarian behaviours. Moreover, macro-level forces 
such as industrialisation and urbanisation, which have been sweeping the 
whole of China for decades, have drastically transformed the nature of 
agricultural production in China as will be shown later in this chapter. At the 
micro-level, farmers’ agency takes place in the matrix of macro-forces which 
at once provide constraint to and the medium for farmers’ actions. Meanwhile, 
farmers’ decision-making on farming arrangements cannot be overlooked 
because farmers’ agency can change conditions of agricultural production at 
the level of family livelihoods or community economic development first, and 
these initiatives may be broadened to have an impact on regional 
development and national grain security later on. The consideration of both 
structural drivers and farmers’ agency is the central principle of this research.  
2.2 Research approaches in agrarian change 
2.2.1 Political economy approach 
Political economy is a prominent research approach for studying agrarian 
change (as well as agricultural geography), with its conceptual boundaries, 
however, loosely defined and broadly used (Marsden et al., 1996; Robinson, 
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2004).  Political economy of agrarian change initially concentrates on analysis 
of social relations based on capital and labour dynamics, focusing on: 
capitalism production and accumulation; commoditisation and the classical 
dynamics of agrarian societies, originating from Marxism (Bernstein, 2010). 
This approach has been constantly developed into different branches under 
different contexts (Marsden et al., 1996). For instance, in the context of 
developed countries, Robinson (2004) has argued that political economy 
approaches initially stressed the role and importance of the state, which sets 
up the parameters for agricultural changes, and then expanded to the 
linkages between rural change and macro-level socio-economic 
transformations. Contemporary agriculture has been conditioned by wider 
forces locally and globally, including agri-commodity chains (Whatmore, 
2002), the global food system (Goodman and Watts, 1994) and state policies 
(Marsden, 2003).  
 In the context of agrarian transitions in developing countries, political 
economy can be roughly divided into two strands, the Lenin and Chayanov 
schools (Bernstein, 2009). Leninists (e.g. H. Bernstein and T.J. Byres) 
propose that agrarian transition follows Prussian and American paths of 
capitalist agriculture through differentiating peasantry into capital and labour, 
thus remoulding small-scale farming into large-scale, industrialised capitalist 
agriculture (Bernstein, 2009). Studies of Leninists often adopt a structuralist 
approach, analysing macro-level forces. Chayanovianists (e.g. Teodor Shanin, 
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James Scott, Norman Long, van der Ploeg) assert that peasants have their 
own internal logics (demographic cycle and self-exploitation) and will 
reproduce themselves; therefore, in research they often take into account 
agency and heterogeneity of peasants and attempt to combine micro- and 
macro-level issues (see Scott, 1985; Ploeg, 2008). Similarly, in the context of 
discussing the rural restructuring of developed countries, a new political 
economy approach is proposed by Marsden (1998:16), which combines 
“actors in situ and their sets of relationships with non-local actors and 
agencies”.  
Overall, in the perspective of political economy, agricultural production 
is never operated independently, but is embedded in the networks of “social, 
political and cultural processes and practices” (Marsden et al. 1996: 362). As 
similarly argued by Woods (2005), this approach provides a framework that 
connect micro-rural economies and societies with macro-level socio-economic 
processes, and highlights that “rural areas do not exist as isolated, discrete 
territories but rather are shaped and influenced by actors and events outside 
rural space” (Woods, 2005:23, see also Ploeg, 2006). In this respect, political 
economy provides a theoretical foundation for this research that agriculture is 
embedded in broader socio-economic and political processes, especially in 
the case of the Chinese political economy which has featured an 
overwhelming emphasis on state-led industrialisation, urbanisation and 
agricultural modernisation. What is occurring at the macro- levels (national 
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and international) sets the parameters or frameworks for the micro-level 
(regional and local). Therefore, general “structures” that Chinese agriculture is 
embedded in will provide an important context for the investigation.      
Nonetheless, the political economy approach (often the Leninist 
approach) has been criticised for emphasising abstract structures and 
processes too heavily and downplaying social agency, dynamics and 
heterogeneity (Ploeg, 1993; Marsden et al., 1994; Woods, 2005; da Corta, 
2008).  Its deterministic and uni-linear tendencies often simplify agriculture 
into a profit–chasing sector as any other form of capitalist production (Woods, 
2005).  This means they often “overlook farm and farm-household dynamics, 
and neglect key components of farm-based decision-making” (Robinson, 
2004:42), as well as greatly relegating “the individual and household to the 
status of pawns on a structuralist chessboard” (Rigg, 2001:24).  Bearing 
practical limitations in mind, this study will adopt a balanced approach, not 
only investigating the structural aspects, but also focusing on farmers’ 
diversity and agency, which is more in line with the Chayanovianist or new 
political economy approaches discussed above.  For instance, there are 
multiple types of farmers at different standards (Ploeg, 1993), such as full-time 
farmers, part-time farmers, large-scale farmers, and smallholders, and the 
level of agricultural production of different farmers is also different. Their 
demands and decision-making (agency) are not (always) unanimous. This 
study will thus divide farmers into various analytical categories depending on 
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research objectives.   
In addition, although focusing on a rural community of southwest 
China, this study attempts to link the local to the macro level, as “it is through 
a more sophisticated analysis of the ‘local’ that a broader comparative 
analysis of capitalism and globalisation can be built” (Marsden, 1998:27).  The 
local community experiences the broader political economy. As Miller 
(1995:10) argued,  
Our micro-studies of consumption are not a retreat from political 
economy because we are finding that the local has become the 
commanding heights of the political economy. It is in here that we can 
relate directly to questions of, for example the comparative experience of 
World Bank sponsored structural adjustment (Citing from Marsden, 
1998:27).  
2.2.2 The cultural turn 
In recognizing the limitations of the political economy approach, human 
geographers have embarked on an intellectual shift towards more 
consideration of cultural processes since the 1990s, which has been termed 
the “cultural turn” (Crang, 2000). The cultural turn promotes the notion that: 
Culture as the product of discourses through which people signify their 
identity and experiences and which are constantly contested and re-
negotiated, and cultural geographers started to explore spatial relations 
and the meaning of place through issues of identity, representation and 
consumption (Woods, 2005:24).   
This shift has aligned with broader philosophical debates of post-modernism 
and post-structuralism in social sciences (Cloke, 1997; Barnett, 1998; Philips, 
1998). In some senses, with stressing meaning, discourse and difference, the 
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cultural turn has challenged the tradition of empiricist and particularly logical 
positivism in human geography (Philips, 1998). Rural geography has also 
been affected by the cultural turn with a resurgence of rural studies in the 
1990s, especially studies of rurality (Cloke, 1997). Methodologically, cultural 
studies of the rural have been fascinated with qualitative approaches, such as 
participant observation (ethnographies), discourse analysis and focus groups 
(Cloke, 1997; Philips, 1998). Influenced by the cultural turn, a host of 
“excitements” in rural studies have emerged in the mid-1990s, including, as 
Cloke (1997) mentioned, nature-society relations, discourses of rural 
experience and imaginations, symbolic texts of rural cultures and movements. 
Particularly agricultural geography has also started to emphasise “the 
ways in which farmers develop locally-based adaptive strategies reflective of 
local culture, agri-ecology and household resources” (Robinson, 2004:42). 
More clearly, Morris and Evans (2004) reviewed four research areas of 
agricultural geography stimulated by the cultural turn (an “agri-cultural turn”) 
during the 1990s: representations of agriculture, nature-society relations, 
heterogeneous agri-cultures and enculturing the agri-food economy. 
Especially, agriculture as representation has been approached through 
discourse analysis. As Morris and Evans further argued, “authors have been 
concerned to uncover the many competing discourses that exist to give 
meaning to specific agricultural phenomena and to explore the ways in which 
discourse structures experience and action” (2004:101). Therefore, agriculture 
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can be represented differently by different actors and the key lies in discourse 
construction and contestation. In this sense, discourses serve as a form of 
power that constructs agricultural knowledge and social practices (Liepins, 
1996). In addition, in reviewing studies on enculturing the agri-food economy, 
Morris and Evans argued that agricultural economic processes were culturally 
embedded, and “in this context, embeddedness recognises that the social and 
the cultural cannot be disassociated from the economic aspects of food 
production and consumption” (2004:106). Therefore, cultural studies enrich 
agriculture with cultural attributes, through which agriculture is not merely an 
economic activity of food production, as political economy presumes, but 
rather carries an array of embedded socio-cultural meanings.  
Cultural analysis provides fresh research approaches contrasting with the 
structuralist nature of political economy, while it is also exposed to critiques of 
the extent to which it relies on discourse (post-structuralist) analysis, and often 
ignores the “material” aspects (Philips, 1998; Crang, 1997; Morris and Evans, 
2004). Therefore, a balanced approach is desirable as Morris and Evans 
(2004:101) have argued,  
The situating of discourse-based explanations of agricultural change 
within the theoretical perspective of political economy… may be one way 
of addressing this difficulty, permitting a more balanced view of the 
interplay between cultural practices and the structural constraints which 
are configured by, and reconfigure, them. 
As suggested above, this study adopts a balanced approach, combining 
political economy and cultural analysis approaches together, with inspiration 
from Morris and Evans’s argument, that “the juxtapositioning of cultural with 
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other approaches is possible and rewarding” (2004:107). As political economy 
can offer a theoretical guide for analysis of economic elements, cultural 
analysis can provide theoretical support for the analysis of socio-cultural 
factors that impact on contemporary Chinese agriculture. For smallholders 
generally, agriculture is not only a productive activity, but also a way of life (at 
least for some of them). It is thus important to shed light on the cultural 
meanings of agriculture in rural households and communities, how agriculture 
is situated in the meanings or morals of farmers and communities, and how 
agriculture as representation (the discourse of agriculture) is culturally 
constructed, contested and negotiated and such. Additionally, it is necessary 
to ask how rural residents see themselves, their identities and their next 
generations. What are socio-cultural expectations of young rural generations 
from family, community and broader society? All may have impacts on 
agricultural production as the cultural turn suggests.  
2.3 Rural and agricultural change: a transition theory 
perspective 
For the real world, the only constant principle is change, or in other words, 
transition (towards new states or directions). Having been debated largely in 
natural sciences for a long time, transition theory begins to gain increasing 
intellectual attention in social sciences in recent decades (Pickles and Smith, 
1998; Chakrabarti and Cullenberg, 2003; Wilson, 2007, 2012). As Wilson 
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(2007:14) contended, 
From a social science perspective, transition theory should be seen as a 
theoretical framework that attempts to understand and unravel socio-
economic, political, cultural and environmental complexities of societal 
transitions (or sub-systems of society such as agriculture) from one state 
of organization to another.  
There are different transition pathways in different circumstances. In contrast 
with what often occurs in the natural world where transition processes are 
often deterministic and non-anticipatory, transition in the social world is usually 
non-deterministic and anticipatory, as human systems have abilities of social 
learning and system memory (Wilson, 2007). After examining various 
transition pathways, Wilson further argued that transitional processes were 
inherently complex, with characteristics of “temporal non-linearity, spatial 
heterogeneity, global complexity and structure-agency inconsistency” (Wilson, 
2007: 78). Various forms of transition have occurred at multi-level and multi-
scale of human society, economy, population, and environments, including, for 
instance, transitions towards post-Fordism, post-modernism, post-socialism, 
post-colonialism and environmentalism.   
Agriculture has also been in transition in the contemporary world, with 
different pathways in different countries. In developed countries, like UK and 
other West European countries, agriculture has been shifting from a 
productivist regime, which emphasises the quantity and standardisation of 
agricultural production, to a post-productivist regime (Potter, 1998; Marsden, 
2003; Mather et al. 2006) or a multifunctional regime (Wilson, 2001, 2007), 
which greatly accentuates quality, diversity, flexibility, and the environmental, 
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and consumption aspects of agriculture. In developing countries like China, 
India, Southeast Asia, and Africa, agricultural production is still within the 
transition corridor from traditional peasant farming to agricultural 
modernisation and industrialisation (Woods, 2010). In common with past 
trends evidenced in developed countries, the agricultural sector in the 
developing world has been progressively de-populated due to increases in 
agricultural productivity, mechanisation, and overwhelming urbanisation and 
industrialisation. This readjustment of rural labour employment from 
agriculture to non-agriculture (or non-farm) has been widely identified and 
seen as the most noticeable transitional phenomenon occurring in developing 
countries (Eillis, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Rigg, 2001).  
In line with agricultural transition in practice, rural communities have  
undergone different transitions in different socio-economic contexts, driven by 
various external and internal forces including globalisation, neo-liberal 
ideologies, climate change, population growth and so on (Wilson, 2012).  For 
instance, driven by counter-urbanisation, rural communities in developed 
countries have increasingly transitioned from production to consumption 
locations (Marsden, 1999, 2003). Not specific to agriculture, multifunctionality 
has also expanded in the whole rural space in developed countries, producing 
a greater balance of economic, social-cultural and environmental aspects of 
rural communities (Wilson, 2010). In the developing world, driven by the 
overarching processes of urbanisation and industrialisation, rural communities 
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have experienced dramatic deagrarianisation, which are characterised by 
agricultural depopulation, rural out-migration, increasing non-farm 
employments and declining agricultural income as a proportion of total GDP 
(Bryceson, 1996; Rigg, 2001). In deagrarianisation, agriculture is no longer 
the main income source of rural households and communities (Rigg, 2006).    
From the transition perspective, China has been undergoing multi-
faceted transitions. First, and the most important, is the state-led transition 
from a planned economy to market economy, namely the post-socialism 
transition, originating from the landmark HRS reform in 1978. Unlike the 
sudden transition of the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Georgia, etc.) 
post 1991, (Pickles and Smith, 1998) which required  rapid socio-economic 
engineering in just a few years (so called “shock therapy”), the Chinese 
transition has been one of a more  gradualist approach which has proved to 
be a more successful pathway (Lin, et al. 2003).  Although in the market 
transition, the state power or multi-level of governments have long intervened 
in the sphere of economy (Nee, 1989; Oi, 1999), what is beyond doubt is that 
the market reform has gained remarkable progress, and the  market has 
become the fundamental mechanism of resource and labour allocation in 
China (Huang and Rozelle, 2006). Nonetheless, the transition is still in 
progress, and many market institutions are still imperfect and need to be 
improved. The agricultural sector has been substantially liberalised in the 
market transition, and multi-dimension of agricultural markets, input and 
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output, domestic and international, have been greatly improved (Huang and 
Rozelle, 2006; Huang, 2010).  
Another simultaneous transition in China is modernisation, which has 
been the all-embracing and overwhelming socio-economic force driving 
change in contemporary China. Under the umbrella of modernisation, there 
are several aspects of transition that have occurred in China, including 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and agricultural modernisation, which have 
been considered as the primary drivers and foci of Chinese policy makers 
(see various government documents, like Five-Year Master Plan).  The origin 
of the industrialisation project was the Mao era in the 1950s, and after the 
1978 reform, progress has been substantially accelerated. In 2010, the 
industry sector contributed 46.7% to the national GDP, with the agricultural 
sector contributing only 10% (NBSC, 2012).  Commentators estimated that by 
2010, Chinese industrialisation level had reached the later middle stage 
(Chen, et al. 2012), and some even predicted that China would accomplish 
the final stage of industrialisation at latest by 2028 (Wang, 2012). Urbanisation 
is closely linked to, or to put it another way, realised by, industrialisation 
(Chen, et al. 2012). It is reported that by 2011, the urban population of China 
has arrived 51.5% of total population, indicating for the first time, Chinese 
urban residents outnumbered rural residents (CASS, 2012). Moreover, 
Chinese governments take urbanisation as the primary development engine in 
the future (Chinese 12th Five-Year Master Plan).  
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Industrialisation and urbanisation have created massive opportunities 
for Chinese residents, particularly the rural peasants, providing them with non-
farm employment in cities and towns, driving massive rural-urban migration 
(Long, et al. 2009). In addition, the state has kept promoting agricultural 
modernisation, which substantially improves the land productivity and 
mechanisation, and consequently creates a huge amount of rural surplus 
labour. Attracted by high income in urban areas, which is seen as the main 
“pull” driver, the surplus labour becomes the main body of rural-urban 
migration and other non-farm employment (Johnson, 2000). The 
readjustments of rural labour, in turn, cast great challenges for agricultural 
production in China. Under the political economy of contemporary China (e.g. 
the Hukou system and land tenure system), it is not a smooth process of 
transferring rural peasants into urban citizens, so that some members, 
especially the elderly and women, of rural households cannot migrate with 
other members, and thus are left behind to take care of housework and 
farming (Ye and Wu, 2008; He and Ye, 2013). To deal with the labour shortage 
in agriculture, the state has promoted a series of favourable policies and 
projects to perfect relevant institutions, improve rural infrastructures and 
enhance subsidies.  Therefore, from the perspective of transition, the Chinese 
countryside and agriculture is now situated in a context where a few 
paralleling transitional processes including market transition, industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and agricultural modernisation converge. While fully 
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acknowledging the complexity, heterogeneity and non-linearity of transition 
trajectories, as contended by Wilson (2007), it is still safe to argue that the 
principal direction of Chinese transition has been a transformation from a 
traditional, agriculture-based, and planned economy and rural society towards 
a modern, industry-based, market economy and urban society. It is under this 
overarching transition of China that this research resides.    
2.4 Smallholders and livelihood diversification 
There have been at least a dozen terms to signify farmers in developing 
countries, such as petty commodity producer, smallholder and peasant.  
Smallholder is a most appropriate term to refer to Chinese farmers. According 
to Netting (1993:2), smallholders are:  
Rural cultivators practicing intensive, permanent, diversified agriculture 
on relatively small farms in areas of dense population. The family 
household is the major corporate social unit for mobilizing agricultural 
labour, managing productive resources, and organizing consumption.  
In Netting’s sense, based on various cross-cultural agricultural systems 
globally, smallholders own a set of distinctive features: 
 The farm size is small-scale; the cultivation is intensive in areas of 
dense population. 
 Smallholder agriculture servers both subsistence consumption and 
market demands. 
 Household is both productive and consumptive unit of agricultural 
production.  
   
39 
 
 Intensive agriculture as the principal jobholding takes most work time 
of the family members. Off-farm work returns less than smallholding. 
 The smallholding is environmentally sustainable with careful and 
sophisticated farming practices. 
 The yields are relatively high; they produce in a more diversified and 
continuous way.  
 The land tenure is long-term usufruct which can facilitate intensive 
cultivation. 
 The households in communities are unequal, heterogeneous and 
dynamic.  
 Agriculture collectivisation impedes tremendously land productivity 
which is best illustrated by the Chinese case (Netting, 1993: 321-323). 
Netting takes Chinese agriculture (off course, excluding agriculture of 
collectivisation era) as an exemplar of intensive agriculture and smallholder 
model. He states:  
China is the land par excellence of smallholder intensive cultivators. No 
other society on earth has the same unbroken history of a dense rural 
population practicing permanent, sustainable agriculture in the context of 
a great and enduring civilization (Netting, 1993: 232).  
Although through the collectivisation period, from the 1950s to the end of 
the 1970s, smallholder agriculture had been greatly impeded due to the 
ossified unification of labour, land and management of agricultural production, 
Chinese farmers turned back to smallholder agricultural patterns after the 
HRS reform. Twenty years have passed since Netting interpreted Chinese 
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agriculture and farmers with smallholder patterns, during which time China’s 
whole economy and society have experienced dramatic transitions. 
Smallholder agriculture has experienced no less dramatic transformations 
over time, driven by both socio-economic and political forces (Huang et al., 
2010). Thus, Netting’s smallholder model becomes increasingly inadequate to 
conceptualise contemporary Chinese farmers. For instance, his model 
proposes that for smallholders, agriculture takes most work time and off-farm 
work returns less than smallholding. This assertion seems untenable for most 
contemporary Chinese farmers (Deininger et al., 2012). Thus, this study will 
reveal a modified smallholder model based on the contemporary Chinese 
case.     
Farmers’ livelihood diversification is the most fundamental characteristic 
of agrarian transformation around the whole developing world (Bernstein, 
1992; Ellis, 1998). Among multiple and diversified household strategies, off-
farm activities at the local-level and migration have been identified by scholars 
as the two main paths for smallholders to cope with challenges and enrich 
their wellbeing (Ellis, 1998; de Haan, 1999). Since the 1980s, China has 
undergone massive progress of urbanisation and industrialisation, which have 
created great opportunities for smallholders to seek off-farm activities in local 
areas or by migrating to urban areas (Huang, 2010). Concurrently, agricultural 
production is embedded in the arrangements of livelihoods and has been 
influenced by this process to a significant degree. For instance, there has 
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been a tendency of “deagriculturalisation” which refers to a shift of 
employment from agricultural sectors to non-agricultural sectors in China (Lei 
and Lu, 2005).  
Livelihood diversification can provide a useful lens for this study to link 
agricultural production at the household level with broader structural forces. 
As Rigg (1998) has argued in southeast Asia, contemporary agrarian change 
has to be understood through non-agriculture, non-farm activities. Relevant 
studies are very extensive both in China (e.g. Rozelle et al., 1999; de Brauw 
et al., 2002) and globally (e.g. Azam and Gubert, 2004 for Mali; Germenji and 
Swennen, 2002, and Miluka et al., 2010 for Albania). Moreover, household 
livelihoods are situated within broader structural forces such as political 
economy and history, and are “conditioned by histories of places and peoples, 
and their wider interactions with colonialism, state-making and globalisation” 
(Scoones, 2009:186). Therefore, farmers’ livelihoods diversification “must look 
simultaneously at both structure and agency and the diverse micro- and 
macro-political processes that define opportunities and constraints” (Scoones, 
2009:186). 
2.5 Agrarian transition of the BRICs  
With impressive economic growth, the BRICs are playing increasingly 
significant roles in the global politics and the global economy. In 2010, the 
GDP of the BRICs accounted for a quarter of the world’s gross income, and 
   
42 
 
they represent over a quarter of the world’s land area and more than 40% of 
the world’s population (World Bank, 2011). Their rapid economic growth has 
also exerted considerable impacts on global food markets, having the 
potential to change the global agri-food trade pattern in the future (Haq and 
Meilke, 2009). To various degrees, the BRICs are still in the process of 
industrialisation and modernisation and largely remain agrarian societies, 
especially in the case of China and India. Therefore, a review of the agrarian 
transition of the BRICs may well shed light on their potential to affect global 
food security issues. This section will briefly introduce agrarian changes in the 
BRICs, providing an international context for the Chinese agrarian transition.  
In Brazil, agriculture contributes substantially to domestic economic 
growth and expanding export markets (Martinelli et al., 2010).  It has enabled 
Brazil to become a leading player in global agricultural markets (Matthey et 
al., 2004). Economic reform, beginning in the early 1990s, which was 
designed to reduce or eliminate government control and interference, has 
helped to stabilise the economy and create a more liberal policy regime 
favourable to agricultural investment, production and exports (Schnepf et al., 
2001; Valdes, 2006). Brazilian agriculture is characterised by a stark division 
between large-scale agribusiness and small-scale family farming, with the 
former dominating the whole agricultural system. Although a series of agrarian 
reforms, attempting to enlarge the amount of land possessed by smallholders 
and improve social welfare, have been implemented since the late 1980s, the 
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fundamental structure and tension between the two agricultural forms has 
largely remained (Chaddad and Jank, 2006; Pacheco, 2009). Consequently, 
in Brazil a small number of large-scale agribusinesses cultivate the vast 
majority of fertile land and gain massive profits from both domestic and global 
markets, while millions of smallholders only own a small fraction of land and 
desperately struggle against poverty (Chaddad and Jank, 2006). Furthermore, 
there are still millions of landless families waiting for land. The dominant form 
of Brazilian agriculture has brought great challenges to environmental 
sustainability (Martinelli et al., 2010), poverty and inequalities between large-
scale export-oriented farming and family farming (Ploeg et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the main task of Brazilian agriculture in the future will be to balance 
agricultural modernisation, environmental conservation and social justice 
(Martinelli et al., 2010). Comparatively, China is in a dilemma, between 
sustaining peasant farming (Ploeg et al., 2012) and transforming peasant 
farming into large-scale, industrialised, capitalist production as the primary 
way to realise agricultural modernisation. Whether the Brazilian agribusiness 
model will be the future of Chinese agriculture or not is highly controversial at 
present, and still remains to be seen, although the tendency towards scaling-
up agricultural production has seemingly commenced in many regions of 
China (e.g. see Chen, 2012).  
Russian agriculture experienced dramatic restructuring in the 
momentous transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
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in the beginning of the 1990s (Brooks, 1991). In the market transition, 
agricultural land has been largely transferred from large collective state farms 
to individuals (Lerman and Shagaida, 2007), so the market became the 
dominant force that drove Russian agricultural production. Contemporary 
Russian agriculture is constituted by three major types of farms: corporate 
farms, household plots and peasant farms (Lerman and Shagaida, 2007), with 
different types of farms specialising in different crops or livestock sectors 
(Liefert and Liefert, 2012). However, large corporate farms still dominate 
agricultural production in transition Russia and, especially in the 2000s, the 
growth of Russian agricultural outputs has been driven by large agro-holdings 
(Liefert and Liefert, 2012). Small-scale family farms have never prospered in 
Russia for various institutional, historical, socio-economic and political 
reasons (Wegren, 2008), and hence the agricultural development pathway of 
Russia refers primarily to the industrialisation and modernisation of large-
scale corporate farms.  
In this sense, Chinese agriculture which is predominated by small-scale 
peasant farms is overtly different from the case of Russian agriculture. This 
said, recent Chinese policies encouraging large agribusiness, fostering a land 
transfer market and new agricultural operators seem to have resonances with 
contemporary Russia that relies substantially on large modern agricultural 
enterprises (Wegren, 2005). Furthermore, the Chinese government has been 
particularly promoting agricultural land transfer markets to accompany the 
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massive outmigration of rural population, while land markets in Russia have 
been largely circumscribed by the inefficiencies of the administrative and 
technological infrastructure (Lerman and Shagaida, 2007), although most 
agricultural land has been privatised officially. As Wegren (2008) predicted, 
the difficult situation of land markets of Russia is likely to continue, which 
means that Russian agriculture in the future will continue to be dominated by 
large agribusinesses rather than thousands of individual peasant families. 
Lastly, with Russian accession to the WTO in 2012, Russian agriculture will 
face great challenges from global agro-food markets, similar to China.   
India initiated its economic reform firstly from non-agricultural domains 
in the early 1990s, which has had extremely different repercussions on 
agricultural production compared to Chinese experiences (Gulati and Fan, 
2008). As Gulati and Fan (2008) amply illustrated, agricultural growth has 
been substantially constrained by the urban-led reform. In the Chinese case 
however, surplus rural labour has been largely absorbed by the rapidly-
developing urban economies, leading to the most spectacular rural-urban 
migration in the world, which also results in various consequences for 
agricultural production. In India, the prospering urban economies have only 
created limited opportunities for rural labourers, and thus rural-urban migration 
has never been so intensive (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013). Consequently, the 
vast majority of rural labour in India is still dependent on agriculture or 
emerging rural non-farm sectors for their livelihood (Gulai and Fan, 2008; 
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Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013). Nonetheless, both India and China are dominated 
by smallholder agriculture (below two hectares) (Gulati and Fan, 2008), and in 
India, over 70% of farmers own less than one hectare at present, with less 
than 1% owning more than 10 hectares (Lerche, 2011). However, different to 
Chinese egalitarian land reform, unsuccessful Indian reform has led to a large 
number of landless agricultural workers (Gulati and Fan, 2008). The rural 
landless often largely remain unemployed or become part-time agricultural 
workers with meagre wages (Lerche, 2011), which is sharply different from the 
“capitalization without proletarianization” of Chinese smallholder agriculture 
(Huang, 2012). In addition, to relieve the severe agrarian crisis (evident in for 
example poverty and farmers’ suicides), agribusiness, especially in the form of 
contract farming, has gained impressive rates of development in some states 
of India (Singh, 2004; Kumar, 2006). This agribusiness-led development 
pathway has also been adopted by the Chinese state to connect smallholder 
agriculture with domestic and international markets (Zhang, 2012). Lastly, 
both countries have joined the WTO, which suggests that international 
markets and globalisation processes will increasingly influence agricultural 
development in both countries.  
China is the biggest socialist country in the world, whose political 
system, policy-making, and development strategies exhibit particular 
characteristics. Especially with regard to the political system, in contrast with 
the other three BRIC countries, there is only one ruling party in China’s 
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political arena and this can provide a relatively peaceful and consistent 
environment for the reforms (Gulati et al., 2005).  China initiated rural reform 
in 1978, replacing collective farming with a household-based system, which is 
now known as the HRS.  Compared with the weak authoritarian states of Latin 
America, China maintained its ability to rein in economic activity after reforms 
began (Oi, 1995). Different from Russia and other Eastern European and 
Former Soviet Union countries, China adopted a gradual, evolutional 
approach to the transition towards a market economy and the results have 
been very successful (Lin et al., 2003; Lin, 2004). China initiated reforms 
within agriculture instead of within the urban economy as India did, which 
ensured that the majority of the population benefited from the initial reforms 
and also provided the necessary conditions for the manufacturing and service 
sectors to reform and grow (Gulati et al., 2005). Through the series of reforms 
(see Appendix A) in aid of vast technological progress and agricultural 
mechanisation, Chinese agriculture has not only basically realised self-
sufficiency, but has also achieved great growth in quantities of production, 
being ranked first in the world for cereal production (FAOSTAT, 2009). 
Nonetheless, there are also many specific challenges for Chinese agriculture, 
for instance, accelerating growth, improving efficiency and at the same time 
ensuring that this growth is both equitable and sustainable (Gulati et al., 
2005). 
Overall, agrarian transitional pathways in the four countries vary and 
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are context-based. After investigating the agricultural production of Hu Village 
and based on the findings, a comparative discussion of the four countries 
regarding agriculture will be presented in the conclusion chapter.    
2.6 Socio-economic drivers of agricultural production  
This section reviews various socio-economic factors that drive agricultural 
production globally, with a particular focus on China. Firstly, classic theories of 
agricultural production will be reviewed and discussed. Then, studies of 
specific socio-economic factors will be discussed, including economic reform, 
land tenure, rural-urban migration, subsidies and social factors. The relevant 
studies will offer great insights for the research in this study.  
2.6.1 Classical theories of agricultural drivers  
There are a few classical theories considering agricultural driving forces.  
Chayanov (1966) argued that a peasant farm is not only a production unit, but 
it is also a consumption unit and the family life cycle is one primary factor in 
the organisation of a peasant farm. Based on empirical data, Chayanov 
developed an economic model, namely the labour-consumer balance, which 
means that agricultural production is determined by the divide between the 
intensity of annual family labour and the degree of satisfaction of its demands. 
Emphasising family dynamics, the Chayanovian model offers theoretical 
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insights for this study on how family life course and labour division change 
Chinese smallholder agriculture. From another angle, Boserup (1965) 
identified population growth as the autonomous and dominant force driving a 
steady intensification in agriculture. Her main concern is that primitive 
communities with sustained population growth have a better chance of getting 
into a process of genuine economic development than primitive communities 
with stagnant or declining populations. Boserup’s analysis revealed causal 
links between population and labour power on one side and agricultural 
technologies, off-farm employment and various market factors on the other. 
Her model has been criticised for its simplicity, for not taking external 
elements into account (Brookfield, 2001). Yet, its emphasis on a demographic 
element provides valuable insights for this research, indicating that rural 
demography is an important parameter for agriculture.  
Based on international comparisons, Hayami and Ruttan (1971) 
proposed a theory of an “induced development model” in the agricultural 
economic system, which contends that technological and institutional change 
is endogenous to agricultural development. This model suggests that 
agricultural technological change is induced by various factors, including the 
non-agricultural sector, the state, farmers, agribusiness and market 
conditions. Therefore, effective interaction between these elements is the key 
to agricultural development in developing countries. This model underlines the 
importance of integrating various socio-economic and political drivers of 
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agricultural development, which theoretically supports the present emphasis 
on comprehensive factors of agricultural production and the analysis of 
agricultural technological change.  
Overall, these three classical theories suggest that rural demographic 
change, family life course (constitution), non-agricultural sectors, the state, 
market conditions and so forth are all drivers of agriculture production. Any 
single factor can never interpret agricultural change comprehensively.  
2.6.2 Economic reform 
A host of studies have focused on the effects of rural economic reform on 
agricultural growth, although they have often arrived at contradictory 
conclusions. McMillan et al. (1989) calculated that 78% of the increase in 
agricultural productivity between 1978 and 1984 could be attributed to the 
incentivising effects of HRS and 22% to the effects of higher prices. Lin (1992) 
assessed the contributions of agricultural decollectivisation, price adjustments 
and other institutional reforms to China’s agricultural growth during the reform 
period by province-level panel data. This study revealed that decollectivisation 
(through the HRS) was to account for about half of the output growth during 
1978-1984, while the effect of other market-related reforms on productivities 
and output growth is very small. After 1984, China’s agricultural productivity 
experienced a slowdown, and Lin (1992) argued that the one-time discrete 
effect of the HRS reform had ended in 1984, and the rapid exodus of the 
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labour force from agriculture and the sharp decline in the growth rate of 
fertilizer usage were responsible for the stagnation. However, Huang and 
Rozelle (1996) identified technology adoption as the most important 
determinant of rice yield growth during 1978-1984, accounting for nearly 40% 
of the growth. In 1985-90, technology has accounted for all the increase in 
rice yields, suggesting that Lin’s (1992) analysis may over-estimate the impact 
of decollectivisation. Similarly, Mao and Koo (1996) also found that technical 
progress had been the most important factor for Chinese agricultural 
productivity growth since 1984. Fan (1991) asserted that conventional 
approaches overestimated the impact of the rural reforms on both production 
and productivity growth, and he concluded that it was imperative for the 
government to increase investments in agriculture to promote the long-term 
production and productivity growth (see also Li and Liu, 2009).  
Overall, scholarship on economic reform reaches differential 
conclusions indicating that various subsequent elements have also had an 
impact on agricultural production in China. These studies can provide 
important insights for this study regarding the economic factors that may drive 
agricultural production. However, a palpable limitation of these studies is that 
all of them adopt quantitative approaches, greatly ignoring farmers’ agency at 
the micro-level, which is one of the research gaps that this study will attempt 
to address.      
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2.6.3 Land tenure 
Another focus is to identify the characteristics of the Chinese HRS land tenure 
system (e.g. Wen, 1995; Yao, 1995, 1998; Li et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002). 
Under the HRS tenure system,  individual households only were assigned 
residual income rights of the land, leaving a variety of other use and land 
reallocation rights vested in the state and local collective authorities (Liu et al., 
1998), generating a highly complex property rights regime (see also Brandt et 
al., 2002). This “two-tier” land tenure arrangement (Dong, 1996), namely 
farmers holding the use rights and the collective maintaining ownership, was 
criticised for its inefficiency and uncertainty. Wen (1995) and Yao (1995) both 
argued that uncertainty in land tenure dampened farmers’ incentives to invest 
in agriculture. Furthermore, Yao (1998) demonstrated that uncertain land 
tenure and restrictions on land trade rights negatively influenced agricultural 
output. Carter and Yao (1998) also found, from analysis of national data, that 
tenure security significantly affected farmers’ investment in agriculture. 
However, Kung (1995, 2000) found that the downsizing of farmers’ incentives 
due to uncertainty of land tenure under HRS did not affect inefficiency in 
agriculture so much as some scholars asserted. Especially, Kung and Liu 
(1997) found unexpected evidence from farmers’ perspectives that an 
overwhelming majority of the farmers did not hold a preference for private 
ownership of land, and they wanted to reallocate the land regularly due to 
egalitarian spirit and family size cycles. The contradicting conclusions above 
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suggest that arguments can be different according to the level at which data 
analysis is conducted.  
Compared with private land tenure, Dong (1996) argued that the two-
tier land tenure was more suitable in the Chinese context, because in the 
presence of multiple market distortions, land privatisation was unlikely to 
provide a solution to agricultural problems. It is widely realised that land 
markets can promote allocative efficiency and increasing agricultural 
productivity, by equalizing the marginal product of land and by facilitating 
transfers of land from less productive farmers to more productive ones (Carter 
and Yao, 2002; Deininger , 2003; Jin and Deininger, 2009; Feng et al., 2010). 
Through examining heterogeneities at the village level, Brandt et al. (2002) 
also concluded that poorly developed land rental markets prevented 
households who have limited access to off-farm opportunities from fully 
utilizing their labour and earning more income through expanding the farm 
scale. Using a big national sample in China, Jin and Deininger (2009) found 
that transferring land from less able and richer households who joined the off-
farm activities, to poorer households with sufficient reserves of family labour 
could significantly enhance agricultural output. Through a plot-level case 
study, Feng et al. (2010) found that households which rented additional land 
had higher rice yields per unit, and their land investment and input levels did 
not differ significantly from other households. Therefore, land rental markets 
have important implications for allocative efficiency and agricultural 
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productivity. 
This strand of studies elabourates on the complex relationships 
between land tenure and agricultural production, offering an extensive range 
of perspectives for analysis of the land tenure system for this study. However, 
what they fail to address is the dynamism of the relationships. Conclusions 
are contextually based rather than universal, and the HRS tenure system 
might be a positive driver at first while it may become negative later. Another 
gap is the lack of linkage between land tenure and farmers’ livelihoods with 
external political economic arrangements, which could be the cause of 
underlying dynamics. This study will deal with this gap based on the case of a 
rural community of China.   
2.6.4 Rural-urban migration  
Non-farm activities have increasingly become major sources of livelihood for 
farmers in the developing world (Reardon et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2010).  
Studies of the relationship between non-farm activities and agricultural 
production have primarily focused on how agricultural production facilitates or 
impedes non-farm activities (Davis et al., 2009; Haggblade et al., 2010). The 
other side, how non-farm activities of farmers affect agricultural production 
has just recently received academic efforts (e.g. Huang et al.,2009 for China; 
Oseni and Winters, 2009  for Nigeria; Kilic et al.,2009 for Albania; and Hertz 
2009 for Bulgaria). Rural outmigration, as one of the most important non-farm 
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activities, however, has attracted considerable academic attention to its 
influences on agricultural production. In China, rural-urban migration has 
become the fundamental path for farmers to seek off-farm economic activities 
(de Brauw et al., 2002). Because of institutional constraints (e.g. Hukou 
system), rural migrants cannot become legal residents in cities and have to 
commute between work cities and original villages, and send the wages back 
to their home communities. Absence of labourers in rural communities 
coupled with remittances from the outside, affect agricultural cultivation 
significantly and in a range of ways. Rozelle et al. (1999) found that migration 
had a significant and negative effect on yields, which fall sharply if a family 
member leaves the farm in China. They also attributed the slow-down in the 
growth of grain during the 1990s to rural outmigration. Similarly, de Brauw and 
Rozelle (2003) found no evidence of a link between migration and farmers’ 
productive investment in China, and in poorer areas they found that migration 
increased consumptive investment by nearly 20%. The same conclusion of 
negative linkage between migration and investment, and positive linkage 
between migration and households’ consumption has also been found in other 
countries (Taylor et al., 1996 for Mexico; Azam and Gubert, 2004 for Mali; 
Germenji and Swennen, 2002, and Miluka et al., 2010 for Albania). In 
contrast, some scholars have also found positive correlations between 
migration and agricultural production. Taylor et al. (2003) offered evidence 
from China that remittances partially compensate for a negative lost-labour 
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effect and stimulate crop production and possibly self-employment (see also 
Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001 for Mexico; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2001 for 
Turkey; Oseni and Winters, 2009 for Nigeria).  
Besides, migration also influences agricultural restructuring. Mckay 
(2005) found in the Philippines, women’s migration caused the transition from 
subsistence to commercial agriculture, and in turn, this transition also 
strengthened women’s migration. Miluka et al. (2010) found in Albania, 
remittances led to a structural transformation from labour intensive to capital 
intensive agriculture. 
Overall, these studies are helpful for the analysis in this study on the 
effects of the economic diversification of rural households on agricultural 
production. However, analysis is generally confined within the economic 
domain in these studies, without shedding light on how diversification, and 
particularly outmigration, impacts on agriculture through social processes, for 
instance, family labour division or the family life cycle. This study will address 
this issue using more holistic perspectives.    
2.6.5 Subsidy policy 
From 2004, the Chinese central government began to prioritise national grain 
self-sufficiency and cancelled the longstanding tax policy on farmers, and 
began instead to subsidise them to encourage grain cultivation. Subsidy policy 
has been supposed to be a potential driver for agricultural production, 
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particularly for grain cultivation in China. Based on data from 421 households 
in Anhui Province of China, Wu and Cai (2010) found that grain subsidy policy 
has obvious positive effects on encouraging farmers to enlarge grain sown 
acreage, and exhibits an obvious excitation effect of “land-input”. However, 
other scholars have reached contrary conclusions. Based on analysis of a 
national dataset, Huang et al. (2011) found no evidence that grain subsidies 
are distorting producer decisions in terms of grain area or input use decisions, 
and they argue the main reason is that subsidies are mostly sent to land 
contractors instead of actual tillers (see also Ma and Yang, 2005). These 
conclusions are mostly drawn from quantitative data analysis, often neglecting 
farmers’ voices. This study will approach this issue from the perspectives of 
farmers, to explore the underlying reasons.  
2.6.6 Social drivers of agricultural production 
Social drivers here are broadly defined, referring to socio-cultural aspects of 
society, excluding economic, political and environmental factors. As discussed 
earlier, various socio-economic factors are often interwoven together, and it is 
sometimes difficult to split social and economic drivers. For instance, rural 
migration could be both an economic and socio-cultural driver for agriculture. 
This section briefly reviews how socio-cultural factors have changed the 
agricultural landscape in developed countries at first and then discusses the 
circumstances in developing countries, especially China.  
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Agriculture in the developed countries has been undergoing a regime 
restructuring from productivist agriculture towards multifunctional agriculture 
(Wilson, 2007; Woods, 2010). In a productivism regime, agriculture is 
considered as the core of rural communities, and at the individual level, to 
maximise land productivities is generally identified as the primary duty of 
farmers, the most significant standard to be “good farmers” (Burton, 2004). In 
multifunctional agricultural regime, socio-culturally, agriculture often loses the 
central position in society and rural communities (Wilson, 2007); and 
pluriactivity has become more the norm in rural economies (Ilbery and Bowler 
1998; Wilson, 2007). Besides economic and political drivers, this transition 
has been socially driven by counter-urbanisation, environmental concerns and 
the shift from production to consumption of the countryside (Wilson and Rigg, 
2003; Wilson, 2007). After long-term rural depopulation driven by urbanisation 
and industrialisation, the countryside of the developed world has experienced 
a population turnaround since the 1970s (Woods, 2005). The long-lasting 
trend of counter-urbanisation has projected a multiple portfolio of agricultural 
activities (Wilson, 2007).  
In contrast, most developing countries are still in the process of 
urbanisation and industrialisation and rural society has been experiencing 
deagrarianisation (Bryceson 1996; Rigg 2001), which has triggered various 
agricultural changes, for instance, mechanised, feminised and geriatrified 
agriculture (Rigg, 1998; Rigg et al., 2012). Quite similarly, driven by state-led 
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industrialisation and urbanisation, rural China has been also involved in a 
trend of deagriculturalisation (Lei and Lu, 2005). Huang and Peng (2007) 
argued that contemporary Chinese agriculture encounters three historical 
forces: declining population growth, massive and expanding non-farm 
employments and changes in food consumption patterns.  
Researchers have revealed that the social relations and cultural roles 
of rural space have substantial repercussions on agricultural production under 
the context of agrarian transition. For instance, gender divisions within rural 
households in developing countries have widely led to agricultural feminisation 
(e.g. Fan, 2003, Zuo, 2004 for China; Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006 for Latin 
America and Africa), and generational division has often resulted in 
agricultural geriatrification (e.g. Rigg et al., 2012 for Asian countries; Lin and 
Deng, 2012 for China). The large-scale rural outmigration has changed the 
values and actions of migrants, farmers and rural society in China (Murphy, 
2002). Agriculture has been constantly constructed and stigmatised by the 
social and cultural norms as a “low status”, “hopeless” occupation, pushing 
rural elites with physical strength and the best levels of education out of 
agriculture (e.g. Croll and Huang, 1997 for China; Rigg, 2001 for southeast 
Asia). Meanwhile, culturally, the countryside and agriculture have been 
constructed as “backward” and “traditional” under the overwhelming discourse 
of modernisation in China (Lei, 2003). All these socio-cultural factors may 
influence agriculture production, and this research will explore this issue at the 
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community level.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has set the literature context for this project. It firstly reviewed 
debates on three philosophical approaches underlying human geography 
research. Bridging the gap between structure and agency is the basic 
philosophical standpoint underlying this project. After reviewing two strands of 
research approaches in human geography, this study will combine political 
economy and cultural analysis, as suggested by the cultural turn. Through 
reviewing rural and agricultural change from the perspective of transition 
theory, the transitional contexts that this research resides are discussed. The 
discussion of smallholders and livelihoods diversification helps to understand 
Chinese smallholder agriculture under broader political and socio-economic 
contexts. It then discussed agrarian changes of the BRIC countries, providing 
an international context for Chinese agrarian transition. Based on the findings 
of the study, a further comparison will be discussed in the concluding chapter.  
Lastly, this chapter reviewed studies on socio-economic drivers of agricultural 
production, revealing the gaps of each strand of studies and also drawing 
theoretical and practical insights for this study.  
Overall, as discussed in this chapter, in a rapid transition economy like 
that of China, understanding agricultural production comprehensively is 
challenging as so many forces and factors are involved in the process. 
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Emphasizing any one aspect cannot produce conclusions which will 
adequately provide an understanding of agricultural production. As reviewed 
in Section 2.5, socio-economic drivers of agricultural production in China, 
various factors are often studied separately to understand agricultural 
changes, which is the most prominent gap emerging in the literature and one 
this project aims to bridge.  
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on a rural community in southwest China, the aim of this project is to 
investigate how various socio-economic forces impact agricultural production 
at the local level. This chapter sets out the methodology of the project. The 
approach adopted here is a multi-methods strategy, using both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Section 3.2 briefly introduces methodological 
approaches in social sciences, mainly focusing on three different approaches: 
quantitative, qualitative and multi-methods approaches, and justifies the multi-
methods approach as the research approach of this project. Section 3.3 
rationalises the case study approach for this project and provides the rationale 
of Hu Village as the study site. Section 3.4 details the specific data collection 
methods for this project. Ethical issues for this project are discussed in section 
3.5, after which the conclusion forms section 3.6.  
3.2 Methodological approaches in social sciences 
Methodological approaches in social sciences have been divided into two 
categories: quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches and the two 
approaches both have strengths and weaknesses. Their distinctions in 
practice and philosophy have been often exaggerated by academia, but as 
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David and Sutton (2004:43) proposed: “Real innovation in social research will 
come from those who seek to overcome the distinction, not merely to 
mechanically repeat the practices and beliefs of one side or the other”. To 
achieve the research objectives, a multi-methods approach will be utilised for 
data collection. This section firstly will introduce the two approaches in 
general, and then will detail the multi-methods approach in the third section. 
3.2.1 Quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach has been introduced and discussed in almost every 
methodological book. Bryman defined a quantitative approach as a research 
strategy:  
That emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data and 
that entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research, in which the accent is placed on the testing of theories 
(Bryman, 2008:22). 
With a belief in macro-patterns and social causation, quantitative researchers 
mainly use standardised methods of data collection and data analysis to reach 
generalisations of findings (David and Sutton, 2004). In practice, quantitative 
methods include surveys, questionnaires, experiments and observations. As 
Parfitt (1997) summarised, quantitative data collected by survey through 
questionnaires generally includes three types. The first is basic information 
which can classify people into simple categories. The second type is 
associated with the behaviour of people. The third one is information about 
attitudes, ideas and beliefs of people. Hence, quantitative data is generally 
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presented in numerical form, often as percentages. 
The weakness of the quantitative approach has been critiqued for 
many years by social researchers based on its philosophical foundations and 
practical operations (eg. Neuman, 1999; David and Sutton, 2004; Bryman, 
2008). As Bryman (2008) summarised, four criticisms of the quantitative 
approach can be identified. First, it is not able to distinguish human and social 
systems from those of the natural world. Second, the measurement process of 
quantitative research is designed artificially so that to some degree, it may be 
less precise and accurate. Third, the “standardised” research procedures omit 
the interaction and connection between research and everyday life. Fourth, 
artificial variables often provide a static view of social world, which downplays 
the dynamics of human life.  
This study will largely draw on the advantages of quantitative approach, 
using questionnaire surveys to collect basic information of people and 
information about attitudes and ideas which will be further elaborated on using 
qualitative methods, as described in the following sections. 
3.2.2 Qualitative approach 
Qualitative approach includes an array of methods to understand  
How the world is viewed, experienced and constructed by social actors. 
They provide access to the motives, aspirations and power relationships 
that account for how places, people, and events are made and 
represented (Smith, 2000:660).  
A qualitative approach enables researchers to understand people’s attitudes, 
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and the actions and meanings behind their behaviours in concrete contexts. It 
can also help to understand the process and logic of social events and 
phenomena which are not easily identified. This is also the reason that 
qualitative research often answers “why” questions.  
The qualitative approach includes a series of specific research 
methods such as in-depth interview, participant observation, discourse and 
text analysis and so on. Different from the quantitative approach of 
emphasising numbers, these methods stress meanings of human agency with 
a belief that human life is implicated by interconnected meanings that cannot 
be broken from their meaningful contexts (David and Sutton, 2004). In 
practice, qualitative research greatly relies on the experiences and wisdom of 
researchers because it takes place in the dynamic sphere of interaction 
between researchers and target populations.  
Several weaknesses in qualitative approaches can be identified. For 
example, qualitative research is more subjective because findings and 
conclusions are often based on the personal relationship between researchers 
and people studied (Bryman, 2008). Another critique focuses on the scalability 
of the findings of qualitative research as they are often too limited to be 
generalised to wider scopes (David and Sutton, 2004; Bryman, 2008). 
However, this critique is often refuted by the belief that: “it is the quality of the 
theoretical inferences that are made out of qualitative data that is crucial to the 
assessment of generalization” (Bryman, 2008: 392), rather than statistical 
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criteria. This research will use a qualitative approach to collect data regarding 
reasons for the various underlying social phenomena as will be further 
discussed in following sections.  
3.2.3 Applying multi-methods approach 
As discussed above, quantitative and qualitative approaches are obviously 
distinct from one another. Nevertheless, any social research will inevitably 
involve both quantity (e.g. measurements) and quality (e.g. classification) 
(David and Sutton, 2004), so that it is unreasonable to entirely rely on any one 
approach. To cover these gaps, multi-methods approaches, combining both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, have been developed in social sciences 
(Neuman, 1999; Hoggart et al., 2002; David and Sutton, 2004; Bryman, 2008). 
This approach will be used to inform the methodology of this study.  
An obvious advantage of the multi-methods approach is triangulation, 
where quantitative and qualitative approaches are integrated to triangulate 
findings for mutual corroboration (Bryman, 2008). For example, in research it 
is quite common to use observations or interviews to triangulate the findings 
from questionnaires (David and Sutton, 2004). Consequently, multi-methods 
approach can greatly improve the validity of conclusions. Apart from 
triangulation, Hammersley (1996) also proposed another two merits: 
facilitation and complementarity. As is explained by Bryman (2008), facilitation 
refers to using one method to facilitate the other. For instance, researchers 
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use findings from questionnaire surveys to deepen the scope of in-depth 
interviews. Complementarity means that both quantitative and qualitative 
methods are employed to dovetail different aspects of the research project.  
Encouraged by these advantages, this project applied a multi-methods 
approach to achieve the objectives set by this project. Therefore, this project 
collected both quantitative data and qualitative data according to different 
research questions, and these two types of data were then triangulated to 
complement each other, to deepen the enquiry and reinforce validity. 
Specifically in the case of this project, quantitative data is associated with rural 
demography, occupation information, land use and transfer, agricultural inputs 
and outputs, livestock cultivation, economic income and expenses, and impact 
of migration on farming. This part of the data was collected through 
questionnaire surveys, and the findings also helped to guide the collection of 
qualitative data.  
The qualitative data includes different actors’ viewpoints (e.g. different 
groups of farmers, migrants, government officials and marketers) on farming, 
agricultural policies, contract farming, land use and transfer, migration, rural 
cultural changes and so on. How the socio-cultural factors (e.g. family 
relationship, education, community values) impact agricultural production will 
be explained by data collected through observation and interview. Additionally, 
the “why” questions were also answered through interview and observation. 
For instance, why do farmers migrate rather than stay? Why do some migrate, 
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while others stay or come back to farming?  
To sum up, this study starts from the assumption that not only macro-
level forces influence agriculture, but also farmers’ agency at the local-level 
shapes the outcome (Long and Ploeg, 1994). To study these connections 
comprehensively, a multi-methods approach is appropriate.  
3.3 Case study 
3.3.1 Case study approach 
The case study has long represented a very important approach in social 
research. Yin (2003:13) gives a comprehensive definition of case study 
research which “is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. A case study is 
often classified by social researchers as in the domain of qualitative research. 
Yet, as many scholars have indicated, the case study can involve any sort of 
research, whether quantitative, qualitative or multi-methods (Stake, 2000; Yin, 
2003; David and Sutton, 2004).  This has caused Yin (2003:14) to further 
comment that the case study “comprises an all-encompassing method—
covering the logic of the design, data collection techniques, and specific 
approaches to data analyses”. A case study can be based on any type of 
evidence as well, either quantitative or qualitative, or both. Regarding the 
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“case”, a case study can involve any specific “unit” of analysis,  including 
individuals, organisations, events, social phenomena, periods of time and so 
on (David and Sutton, 2004). Additionally, the “case” can also geographically 
range in scale from being a country, a region, a district, to a local community 
or an even smaller group (Yin, 2003). 
The rationale for the utilisation of the case study approach is 
associated with its advantages compared with other approaches. Briefly, the 
case study approach enables researchers to obtain the holistic and 
meaningful features of real-life events, for instance, individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, 
international relations and the maturation of industries (Yin 2003). Compared 
with a descriptive survey, a case study can not only describe a situation but 
also uncover the hidden causation. Therefore, a case study is usually initiated 
and organised through a couple of research questions which are almost 
always related with “how” and “why” (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2003).  
In spite of that, there are still challenges to the case study approach, 
and one of the most mentioned is “how to generalize from a single case”. It 
actually depends on types of generalisation. Case study research is 
applicable to theoretical propositions rather than populations or universalities 
(Yin, 2003). Under these circumstances,  
The case study, like the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, and 
in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize 
theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization) (Yin, 2003:10). 
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Additionally, a case study demands another two conditions: the events are 
contemporary rather than historical and the investigator has little or no control 
on the events (Yin, 2003).  
There are different types of case study according to different criteria. 
Stake (2000) classified case studies into three categories based on research 
aims. The first is the intrinsic case study, through which researchers want a 
better understanding of a particular case. The second is an instrumental case 
study, in which the particular case is mainly considered as a breakthrough 
point to discern a broader issue or revise a theory. The third is a collective 
case study, through which researchers jointly study multiple cases to 
investigate a special issue. Alternatively, case study is also categorised in 
terms of analysis types, “descriptive”, “explanatory” and “exploratory” case 
studies respectively (Yin, 2003; Gray 2009).  
The process of case study design often includes five components: 
research questions, research propositions, units of analysis, linkages of data 
to propositions and criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003). Unit 
analysis or case selection may be the unique feature of the case study. The 
criteria of case selection have been variously discussed by writers (Stake, 
2000; Yin, 2003). As Yin (2009) further argued, the definition of the unit of 
analysis, namely the case, is fundamentally determined by the initial research 
questions. Particularly for the current research, a local community was set as 
the “case” based on the type of the research questions, which primarily focus 
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on the “how” and “why” aspects of agricultural production in contemporary 
China.     
3.3.2 Village studies 
In rural geography, case studies at the village level have been used 
extensively by researchers to investigate both micro-level questions defined in 
a community and macro-level ones that concern phenomena beyond the 
local. A rural community is a group of socially interacting people living in a 
rural area and sharing one or more common ties. A rural village can generally 
be seen as a case of the local in scale which is not static but which is 
interactive with structural forces at broader scales, like regional, national and 
even global. As Murdoch and Marsden (1994:9) argued when they 
investigated processes of reconstructing the rural and rurality in the UK, “the 
rural is best regarded as the outcome of a variety of economic, social and 
political processes”. In this sense, rural localities can be considered as 
“meeting points” where particular sets of social relations intersect (Murdoch 
and Marsden, 1994:10). This view is echoed by another geographer, 
Jonathan Rigg (2007), who reviewed a number of case studies (most are 
related to rural communities) in the Global South under the background of 
modernisation and globalisation. Rigg (2007) argued that scale and the role of 
place are powerful and significant contextual axes. He also criticised 
aggregate statistics and broad trajectories which entirely emphasise macro-
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structuralist views of the world, and called for an “everyday geography” which 
connects ordinary people’s everyday life with macro-forces like modernisation 
and globalisation, the processes of which are actually embedded in particular 
places. Drawing on this theoretical standpoint, a community-scale case study 
can provide a breakthrough point to investigate the process that shapes how 
different forces influence agricultural production at the local level.  
For more than half a century, Chinese social scientists have 
investigated China’s transformation through village case studies (e.g. Fei, 
1939; Yang, 1959; Hinton, 1966; Wang, 1997; Yu, 2001).  As Fei (1998) 
remarked, “For many reasons, the unit of Chinese rural community is ‘village’, 
ranging from villages with only three or five households to villages with 
thousands of households”. The underlying message behind village studies is 
that a village or community has been seen to have independent economic, 
social and cultural borders. However, in the wake of modernisation, 
marketisation and globalisation permeating even the most remote corner of 
China, the rural village is not a closed and autonomous entity as previously 
recognised. Moreover, the rural Chinese village has been re-recognised as a 
particular bridge between the state and society (Oi, 1989). Villages record the 
processes of state power infiltrating rural society, so that the nature of state 
operation can be captured.  In this sense, the village still can be recognised as 
one of the “meeting points” where different macro-level processes intersect.  
Methodologically, a village case study, with its merits of in-depth investigation 
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and interpretation, is a powerful tool to understand the complexity of rural 
China in such a rapidly changing period (Di, 2009). This argument is also 
echoed by other researchers in respect of researching agrarian change in the 
third world (see Rigg et al., 2012). Given that this project focuses on how 
different socio-economic forces interact with local farmers’ agency, a village as 
a unit of analysis is appropriate for this project.  
3.3.3 The rationale of Hu Village as study site 
According to Yin (2003), a rationale for a case study is that it is a 
representative or typical case. There are principles to follow in choosing a 
suitable case. As Stake (2000:447) reminds us, diversity is desirable but an 
“opportunity to learn is of primary importance”. Specifically for village studies 
on agrarian change, Rigg and his co-authors (2012:5) have commented that it 
is quite impossible to find a typical village in Asia, but “there are trends or 
tendencies which can be drawn from one instance or example…and then 
used to speak to a wider context”.   
Concerning the present objectives and research questions, the primary 
criterion of choosing to study a specific village is that the village should be a 
“meeting place” for different forces and processes (e.g. migration, markets, 
state power, social and cultural changes and so on). Secondary criteria 
include representativeness of agricultural production, multiple landscapes, 
transport accessibility, and so on. So, for this project, comprehensive 
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coverage of these features is the key. The reasons why Hu Village was 
chosen as the study site for this project can be summarised by the following 
points: 
1. The agricultural production of Hu Village is typical in southwest China. 
Rice, rape, corn, sweet potato are very typical and general crops in 
Southwest China. Moreover, cash crops (e.g. rape, orange trees and so 
on) are also quite pervasive in these areas. Both subsistence 
cultivation and market production exist in Hu Village, which can thus 
provide a comprehensive understanding of different agricultural types. 
2. Geographically, the landscape of Hu Village is complex and multiple, 
including both flat and hilly areas. The diversity of landscape shapes 
agricultural production in a diverse way so that through investigating Hu 
Village, various and heterogeneous forms of agricultural production can 
be examined.  Climatically, the subtropical humid climate covers not 
only a great part of Sichuan, but also some other parts of subtropical 
China. 
3. Different forces and processes are acting on agricultural production of 
Hu Village, which can therefore be seen as a “meeting point” of various 
macro-level structures and the micro-level processes of farmers’ lives in 
the world. Due to rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, a mass of 
rural labour migrates to cities to seek cash, which has greatly 
transformed the demography and the socio-economic landscapes of 
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the community. This “mobility-stay” dualism of livelihood arrangements 
of smallholders is highly prevalent in transitional China (Fan, 2008; Ye 
and Pan, 2008; Ye and Wu, 2008; Ye and He, 2008). In this respect, Hu 
Village is particularly typical, with more than 60% of the population 
being migrant workers. Multiple job holding is the predominant 
livelihood arrangement or strategy for Hu Villagers. Additionally, in Hu 
Village, commercial farming, contract farming, land transfer between 
farmers, and governmental policies and projects are all coexisting in 
the arena of agricultural production. 
4. Considering the linkage between local and state regulations, Hu Village 
is tightly embedded in the national context of rural reforms initiated from 
the central government, in the capital Beijing. The village history 
reveals that every major reform from the state has become engraved 
on the vicissitudes of Hu Village just as most villages from across 
China. Therefore, Hu Village is a window to link micro- to macro-level 
processes.  
5. My previous research experiences in Hu Village can offer me privileged 
access to this community. The acquaintance between the researcher 
and the villagers also provides great convenience for participant 
observation since I am often treated as a common villager in the 
community.  
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3.4 Research methods 
This section discusses the specific research methods for this project. 
Questionnaires, interviews, participant observation, focus groups and analysis 
of secondary data sources were the methods used in the research.  These are 
introduced respectively in the following sections.  
3.4.1 Questionnaire survey 
Questionnaire survey and its advantages and disadvantages 
Questionnaire surveys are a frequently used tool for collecting data from and 
about people in social research. In questionnaire surveys, people are asked to 
answer or respond to the same series of questions in a predetermined order 
(Gray, 2009). As Parfitt (1997) summarised, questionnaires can conveniently 
collect three types of data: “data which classifies people, their circumstances 
and their environment”, “data which relates to the behaviour of people”, and 
“data which relates to attitudes, opinions and beliefs” (Parfitt, 1997: 77). 
Compared with other research tools, questionnaire surveys have particular 
advantages and disadvantages as is shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires 
Source: Adapted from Gilham, 2000, and Bryman, 2008.   
The questionnaire survey is a very important data collection tool in this 
project. Using questionnaires, it is possible to collect a great deal of basic 
information for every respondent in a normative form. This information is of 
great importance to accomplish the objectives of the research. The data 
collected by questionnaires in this project mainly included the following 
contents: 
 Demographic characteristics of respondents and their household 
members;  
 Land use practice and willingness to land transfer/change; 
 Inputs and outputs of agricultural production;  
 Livestock raising information; 
 Off-farm economic activities, income and expenditure ; 
 Migration and agricultural production (for migrant households). 
To seize opportunities to investigate the “why” questions, some open-ended 
Advantages  
• Low cost in terms of both time and money. 
• The inflow of data is quick and from many people. 
• Respondents can complete the questionnaire at a 
time and place that suits them.  
• Data analysis of closed questions is relatively simple, 
and questions can be coded quickly. 
• Respondents’ anonymity can be assured.  
• There is a lack of interviewer bias.  
Disadvantages 
• Researchers cannot prompt the interviewees.  
• Researchers cannot probe the questions. 
• Researchers cannot ask many questions that are not 
salient to respondents. 
• Don’t know who answers the questions. 
• Cannot collect additional data. 
• Not appropriate for some kind of respondents.  
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questions were also attached in the questionnaire (see Appendix B).   
Before the formal survey is conducted, a pilot survey is essential.  As 
Straits and Singleton (2011) recommended, a pilot survey can pretest 
whether the methodological instrument fits the purpose of the research and if 
a revision is needed, for example, with a smaller sample size. After a pilot 
survey, the researcher will know if the respondents can fully understand the 
survey questions, and if the questions are really appropriate for gaining 
requisite information (Straits and Singleton, 2011; Robson, 2011).  In this 
project, a pilot survey with 20 respondents was conducted to test the 
questionnaire. This procedure showed that the pilot study was essential to fit 
the questions to the social reality of the case study site. For example, in the 
previous draft, questions about labour input were designed to estimate how 
much labour a farmer had invested in farming in 2011. However, the pilot 
study showed that in practice the labour inputs of farmers were so 
complicated and confused, it was impossible to be quantified accurately. To 
ask the questions was also very time-consuming. So these questions were 
cut away, and for the labour input issue, general information was collected 
during interviews with experienced farmers and village cadres. Besides, in 
the previous draft, several questions had been designed to ask about the 
farmers’ participation with different agricultural policies. After the pilot survey, 
it was found that all the farmers surveyed were involved in the agricultural 
policies listed on the questionnaire, and the attitudes to the policies were very 
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similar. For example, all of the twenty respondents showed that the most 
favourable policy was the agricultural subsidy. Therefore, it was decided to 
collect qualitative information through in-depth interview and focus groups 
rather than quantitative data on rates of participation. Survey questions 
related to policies were also removed from questionnaires, to be explored 
through semi-structured interviews and focus groups.  
Questionnaire survey using face-to-face interviews  
According to implemental instruments, questionnaire survey is generally 
classified into various types including paper-and-pencil questionnaires, 
internet questionnaires, face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews 
(Czaja and Blair, 2005; Straits and Singleton, 2011). Each has its own 
advantages and disadvantages and is applied differently based on specific 
research conditions. The aim of the interview-based questionnaires is to give 
all interviewees the same context of questioning, which means that each 
interviewee receives the same interview stimulus as any other. Bryman (2008) 
argued that the goal of this type of interview was to aggregate the 
respondents’ answers. One significant advantage of a face-to-face survey is a 
high response rate (Straits and Singleton, 2011). In addition, face-to-face 
interviews are more feasible when the research is geographically limited to a 
particular area (Robson, 2011). Another merit of the face-to-face interview is 
that some open-ended questions, as well as closed questions on the 
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questionnaire, can be approached during interviews (Robson, 2011). 
Furthermore, there is no time limit for interviews and so more complex 
questions can be added when interviewing (Straits and Singleton, 2011).  
Nevertheless, there are also potential limitations associated with face-
to-face questionnaire surveying. As Bryman (2008) commented, the 
characteristics of interviewers can exert effects on the interviewees’ replies. 
For example, the ethnicity of interviewer may significantly influence the 
answers of respondents. In other words, the age, social background, gender, 
and prior experience of interviewers can be elements which limit the potential 
of the interview effect (David and Sutton, 2004). Another disadvantage of 
face-to-face interviews is the so called “response set” which implies that 
“people respond to the series of questions in a consistent way but one that is 
irrelevant to the concept being measured” (Bryman, 2008: 210).  
For this research, face-to-face interviews were selected to be more 
appropriate than any other questionnaire survey types. The education level of 
the farmers in Hu Village is relatively low, many of them are illiterate, so that it 
is impractical to distribute questionnaires among them and collect later. In 
addition, the respondents in rural China cannot yet be comprehensively 
reached by email or telephone. Therefore, it is more feasible to interact with 
them and for the questionnaires to be completed there and then by the 
researcher. 
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Questionnaire sampling  
Sampling is a particularly important aspect of social research, as generally 
people, places and events are understood based on fragmentary evidence 
from samples rather than research of all cases (Robson, 2011). In sampling, a 
sample is connected with a “population” which refers to all the cases, and 
sampling means selecting a segment of population for investigation (Bryman, 
2008; Robson, 2011). According to Parfitt (1997), three attributes of the target 
population can be identified: a geographical boundary, a temporal boundary 
and a boundary defined by population characteristics. In this project, the land 
use and agricultural activities in China are still organised mutually by family 
members rather than individual farmers, so that the “household” is a more 
appropriate survey unit for agricultural production than individuals. Therefore, 
the “population” of this research can be defined as all the 886 households 
officially registered in contemporary Hu Village.  
For the questionnaire survey in this project, interviewing every 
household of Hu Village would be extremely time-consuming; therefore, an 
appropriate sample can be helpful to make the research practical. According 
to whether the selection of each respondent is known or not, sampling is 
generally classified into two types: probability sampling and non-probability 
sampling (Parfitt, 1997; Sarantakos, 2005; Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011). In 
probability sampling, the sample can be taken as representative of the 
population, while in non-probability sampling, statistical inferences are hardly 
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made but specific findings from the sample can be of great value. In practice, 
probability sampling needs a sampling frame, namely a list of all members of 
the population, whereas this is not essential for non-probability sampling. As 
two groups of sampling strategies, each of them has different sub-methods 
which are shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Probability Sampling 
Source: Adapted from Parfitt, 1997:96, 97; Sarantakos, 2005:160,161; 
Bryman, 2008: 171.  
 
 
 
Simple random sampling 
With random sampling, each unit of the population has an equal probability of 
inclusion in the sample. All the population members are listed and numbered for 
random selection.  
Systematic sampling 
This sampling draws a probability sample from a sampling frame. The start point 
should be randomly selected by numbering the beginning section of the list and 
selecting a number using the random number generator on a calculator. The sampling 
interval is then added to the number of the randomly selected member to identify 
sample number two. The process is repeated until the required sample has been 
drawn. 
Stratified sampling 
The population is divided into homogeneous groups whose relative size is known and 
which must be mutually exclusive. A random sampling can be taken in each stratum, 
either proportionately or disproportionately. 
Cluster sampling  
Cluster sampling is a procedure in which the researcher chooses the study units 
progressively, beginning with clusters and moving to smaller groups within them, 
before the final sampling units are considered. This method is employed primarily 
when a sampling frame is either unsuitable or not available.  
Multi-stage sampling  
The sample is drawn in more than one stage, usually after stratification by region and type of 
district.  
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Figure 3.3 Non-Probability Sampling 
Source: Adapted from Sarantakos, 2005: 164,165; Robson, 2011:274,275.  
As presented in Figure 3.2, cluster sampling was utilised in this 
research to select respondents, primarily to avoid any geographical or socio-
economic bias and to ensure the survey can cover the whole village. In 
practice, Hu Village has been officially divided into 8 individual groups 
according to landscapes and socio-economic characteristics. The numbers of 
residents of each group are also slightly different. For the sake of efficiency 
and convenience, each group is sampled in sequence and the sample size of 
each group was supposed to be 30 households, the minimum figure justified 
to represent the population statistically. 
In addition, to improve the representative nature of the methods, 30 
households were randomly chosen. The actual practice proved that to sample 
Quota sampling 
In quota sampling, the researcher sets a quota of sample to be selected from specific 
population groups, decides the criteria of choice and the size.  
Convenience sampling  
This sampling involves choosing the nearest and most convenient individuals as 
respondents. This process is continued until the required sample size has been 
reached. This method is widely used but least satisfactory.  
Purposive sampling  
The researcher chooses subjects with their own judgments. The sample is selected to 
satisfy the researcher’s specific needs.  
Snowball sampling 
With snowball sampling, the research a few individuals from the population and then 
ask them to recommend more other respondents in the population. This is useful when 
it is difficult to identifying members of the population.  
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group by group was of great necessity because the major livelihoods and 
forms of agricultural production are distinctive among groups. And this 
sampling strategy was well-suited to capture the diversity and heterogeneity of 
Hu Village. For instance, Group 1 and Group 8 occupy most sericulture3 
households, while most fish farming households agglomerate in Group 2.  
Regarding the wealth of households, although there are slight 
differences in terms of geographical situation and livelihoods, there is no 
striking difference among the 8 groups according to interviews with village 
cadres. All groups have wealthy households and poor households. For 
example, Group 3 has very convenient transportation links as many of its 
households live along the road and therefore has easy access to their place of 
business, while people from Group 8 can reach a similar level of wealth 
through rural-urban migration.  Poor households, according to village cadre 
estimates, never crowd in any particular group or groups but are relatively 
equally dispersed across all 8 groups.  
In terms of sample size, as Bryman (2008) has suggested, sampling 
error, time and cost, as well as the non-response rate can affect the sample 
size. For Hu Village in this research, the sample size was 30 households from 
each group, therefore 240 samples for the whole village were the target. 
Furthermore, a survey of 240 households was also affordable and appropriate 
for this project.  
In practice, the survey was often interrupted by incidents, as farmers 
                                                             
3
 Sericulture is silk farming, which is to raise silkworm for the production of silk.  
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have their own lives and schedules, and a complete interview was often a 
lucky coincidence. Once the questionnaire survey was interrupted, the 
procedure was halted immediately and another visit was requested for a later 
date.  It might happen that upon revisit, the respondents provide different 
information from previous visits or forget the information provided before. To 
deal with this situation, the previous information was repeated to the 
respondents and was confirmed by them from the very beginning before the 
rest of the survey questions were completed. There were also some farmers 
who refused to be interviewed at the very start. The reasons why they refused 
can be identified through the frequent complaints from them: the interview was 
of no use to them, so they didn’t want to waste time on it. Another reason 
given is also noteworthy. Some respondents regarded me as a cheater or a 
salesman (of fodder, fertilizer, pesticide, medicine, insurance and so on) 
because they had been previously cheated or knew someone else who had 
been cheated by someone who misrepresented themselves. Even though 
every effort was made to explain the focus of the current research to them, in 
some cases they were still reluctant to accept to be interviewed. According to 
the ethics informing this study (see Section 3.5), their choices were 
understood and respected. These cases were recorded as refused 
respondents. Having covered all 8 groups, 225 questionnaires were effectively 
accomplished, 10 were refused due to the reasons summarised above, 5 
were invalid. Of the 5 invalid cases, 4 are uncompleted because of the 
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respondents migrating to cities for temporary work at the time of revisiting, 
which also indicated the mobility of farmers. The last case was unfinished 
because the respondent unfortunately passed away and all his family 
members moved out. 
3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Different from a questionnaire survey, interviews are more unstructured or 
semi-structured and take a conversational and fluid form (Valentine, 1997). 
Generally, interviews are classified into three categories: structured, 
unstructured and semi-structured (Sarantakos, 2005). As discussed above, 
questionnaire surveys can use a face-to-face format to accomplish the 
investigation, which amounts to structured interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews lie between the structured and unstructured forms, and the degree 
to which interviews are structured relies on the research topics, purposes and 
so forth (Robson, 2011). Semi-structured interviews are widely used in flexible 
and multi-strategy studies.  
As one of the most frequently used methods of data collection,     
interviews possess many advantages. For example, Valentine (1997) argued 
that a prominent strength of interviews is that they are more sensitive and 
people-oriented, giving more freedom to interviewees to organise their own 
opinions according to their specific experiences and interests. In addition, in 
contrast with questionnaires, semi-structured interviews are used to 
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understand how individual people experience and make sense of their own 
life, rather than to be representative. Valentine (1997) therefore proposed that 
in-depth interviews can be employed as part of multiple methods and are a 
good way to triangulate data. However, semi-structured or in-depth interviews 
can be problematic in some respects. The most significant point is interviewer 
bias, which implies that the respondents may give the answer that they think 
the interviewer wants (Denscombe, 2003).  Therefore, to conduct a valid and 
reliable in-depth interview, as Bryman (2008) recommended, confidential, 
trustable and honest relationships between the researcher and interviewees 
need to be carefully built up.  As for how to select the interviewees, semi-
structured interviews often adopt purposive sampling techniques to select the 
interviewees. As introduced in Figure 3.3, purposive sampling is where 
researchers actively choose samples, so that the sample is selected to satisfy 
researchers’ specific objectives. 
For this project, semi-structured interviews were employed as a tool to 
collect various strands of qualitative data (see Appendix C). There are multiple 
and heterogeneous stakeholders in the agricultural arena of China, including 
farmers, government officials, agricultural experts, commercial marketers and 
so forth. All these actors actively participate in the process of agricultural 
production. Therefore, semi-structured interviews can be very appropriate to 
collect various voices from different groups of people. During fieldwork, 
interviewees were chosen by different approaches and conditions. For 
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farmers’ interviews, respondents were selected through the questionnaire 
survey because this way a brief picture of the farmer household could be 
considered in terms of their utility to the research objectives. In practice, when 
encountering an interesting and typical case in survey, like sericulture 
household, pig breeding household or part-time farming household, a further 
in-depth interview was requested. Yet, this approach was not suitable for 
interviewing migrant farmers because generally, migrant farmers were not at 
home when the interview was conducted in their houses.  Snowball sampling 
strategy was adopted here. As Ruane (2005) argued, snowball sampling 
refers to the fact that researchers first make contacts and build trustful 
relationships with contacts, and then asks the contact for other possible 
respondents or participants. Through personal connections with village 
cadres, who knew the villagers much better, the researcher was able to ask 
for migrant farmers to be introduced when they came back home. Migrants 
were selected with a view to maintaining diversity in different characteristics 
such as age, sex, migrant experiences and family backgrounds and so on.  To 
avoid any socio-economic and geographical bias, the in-depth interviews in 
Hu Village covered all 8 groups. The list of all the in-depth interviews is 
presented in Table 3.2 as follows. To interview village cadres was relatively 
convenient because the contact person in the village is the village head, and 
she was able to introduce me to other cadres. Due to the Chinese special 
bureaucracy system, it was not easy to conduct interviews with government 
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officials who are generally reluctant to speak out in their own words and ideas 
to a stranger (a researcher studying in a foreign university). 
Table 3.1 Stakeholder Interviews 
Stakeholders 
Interviewee 
Numbers 
Information Acquired 
Village cadres 3  Agricultural policies, governmental 
projects, contract farming, village 
socio-economic and cultural 
changes. 
Different types of Farmers 15 Livelihoods arrangements, attitudes 
and strategies to agriculture, life or 
family biographies. 
Migrant farmers (being in Hu 
Village when fieldwork was 
conducted) 
10 Migrant experiences, attitudes and 
strategies to agricultural production, 
future plans. 
Businessmen(conducting contract 
farming in Hu Village) 
2 Contract farming, relationships with 
farmers, life biographies.  
Township-level officials  
(one is agricultural official,  
another is forestry official ) 
2 Agricultural policies and forestry 
policies.  
County-level  
agricultural bureau official 
1 Information of the whole counties 
agriculture, contemporary policies, 
future directions. 
 Source: Author 
Under these circumstances, connections must be utilised. Through the 
village head and a friend in the county, one interview was conducted 
successfully with a township official, and two with county-level agricultural 
bureau officers. An interview request was refused by two county-level officers, 
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and to acquire the information, I had to search the internet for information from 
their departments, which was obviously of weaker quality.  Additionally, some 
important information providers (like village cadres and experienced farmers) 
were interviewed repeatedly.  
3.4.3 Focus groups 
Focus groups have been a well-established tool for collecting data in social 
research. This approach brings a group of people together to discuss a 
specific topic through open-ended questions (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999; 
Sarantakos, 2005; Robson, 2011). Focus groups aim to provide a forum to 
facilitate group discussion, brainstorm solutions and eventually establish a 
mechanism of opinion formation rather than to analyse the group (Sarantakos, 
2005). Therefore, this method can provide a communal atmosphere to 
stimulate different opinions and exchange different ideas. As identified by 
Robson (2011), focus groups have a number of advantages, for instance, it is 
very efficient to collect data from several people at the same time; group 
dynamics facilitate focus on the most important topics; participants are 
empowered and able to make comments in their own words and with stimulus 
from others. Nonetheless, several disadvantages can also be identified: the 
number of questions is limited; conflicts may arise between different 
personalities; the results are not easy to generalise; the facilitator needs more 
skills and experience to control and lead the discussion process and so on 
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(Robson, 2011).  
Conducting focus groups is a complex process involving at least four 
procedures: planning, recruiting, moderating and analysing (Morgan, 1998; 
Hoggart et al., 2002). As Sarantakos (2005) argued, three aspects need 
special attention in focus groups. The first is group selection, which greatly 
relies on the specific purpose of the research. The size of the group is also 
varied, but practically the proper size of a group is around five to ten 
individuals which can both provide a basis for sound discussion and allow for 
personal contracts among participants (Hoggart et al., 2002). The second is 
introducing the goal-oriented discussion. A skilful facilitator is needed to 
present an appropriate introduction to the participants. The third is guiding the 
discussion. In this process, the skills of motivation, encouragement, 
stimulation and control are all vital to guiding the discussion towards the 
research goals.  
For this project, focus groups were helpful in collecting data about 
different farmers’ viewpoints and behaviour regarding a specific issue such as 
an agricultural policy. Rural residents are very heterogeneous groups in terms 
of age, gender, economic situation, family constitution, livelihoods and so on. 
Individuals’ information can be collected through questionnaires and in-depth 
interviews, but how their ideas and decision-making come into formation is 
difficult to be obtained through the previous methods. Focus groups can 
provide farmers from different backgrounds with a chance to present and 
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exchange their ideas. The author was also able to get a better understanding 
of the underlying reasoning and logics behind of different farmers’ actions. 
The choice of groups depended on specific topics. Farmers’ daily lives in the 
countryside are fluid and free-running, often with little routine, and farmers’ 
houses in Hu Village are widely dispersed. It is thus unrealistic to organise 
several farmers to sit together in a fixed place. Therefore, each focus group 
was organised at an open area between their locations where many people 
could easily access, and the discussion was started in the evening when the 
villagers are free from farming and other businesses. Before the discussion, 
participants were informed of the purpose of the discussion to ensure that 
they fully understood what they were going to do.   
According to the research questions, 7 focus groups were conducted 
as shown in Table 3.2. To investigate if different genders have different 
opinions and behaviours regarding agricultural production, male farmers and 
female farmers were organised separately to make a comparison, as gender 
can be a factor that influences attitudes towards agricultural practices (Ye and 
Wu, 2008). A mixed gender group was organised to directly observe how 
farmers with different genders present and discuss their opinions, which also 
sheds light on the gender relationship and how it influences agricultural 
production. As suggested by Ye and He (2008), to examine the attitudes and 
opinions of farmers with different ages towards agricultural production and 
family livelihoods, a group of young farmers and an elderly group were 
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organised to make a comparison.  
Table 3.2 Focus Group Interviews of Hu Village 
Participants Participant numbers Focus issues 
Male farmers (aged from 
42 to 67) 
6 
Land use change, land 
transfer, migration, 
agricultural policies, social-
cultural changes 
Female farmers (aged from 
35 to 70) 
5 
Labour division in family, 
land use change, 
migration, agricultural 
policies, social and cultural 
changes 
Mixed with both male and 
female farmers 
6 
Land use change, land 
transfer, migration, 
agricultural policies, social-
cultural changes 
Young farmers  
(aged under 30) 
8 
Agricultural production, 
migration, family 
relationships, future life 
plans 
Elderly farmers 
(aged from 60) 
5 
Land use change, land 
transfer, agricultural 
development, cultural 
changes, family 
relationships 
Migrant farmers (who  
were back to the village at 
that time) 
5 
Migration, Hukou system, 
farming, social and cultural 
changes 
Residents without land 5 
Rural policies, agricultural 
development, livelihoods 
diversification 
Village cadres 4 
Agricultural policies, 
projects, land use and 
transfer, rural development  
 Source: Author 
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In addition, a group of migrant farmers was organised to examine how 
rural-urban migration changes farmers’ attitudes and opinions towards 
agricultural production and rural development as suggested by Murphy 
(2002). Because the other groups are all non-migrant farmers, the comparison 
can be made between them so that no extra non-migrant group was 
organised. In Hu Village, there are quite a few residents who have no land for 
various reasons, and a focus group of them was organised to discuss and 
examine what the land means to them and other issues related to rural 
policies, agricultural development and so on. The last group is the village 
cadre group. There are four formal village cadres in Hu Village, and a group 
discussion was organised to examine their views on agricultural policies, 
projects and land use issues. To avoid geographical bias, these focus groups 
covered farmers from all the 8 groups of Hu Village.  
3.4.4 Participant observation 
Participant observation is one of the central techniques for qualitative 
researchers to collect data in social research. As Cook (1997: 127-128) 
defined, participant observation  
Involves researchers moving between participating in a community—by 
deliberately immersing themselves in its everyday rhythms and routines, 
developing relationships with people who can show and tell them what is 
‘going on’ there, and writing accounts of how these relationships 
developed and what was leaned from them—and observing a 
community—by sitting back and watching activities which unfold in front 
of their eyes, recording their impressions of these activities in field notes, 
tallies, drawings, photographs and other forms of material evidence.  
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Participant observation is very useful in circumstances when researchers want 
to understand “events/processes that take a reasonably short time”, “frequent 
events”, “activities that are accessible to observers”, “when your prime 
motivation is to find out what is going on”, and “when you are not short of 
time” (Robson, 2011: 321).The core of this method is to generate data through 
observing and listening to people in their natural settings, and to uncover the 
social meanings and interpretations of their behaviours (Gray, 2009). 
Sarantakos (2005) summarised the most important characteristics of this 
method from other writers as in Figure 3.4 below. The most particular is that 
the observer attempts to be a member of the observed to communicate and 
interact with them (Robson, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Main Characteristics of (Qualitative) Participant Observation 
 
Source: Adapted from Sarantakos, 2005:231 
Participant observation owns several distinct advantages. One of the 
Qualitative participant observation: 
 Demonstrates a commitment to studying everyday events, which 
are studied in terms of the way they are experienced and 
understood by the participants. 
 Is conducted in a natural environment. In this sense, observation 
remains natural and authentic. 
 Observation is designed to study social events under all 
conditions, bringing data close to reality, the people living in it 
and the way they construct and experience it.  
 Sets data collection within face-to-face interaction. 
 Constructs data collection in an unstructured mode. 
 Employs open and flexible methods. 
 Perceives reality as constructed through the interaction and communication of the 
participants. 
 Address reality in an interpretive manner. 
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most prominent is directness, which means researchers directly watch what 
people do and listen to what they say (Robson, 2011). The directness can 
make it clear what people are doing rather than what they are saying. Other 
merits of participant observation include: providing data when respondents are 
unable to offer information; offering first-hand data; allowing the collection of a 
wide range of information (Sarantakos, 2005); effective at observing non-
verbal behaviours; allowing for a more natural relationship between 
researcher and respondent (Gray, 2009). Nonetheless, participant observation 
is also open to the criticism of possible bias and subjectivity from the 
researcher (Robson, 2011). 
Participant observation generally involves three steps: access, roles 
and writing up data (Cook, 1997). As for access, the best advice is that the 
researcher should try to make the most of contacts which he/she already has 
and prepare to be flexible with any others (Cook, 1997). For the roles of 
researchers, there are various relationships or positions that researchers may 
develop, which also influences the outcome of observations. As Straits and 
Singleton (2011) argued, the degree of participation of researchers can range 
from complete observer without any participation at one extreme, to the 
researcher being a complete participant as a fully accepted member of the 
community, at the other. Participant observation is located between the two 
extremes, and the researcher needs to balance roles of being both a scientific 
observer and a member of the observed. The generally appropriate position of 
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researchers is, as Cook (1997:140) suggested, as an “intelligent, sympathetic, 
and non-judgmental listener” to all other members. 
A good way to construct research data from participant observation is 
in the form of a field diary, or field notes, which records what the observer has 
observed, heard, smelt or physically felt (Hoggart et al., 2002). The field diary 
is very valuable to the whole research project, especially at the beginning 
“when interpretations of events and processes are more tentative” (Hoggart et 
al., 2002: 279).  
Participant observation is suitable for this project in many respects. 
This project attempts to investigate not only what farmers say but also what 
they do in real life. Participant observation can effectively achieve this goal. 
There are various processes and events taking place on the stage of 
agricultural production in Hu Village, like policies, projects, migration and so 
on, which can be observed and recorded through observation.  In fieldwork, 
the researcher lived with an elderly couple in Hu Village for six months, which 
provided me an opportunity for full-time immersion in rural village life. 
Meanwhile, being a son of two farmers from another remote place in China, 
the researcher is well-placed for living in the countryside and understanding 
the joys and sorrows of farmers’ daily lives. As for the “role” played in this 
village, every attempt was made to be, as Cook (1997) recommended, a non-
judgmental listener, or more specifically, an ordinary villager. It is common that 
in Chinese villages, if someone appears as a government official or expert or 
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rich businessman, the farmers generally act in a constrained manner so that 
any observation would be hardly true or valid. This situation was largely 
avoided in the current research through constantly informing villagers of the 
status of the researcher as a student here to do a PhD project on agricultural 
production in Hu Village. To avoid detaching from the villagers and to build a 
friendly relationship, I kept participating in their daily lives by means of 
greeting, chatting and farming with them. It showed that to work with them in 
the field and observe their farming and chatting was very favourable to build a 
relationship. Meanwhile, my contact, the village head, provided great help. 
She showed me around the village and introduced me to the villagers, 
informing them of my background and purpose. The introduction conveyed to 
villagers an important message: this researcher was one of them, and 
specifically was not a government official. As for the degree of participation, 
fieldwork is neither completely detached observation, nor fully involved 
participation (Straits and Singleton, 2011), so that a balance between an 
observer and a village young man was presented. To avoid full immersion, 
when I worked or did something with villagers, or just observed, I kept 
reminding myself that I am a researcher to investigate how agricultural 
production is going on here. To ensure accuracy and objectivity (see Section 
3.5), I kept writing the field diary every day to avoid the problems incurred by 
fading memories making comments and feelings become inaccurate. One 
piece of the dairy is shown in Figure 3.5.   
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Figure 3.5 Research Dairy 
Source: Author 
3.4.5 Secondary data 
Secondary data is information which has been collected by someone else and 
is available for other researchers to scrutinise. Secondary data is frequently 
collected by official public bodies, like governments, which provides “an 
authoritative air which can be both reassuring and beguiling” (Clark, 1997: 
57). Official statistics are one of the most frequently used sources of 
secondary data, and other secondary data sources include business records, 
personal papers, academic research and so on (Bryman, 2008). 
Human geographers have used secondary data for a long time, and the 
reasons are multiple as summarised by Clark (1997). Firstly, secondary data 
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provides an important guide to the geography of research topics, telling 
researchers what an area is like now and what it was like in the past. 
Secondly, secondary data provides a context (geographical, historical, social 
and economic) for the primary data which is being collected in a case study.  
Bryman (2008) has also added other advantages, for example, secondary 
data provides opportunities for longitudinal analysis and cross-cultural 
analysis.  
There are also several limitations to the use of secondary data. As 
Clark (1997) argued, secondary data may be so inflexible that it cannot fit to 
your needs. Another is that the value behind data is different from a current 
approach, because “secondary data is a cultural artifact, produced by 
administrators with priorities and ways of seeing the world which may be 
different from those which underpin your dissertation” (Cook, 1997: 59). 
Particularly for official statistics, Hoggart et al. (2002) reminded us that 
accuracy could not be guaranteed and official statistics are often political 
outputs as they are important mechanisms of evaluating governments’ 
performance. Additionally, Bryman (2008) pointed out there is little or no 
control over the quality of secondary data. All the possible areas for bias 
mentioned above serves as a reminder for researchers to use secondary data 
carefully and cautiously.  
Regarding this project, several secondary data sources provided a 
great deal of information to supplement the data from other methods. Several 
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sources of secondary data have been utilised as shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 Secondary Data Sources of this Research 
 
Secondary data Sources Usage 
Official statistics on 
agricultural production at 
different geographical 
levels 
Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook 
Government websites 
Village committee 
General political, 
socio-economic 
backgrounds for 
different geographical-
levels  
Policy posters  
 
Village committee 
 
Details of policies 
implemented in Hu 
Village 
Newspapers(various 
newspapers focusing on 
this province, county ) 
Village committee 
Government’s views 
of rural development 
Stories from other 
places 
Village pictures  Author 
Village presentation 
Farmers daily life 
 Source: Author 
The official statistics record various socio-economic characteristics 
about a whole region, from a country to a community. This type of statistics 
can be accessed in all kinds of yearbooks, and on government websites as 
well. They are very valuable for portraying the general socio-economic trends 
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of a region.  The official household data of Hu Village was collected by the 
leaders of 8 groups, and the village head estimated that 90% of the data is 
precise. Policy posters and newspapers were obtained from the Hu Village 
committee. Policy posters present the contents of different agricultural 
policies. Local newspapers give a good presentation of levels of socio-
economic development and policy implementation from the perspective of 
governments. Village pictures can vividly present village life, and this is a 
good source for illustrating the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the 
village. Some pieces of pictures are shown in Figure 3.6.  
 
Figure3.6 Pictures of Hu Village 
Source: Author 
village office 
village landscape  
village advertisement 
village road 
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A summary of all research methods used is listed in Appendix D.  
3.5 Ethical issues 
3.5.1 Being ethical in social research 
Values are inevitably implicated in any social research.  “Research takes 
place within a context where certain interests and values often predominate to 
the exclusion of others” (May, 2001: 67); therefore, how researchers handle 
the relationship between the subjects and other stakeholders is relevant to the 
issue of ethics in social research. Ethics is concerned with principles about 
what is right or just in social research processes (May, 2001). In practice, 
ethics refers to conformity to a code or set of guidelines (Robson, 2011). 
Social research ethics focuses on the moral deliberation, choices and 
responsibilities of researchers (Homan, 1991; Mauthner et al., 2002). One 
way to approach ethics in social research is deontology which instructs that: 
Approaches to morality are associated with the work of Immanuel Kant. 
Quite simply, ethical judgments in social research would, from this point 
of view, follow a set of principles which guide the conduct of research 
itself (May, 2001: 60). 
One principle related with deontology is “informed consent” which refers to a 
freely given agreement on the part of the researched to become a subject of 
the research. More specifically, four elements, constituting “informed” and 
“consent”, can be identified (Homan, 1991: 71): 
Informed= 
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1. that all pertinent aspects of what is to occur and what might occur are 
disclosed to the subject; 
2. that the subject should be able to comprehend this information. 
Consent= 
3. that the subject is competent to make a rational and mature judgment; 
4. that the agreement to participate should be voluntary, free from coercion 
and undue influence.  
To obtain participant consent in research, several steps have been suggested 
by researchers. As Robson (2011: 202) summarised, four steps can be 
identified:  
1. To explain what the research is about to participants;  
2. To let them know they can have time to think about participation;  
3. To provide participants with a consent form;  
4. To check and double-check with participants that they fully understand 
the research, their role in the study, and any implications it has for 
them.  
In addition, the researcher needs also to consider any consequences of 
the data after it is published and open to the public. The identity of any 
participant should be protected in every research stage. The privacy of the 
participants is another important issue for social researchers. In an 
information society, people increasingly care about their privacy. It represents 
a great challenge for the researchers to persuade people to participate in 
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social research. However, if researchers grasp the opportunity and keep the 
promise of protecting privacy, then “this not only helps to prevent social 
research becoming a mouthpiece of powerful vested interests, but also assists 
in maintaining public cooperation and trust in social research” (May, 2001: 62).  
A large number of participants were involved in this project, including 
various rural residents, government officials, commercial marketers and 
developers. Among those actors, different values, customs, religions, 
knowledge levels and power positions will be implicated in the research 
process. In addition, methodologically, multiple methods were adopted from 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Diverse participants and 
research methods make ethical issues a serious concern in every stage of this 
project.   
First of all, to stay respectful towards every participant is the most 
fundamental basis for this research, without any bias and discrimination 
towards any participant from any background. In rural villages, various 
relationships regarding power, family, affinity, kin and religion are so 
ubiquitous that great attention has to be paid to how research affects these 
relations. For example, farmers and cadres in the communities hold unequal 
power positions, but all of them deserve equal respect. In addition, privacy is a 
basic right for everyone, so in the whole process of the current research, the 
privacy of every participant was respected and any intrusion of their privacy 
was minimised. 
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Maintaining confidentiality is an effective way to protect the identity of 
participants. Researchers have an obligation to protect confidential 
information from participants. In this research, many are not aware of the 
importance of taking care of their own confidential information. For example, 
some farmers sometimes were so sincere that they told lots of private 
information, but information for long-term use has been carefully selected. 
Anonymity of sources is helpful to protect confidential information. In reporting 
the project and in any further publication, personally identifiable information 
concerning participants of this project will not be disclosed.  
All the participants deserve to know the research purpose and the 
interests behind it in order to decide to accept to be interviewed. The 
agreement of the participants was gained prior to conducting the research 
procedures. The researcher was also honestly open to any questions that 
participants proposed during the research project, giving opportunities for 
them to question any aspects of this research.  
3.5.2 Reflexivity 
Pursuit of truth is a fundamental feature of professional research and 
this is also the basic expectation of professional researchers by the public. 
Therefore, honesty to the truth is a cherished virtue for researchers (Homan, 
1991). The values and beliefs of researchers will probably influence the 
pursuit of truth, as Homan (1991: 7) reminded us, “social researchers who feel 
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passionately about inequalities in respect of class, race and gender may be 
promoted by their concern to devote their energies to researching these 
problems”.  Bearing this in mind, I faithfully recorded what I found by research 
methods on one hand, and kept thinking about and reflecting on my values 
and my position in the whole process, in order to minimise the influence of 
personal values and biases. Another way to avoid subjectivity is to diversify 
the information sources, which can provide multiple discourses and avoid 
unilateralism in data collection (Homan, 1991). Moreover, the implementation 
of research methods can influence the validity and reliability of data. During 
fieldwork, I tried to accurately operate the research methods to ensure the 
procedures were as objective as possible.  
Another important point is the position of the researcher in the field, 
especially for research adopting the methodology of participant observation. In 
this research, I had to balance the roles of a PhD student, researcher, friend, 
learner, young man and tenant of the elderly couple where I resided and so 
on. In addition, my previous experience in Hu Village in 2009 gave me great 
confidence to enter and live in this village. I knew a few villagers well, I visited 
them frequently and we became friends afterwards. To avoid any ethical 
deception, at the very beginning, I frankly and honestly informed people of my 
purpose. This informed understanding built a more trustful and honest 
relationship, and we could discuss various issues related to my project. In 
addition, to avoid distraction from personal relationships, the research agenda 
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included diverse other information sources to further promote objectivity. This 
did not influence the personal relationships, for I was fully aware that 
everyone has his/her own standpoints and owns different options for actions, 
which was totally understood and respected. For instance, the village head is 
a good friend of mine. She helped me a lot in the whole process, e.g. 
accessing the secondary data, introducing me to villagers, sharing viewpoints 
with me, inviting me to participate in various village events and so on. In spite 
of that, I still kept clear that she is the village leader, and her views may be 
different from those of other villagers, and in the interviews and observations I 
did find voices very different from hers. But this did not influence the 
relationship between us, it just gave me more complete understanding of 
some issues.  
The last point is that having undertaken a 6-month fieldwork period, I 
have learnt that participating or experiencing in person is indeed an essential 
way to understand. Through participating in rice transplanting under the 
scorching sun, carrying buckets of manure to fields far away, threshing rape 
by hand, collecting mulberry leaves on rainy days, and feeding pigs in smelly 
pigsties, I really understand why so many rural youths don’t want to farm, and 
really respect that farmers here are enduring such hard work in unfavourable 
environments to make a living for themselves and for the next generation. The 
fieldwork was both a research agenda and an unforgettable lesson for me.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed and set up the research methodology of this project. A 
general discussion on methodological approaches in social sciences was 
firstly reviewed. Then, multi-methods approach combining quantitative and 
qualitative approaches was justified for this research project. This chapter 
then explained the rationale of a case study as the core research approach for 
this project, and Hu Village as the study site was justified based on five 
reasons. A significant part was then given to discuss the specific research 
methods of data collection employed in this project. Questionnaires, semi-
structured and focus group interviews, participant observation and secondary 
data were introduced in detail. Finally, an indispensable issue, ethics, in social 
research was discussed, and then several concrete ethical principles used in 
this project were discussed specifically. Data analysis will be presented and 
discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 4 Chinese Agricultural 
Production at Different Geographical 
Levels: An Overview 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis adopts the “new political economy” 
approach to bridge the gap between macro-level political economic 
structures/forces and micro-level individuals’ agency within rural studies. 
Agricultural production is not an isolated sector, but is embedded in the whole 
socio-economic, environmental, and political structures of the corresponding 
and broader regions (Ploeg, 2006). More particularly, in the context of 
transitional China, agricultural production has been intensely interconnected 
with other processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, marketisation and 
so forth. This chapter provides the backdrop, or the “structures”, for 
agricultural production at different geographical levels, from national to 
community-level. Rather than merely focusing on agricultural production 
backgrounds, this chapter will firstly examine the position of agricultural 
production in the overall macro-economies at different geographical levels, 
and then, more deliberately focus on changes of the agricultural sector. The 
overview is following the scalar order from China, Sichuan Province, 
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Qingshen County, and finally to the local community, Hu Village. 
This chapter will draw on official statistics issued by government 
agencies at various levels to portray a general picture of socio-economic 
conditions and patterns. Official statistics can give general trends and 
magnitudes at the macro-level which other sources of statistics rarely achieve. 
As Guthrie (2009:19) remarked, “Official statistics are a good baseline for 
giving us a sense of things like how large the economy is, how much the 
economy has grown, per capita income, urban/rural differences, and so forth.”  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the general 
situation of Chinese agricultural production under the grand backdrop of the 
BRIC countries. Section 4.3 zooms in to the general picture of Sichuan 
Province referring to broader development patterns in Western China. This 
section shows that parallel changes in terms of socio-economic indicators and 
more especially, the agricultural sector, have occurred at the provincial level. 
Section 4.4 scales down to the county level, introducing Qingshen County’s 
basic situation with reference to socio-economic development, with particular 
emphasis on agricultural production, development strategies, rural-urban 
migration and so on. Section 4.5 specifically focuses on the research 
community, Hu Village, mainly introducing its basic agricultural system, 
agricultural policies and projects which have been conducted and which are 
being conducted in Hu Village. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Agricultural production in transitional China 
The four largest emerging market economies, Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China, have achieved dramatic growth in recent years and have been 
experiencing socio-economic transition at varying paces. As Table 4.1 shows, 
the four countries show different features and stages of economic 
development, in which China is situated differentially according to different 
indicators. In terms of population and GDP, China was far ahead of the other 
three in 2010. Regarding the per capita GDP, Russia and Brazil led the 
BRICs, while India had the least but also had a considerable growth rate. The 
per capita GDP varies greatly in the four counties: Russia had the highest 
figure, US$9910 in 2010, and India the smallest, US$1340 in 2010. Although 
with the largest GDP, China’s per capita was only in third place of the four in 
2010 due to her huge population.  From the composition of three sectors in 
the national economy, all the four countries have been increasingly moving 
from agriculture-based economies to industry- or tertiary-sector dominated 
economies, among which India still has held the largest share of the 
agricultural sector until 2010, while China is the largest industrial country in 
the four, and Brazil and Russia are more dominant in tertiary industries.  As for 
urbanisation rates (as measured by the proportion of the population who is 
urban), Brazil is the most urbanised country in the four, India the least, and 
China holds the third place. For agricultural population, China had the most 
farmers in the four countries in 2010 and followed by India, while Russian 
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farmers only represented 8.1% of the total population. 
Table 4.1 General Profile of BRIC Countries (2010) 
Selected 
Indicators 
Brazil Russia India China 
Population 
(10,000) 
19495 14175 117094 133830 
GDP 
(100 million 
dollar) 
20879 14798 17290 58786 
GDP growth 
rate 
compared 
with 2009 (%) 
7.5 4.3 10.1 10.3 
Per capita 
GDP 
(dollar) 
9390 9910 1340 4260 
Per capita 
GDP growth 
rate (%) 
6.6 3.4 8.3 9.7 
Primary 
sector as 
percentage of 
GDP (%) 
6.0 4.7 16.2 9.5 
Secondary 
sector as 
percentage of 
GDP (%) 
26.0 32.8 28.4 44.6 
Tertiary sector 
as percentage 
of GDP (%) 
68.0 62.5 55.4 45.9 
Urbanisation 
rate (%) 
86.5 72.8 30.1 44.9 
Agricultural 
population as 
percentage of 
total 
population 
(%) 
11.0 8.1 48.9 62.1 
Source: World Bank WDI Database; FAOSTAT; IMF WEO Database; NBSC, 
2011. 
 
BRIC countries have all been experiencing processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation to different degrees, in which China is an 
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outstanding case for her fast-growing economy and huge agricultural 
population. The following sub-sections will introduce what have occurred in 
transitional China since the comprehensive socio-economic reforms of 1978, 
from the perspective of agricultural production.  
4.2.1 Agricultural share in China’s national economy 
In the more than quarter-century-long transition process from planned 
economy to market system, China has already become one of the most 
rapidly-growing and largest economies on the planet in terms of GDP. The per 
capita income of both urban and rural residents has also grown substantially 
during the reform era. Industrialisation, urbanisation and marketisation are 
generally considered as the major engines of China’s economic miracle, and 
in the foreseeable future, these forces will continue to dominate China’s 
economy. Accompanied by remarkable economic growth and dramatic social 
transformation, Chinese agriculture has also experienced tremendous 
changes since more than thirty years ago. Although until now China has been 
considered as an agricultural country by and large, the composition of 
agriculture in the country’s GDP has gradually declined from about 28% in 
1978 to 10% in 2011. Other industries, most specifically the service sector, 
have substantially ascended over time as shown in Figure 4.1 (NBSC, 2012). 
Accordingly, China’s economy has also evolved from an agricultural economy 
into an industrial economy, which is vividly interpreted by the famous address: 
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“world factory”. 
 
Figure 4.1 Changes in Composition of China’s GDP: 1978-2011 (%) 
Source: NBSC (2012) 
4.2.2 Agricultural policy transformation 
At the initial stage of industrialisation, China’s agriculture was primarily 
subordinated to the primitive accumulation of industrial capital by means of 
price scissors of industrial and agricultural products and the unbalanced 
financial system (Huang and Ma, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004). Consequently, 
China’s agriculture has been largely constrained by the uneven development 
strategy which prioritised heavy industry.  Along with the agricultural share of 
the national economy diminishing and that of industry increasing, at the end of 
1998, the Chinese central government made a momentous decision which 
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meant that China’s agriculture entered into new stages. Since then, 
agriculture has been increasingly conditioned by new forms of resources and 
markets, so that agricultural and rural development strategies needed to be 
significantly adjusted. More recently, the national agricultural development 
strategies have also experienced dramatic transformations. On the fourth 
Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2004, President Hu 
Jintao for the very first time propounded “industry-repaying-agriculture” as a 
strategic policy direction for the future, which became a prelude to a series of 
favourable agricultural policies. The investment in agriculture has steadily 
increased year on year from 2004, as is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 National Fiscal Fund for Agriculture from 1985-2011 (billion 
Yuan in constant price) 
Source: NBSC (2012) 
In the wake of declining agricultural shares of GDP and the regressive 
contribution of agricultural taxes to the central fiscal budget, all agricultural 
taxes and fees were gradually eliminated by 2006 and direct subsidies to 
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farmers have commenced on a national scale since 2004. The amount of the 
subsidies has continuously increased over recent years (see Table 4.2). The 
motivation of central government behind agricultural subsidies, especially the 
direct grain subsidy, is to encourage farmers to cultivate grain crops to 
guarantee national food supply and simultaneously enhance framers’ income. 
Table 4.2 Percentage Composition and Magnitude of the Agricultural 
Subsidy of China: 2004-2009 
Year 
Direct 
grain 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Quality 
seeds 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Equipment 
Subsidy 
 
(%) 
 
Input 
Subsidy 
 
(%) 
Total 
grain 
Subsidy 
(billion 
Yuan) 
Share of 
agricultural 
Output 
       (%) 
2004 79.9 19.6 0.5 0 14.5 0.7 
2005 76.7 21.5 1.7 0 17.2 0.8 
2006 46.0 13.2 1.9 38.9 30.9 1.1 
2007 30.9 10.3 2.5 56.4 48.9 1.7 
2008 19.0 15.2 5.0 60.7 79.4 2.3 
2009 12.3 18.9 1.6 58.2 123.1 3.5 
Source: Lei (2012).  
Agricultural production, more precisely grain production, has been 
considered as the primary base of food security for China, which is also one of 
the top priorities in Chinese political issues. For the foreseeable future, it is 
safe to say that agricultural subsidy policy will carry on at increasingly larger 
levels according to various master plans or reports from central government, 
for example, the Chinese National Economy and Social Development Twelfth 
   
118 
 
Five-Year Plan Outline (2010-2015).   
In addition, China’s agricultural policy has also changed by integration 
into the world. China succeeded in acceding to WTO in 2001 after 15 years of 
long-lasting negotiations. To fulfil WTO protocol to accession, China has been 
obligated to further adjust policy regulations in the agricultural field. Chinese 
agricultural policies have been geared to international trade rules and 
dynamics, mainly including cutting tariffs of agricultural products and 
eliminating all export subsidies. Since accession to the WTO, Chinese 
agriculture has been more and more open to the world market. For instance, 
exports and imports related to agriculture have increased by 170% and 225% 
respectively from 2001 to 2008 (Carter et al., 2012). Trade patterns have also 
changed due to China’s comparative advantage in agricultural resource 
endowments on the international market. China’s comparative advantage is in 
labour-intensive agricultural production like horticulture, prepared foodstuffs, 
leather production, clothing and textiles and so on, while comparative 
disadvantage is land-intensive agricultural production such as edible oil, 
oilseeds, soybean and so on (Anderson et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2012).  For 
instance, China’s imports of soybean have increased rapidly from 1.1 million 
tons in 1996 to 54.8 million tons in 2010 (NBSC, 2011). In a broad sense, 
accession to the WTO has been an opportunity as well as a challenge for 
Chinese agriculture.   
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4.2.3 Structural changes of agricultural production 
Various forces have driven structural changes to agricultural production in 
China to a dramatic degree. The fast-growing economy, urbanisation and 
modernisation have changed Chinese consumption patterns, leading to the 
adjustments of agricultural structure. Huang and Rozelle (2009) commented 
that income rises of urban and rural residents, rapid urbanisation and the fast-
growing food markets have created further demand of meat, fruits and other 
non-staple foods in China. For instance, crop products have contributed 
decreasingly to agricultural gross produce, while livestock has continuously 
expanded from 15.5% in 1978 to 35.5% in 2008, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
According to national statistics, the output of fruits has increased from 6.6 
million tons in 1978 to 214 million tons in 2010, thus more than 32 fold in 32 
years. The output of meat in 2010 is 793 million tons, while it was only 106 
million tons in 1979, an increase of almost 8 fold in 31 years. Fishery products 
have increased more than 10 fold between 1978 and 2010.  
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Figure 4.3 Changes in the Structure of China’s Agriculture (contribution 
of four agricultural sub-sectors) (%) 
Source: NBSC (2009) 
The structural changes to agricultural production have been consistent 
with the predominant dietary shift. In the developing world, a salient shift of 
dietary patterns from emphasis on cereal fibre and starch to animal protein 
and fat has occurred, which is often termed “nutrition transition” (Drewnowski 
and Popkin, 1997; Popkin, 2001, 2004). This shift seems to be faster in 
developing countries than in developed countries because of rapid 
urbanisation, rising incomes, changing occupational structures and the 
influences of modern mass media (Popkin, 2001). Particularly, Chinese 
dietary patterns have changed alongside the high-speed and dramatic socio-
economic transformation (Popkin, 2004; Zhai et al., 2009). In China, the 
consumption of grain and vegetables has gradually decreased on both rural 
and urban tables, while meat and fruits have been consumed in increasing 
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quantities, as Table 4.3 shows.  
Table 4.3 Food Consumption of Chinese Residents per year (kg)  
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 
Rural 
residents' 
food 
consumption 
Grain 262 256 250 209 189 181 
Vegetables 134 105 107 102 98 93 
Meat 13 14 18 22 22 22 
Fruits 6 13 18 17 21 20 
Urban 
residents' 
food 
consumption 
Grain 131 97 82 77 81 82 
Vegetables 139 116 115 119 120 116 
Meat 25 24 26 33 35 35 
Fruits 41 45 57 57 57 54 
Source: NBSC (2011) 
The changes in the structure of Chinese agriculture imply an 
unremitting switch from low-value to high-value agriculture (Carter et al., 
2012).  Particularly within the farming sub-sector, as Carter et al. (2012) 
observed through changes of sown area of different crops, agricultural 
production has been moving towards cash crops like vegetables, fruit and 
feed grain. For instance, the reported sown area of vegetables by official 
statistics has increased from 3.3 million hectares in 1978 to 19.6 million 
hectares in 2011, and fruit sown area has also experienced robust growth 
from 1.7 million hectares to 11.8 million hectares in the same period (NBSC, 
2012). 
4.2.4 Agricultural population changes 
China’s population also has long experienced a geographical shift from the 
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countryside to cities, and an occupational switch from agriculture to industry 
and the service sector.  In terms of employment in all industries, as Figure 4.4 
shows, the population of farmers has steadily declined.  
 
Figure 4.4 Changes in Employment Composition of China from 1978-
2010 (%) 
Source: NBSC (2011)  
According to a latest report authorised by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), until 2011 the number of urban residents of China 
has risen to 691 million and the urbanisation rate has reached 51.3%, noting a 
historical change as numbers of urban residents have overtaken their rural 
counterparts for first time and China has begun to enter an urban era (CASS, 
2012, also see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5 Urbanisation Rate of China: 1978-2011 (%) 
Source: NBSC (2012) 
Although it should be noted that residents CASS (2012) counted as 
“urban” in the report include the floating population or rural migrants who are 
still officially registered as rural residents 4 , the trends of increasing 
urbanisation and of the rural population moving out of agriculture in China are 
undeniable and irresistible. According to the latest Chinese state figures, the 
overall non-farm employment population had reached 230 million by 2011 
(NBSC, 2012), while in 2008 the figure was estimated at only 140 million 
(Chan, 2009).  This means that the urban population in China has expanded 
by almost 100 million in four years. More particularly, the proportion of the 
population working in agriculture has declined sharply, from about 70% of the 
total Chinese labour force in 1978 to 38% in 2009 (Carter et al., 2012). 
                                                             
4
 The Hukou system as explained in Chapter 2 has impeded the identity transfer of migrants 
from rural areas to official urban residents, so that a great proportion of urban residents 
currently are still officially agricultural Hukou registration. 
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According to various government reports, a nationwide consensus has 
currently been reached that the social structure of Chinese rural society has 
fundamentally changed and the linkage of the rural and the urban has 
become increasingly tight (Ye and Pan, 2008; Ye and Wu, 2008; Ye and He, 
2008). The constant factor of de-population occurring in the agricultural sector 
has momentous implications on agricultural development for China. 
 4.3 Agricultural production in Sichuan Province 
This section introduces agricultural production of Sichuan Province (Figure 
4.6) to set the background for the case-study community, Hu Village. In the 
context of the whole of China, although Sichuan contributes significantly to the 
total of agricultural production and GDP, being ranked fifth on grain output and 
eighth on GDP in 2011, it is situated below the national average level in terms 
of per capita GDP, rates of urbanisation and per capita incomes of urban and 
rural households as Table 4.4 shows.  This is due to its huge population (the 
fourth largest of any province in China). In addition, higher agricultural 
proportion in GDP and lower urbanisation rate than national averages indicate 
that, compared with the well-developed provinces and regions in the east of 
China, like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Zhejiang, Sichuan is at 
an earlier stage of industrialisation and urbanisation. Compared with the 
poorest provinces, like Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guizhou, Gansu, and Ningxia, 
Sichuan has advantages regarding development opportunities and potentials 
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as will be shown in the following subsection. In brief, as a medium-stage 
developed province of China, Sichuan Province can provide an appropriate 
opportunity to observe agricultural production under the transition from 
traditional, rural, agricultural society to modern, urban and industrial society.  
 
Figure 4.6 Sichuan Map 
Source: Adapted from D-maps.  
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Table 4.4 General Socio-economic Profile of Sichuan Province in China 
(2011) 
Region Per 
capita 
GDP  
 
(Yuan) 
population 
 
 
 
(10,000) 
Per 
capita 
output 
of 
grain 
(kg) 
Per capita 
net income 
of urban 
households 
(Yuan) 
Per capita 
net income 
of rural 
households 
(Yuan) 
Agricultural 
proportion 
in GDP 
 
(%) 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
 
 
 (%) 
Nation 35181 134735 425.0 23979.2 6977.3 10.0 51.3 
Tianjin 85213 1355.0 122.0 29916.0 12321.2 1.4 80.5 
Shanghai 82560 2347.5 52.0 40532.3 16053.8 0.7 89.3 
Beijing 81658 2018.6 61.0 37124.4 14735.7 0.8 86.2 
Jiangsu 62290 7898.8 420.0 28972.0 10805.0 6.2 61.9 
Zhejiang 59249 5463.0 143.0 34264.4 13070.7 4.9 62.3 
Inner 
Mongolia 
57974 2481.7 964.0 21890.2 6641.6 9.1 56.6 
Guangdong 50807 10504.8 130.0 30218.8 9371.7 5.0 66.5 
Liaoning 50760 4383.0 465.0 22879.8 8296.5 8.6 64.1 
Fujian 47377 3720.0 182.0 27378.1 8778.6 9.2 58.1 
Shandong 47335 9637.0 461.0 24889.8 8342.1 8.8 51.0 
Jilin 38460 2749.4 1154.0 19211.7 7510.0 12.1 53.4 
Chongqing 34500 2919.0 388.0 21794.3 6480.4 8.4 55.0 
Hubei 34197 5757.5 416.0 20193.3 6897.9 13.1 51.8 
Hebei 33969 7240.5 440.0 19591.9 7119.7 11.9 45.6 
Shaanxi 33464 3742.6 320.0 20069.9 5027.9 9.8 47.3 
Ningxia 33042 639.5 565.0 19654.6 5410.0 8.8 49.8 
Heilongjiang 32819 3834.0 1453.0 17118.5 7590.7 13.5 56.5 
Shanxi 31357 3593.0 333.0 19666.1 5601.4 5.7 49.7 
Xinjiang 30087 2208.7 558.0 17631.2 5442.2 17.2 43.5 
Hunan 29880 6595.6 447.0 20083.9 6567.1 14.1 45.1 
Qinghai 29522 568.2 183.0 17795.0 4608.5 9.3 46.2 
Hainan 28898 877.3 216.0 20094.2 6446.0 26.1 50.5 
Henan 28661 9388.0 590.0 19526.9 6604.0 13.0 40.6 
Jiangxi 26150 4488.4 459.0 18656.5 6891.6 11.9 45.7 
Sichuan 26133 8050.0 409.0 19688.1 6128.6 14.2 41.8 
Anhui 25659 5968.0 526.0 20751.1 6232.2 13.2 44.8 
Guangxi 25326 4645.0 309.0 20846.1 5231.3 17.5 41.8 
Tibet 20077 303.3 311.0 18115.8 4904.3 12.3 22.7 
Gansu 19595 2564.2 396.0 16267.4 3909.4 13.5 37.2 
Yunnan 19265 4630.8 363.0 20255.1 4722.0 15.9 36.8 
Guizhou 16413 3468.7 253.0 17598.9 4145.4 12.7 35.0 
Source: NBSC (2012) 
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4.3.1 Agricultural geography of Sichuan Province 
Sichuan Province is located in southwest China, with a latitude from 25̊ 58̍ to 
34̊ 19̍ and longitude from 97 ̊21 ̍to 108̊ 32̍. Sichuan is the fifth largest province 
in China, comprising 485,000 square km and is populated with 805 million 
inhabitants. The landscape of Sichuan is very complex, with plateaus and 
mountains in the west and basins and hills in the east. The province as a 
whole can be generally divided into three geographical categories: the 
Sichuan Basin, West Plateau and Southwest Mountain.  The mountain area 
occupies 77.1% of the land, while the plain only holds 5.3%, which is mostly 
located in Sichuan Basin. The climate of Sichuan is no less complex because 
of its special location as the transitional zone from the Tibetan Plateau to the 
Eastern Plain. According to the Sichuan Government, the characteristics of 
Sichuan’s climate can be summarised as follows: 
 Clear monsoon climate with hot rainy season; 
 Significant regional difference : in the east, warm winter, early spring, 
hot summer, rainy autumn, heavy cloud and fog, less sunshine and 
long growing season; in the west, long and cold winter, basically no 
summer, ample sunshine, concentrated rainfall. (Sichuan Government 
Website, 2012) 
Particularly for agricultural geography, the most prominent area in this 
province is Chengdu Plain in the west of Sichuan Basin, which is one of the 
major grain and oilseed bases of China. Chengdu plain is extraordinarily well-
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known as “Heavenly Land of Abundance”, because of its rich and fertile 
agricultural resources and appropriate climate. The main crops of this region 
are rice, wheat, corn, sweet potato, soybean and so on. With a large 
population and relatively scarce arable land, Sichuan is feeding 6.6% of 
national population with 4.7% of national arable land.  Per capita cultivated 
land in Sichuan is 0.05 hectare, and cultivated land per person employed in 
agriculture is 0.19 hectare. In this sense, Sichuan farmers are authentic 
smallholders.  Due to the restriction of natural conditions in West Plateau and 
Southwest Mountain areas, grain production is relatively poorly developed 
while livestock herding and forestry have thrived. Cash crops popularly 
cultivated in Sichuan include rape, peanut, fruits, tea, vegetables, silk, flowers, 
medicine herbs, tobacco and cotton.   
4.3.2 Socio-economic development of Sichuan Province 
Sichuan Province has been experiencing a general transformation from 
agricultural economy to industrial economy, from rural society to urban society 
alongside the broader transition occurring in the whole of China. The GDP of 
Sichuan Province has expanded more than 26 fold from 1978 to 2011, with 
the average annual growth rate exceeding 10% as Figure 4.7 shows. Under 
such a fast-growing economy, differential trends have occurred in three 
industries. According to the Sichuan Yearbook (2012), the contribution of 
agriculture to the whole of provincial GDP has declined from 44.5% in 1978 to 
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14.2% in 2011, while industry, contributing 35.5% in 1978, rose up to 52.4% in 
2011. The service sectors have also expanded substantially from 20% in 1978 
to 33.4% in 2011 (see Figure 4.8).   
 
Figure 4.7 Sichuan GDP Growth from 1978-2011 
Source: SSY (2012) 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Changes in Composition of Sichuan’s GDP from 1978-2011 
(%) 
Source: SSY (2012) 
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From these statistics, it is evident that Sichuan is entering into an industry-
based economy, although with great regional disparities. Furthermore, 
Chengdu, as the provincial capital, is one of the most powerful and influential 
metropolises in southwest China. Its economy takes about one-third of the 
whole provincial GDP in 2011 (SSY, 2012), so that it is one place of strategic 
importance for driving the economic status of not only Sichuan Province, but 
also the whole of southwest China. However, in northeast and northwest 
Sichuan, the industrialisation and urbanisation have long been 
underdeveloped, evidently below the provincial average, due to poor natural 
conditions and other socio-historical reasons. Considering the regional 
development disparities, Qingshen County, the focus of this project, is 
situated in a region of moderate industrialisation in the context of Sichuan 
Province as will be shown.  
Industrialisation and urbanisation, the two interconnected processes, 
have been the most significant drivers and development strategies in Sichuan. 
As the government claims in all the reports and plans, the overall 
development strategy is to “industrialise the province”, and the main efforts 
have been made in the areas of seven competitive industries, namely, 
electronic information, equipment manufacturing, oil and gas and chemical 
industry, beverages and food, modern Chinese medicine, vanadium steel and 
energy/power. The urbanisation rate of Sichuan has steadily climbed from 
11.7% in 1978 to 41.8% in 2011 (SSY, 2012). However, despite this 
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impressive level of progress, Sichuan is still under the average level of 
industrialisation in China.  
The fast-expanding economy of Sichuan cannot be fully understood 
without referring to broader political and economic backgrounds. The most 
fundamental one is the long-lasting national development strategy, “Go-West 
Campaign”. At the end of 1999, to balance sharp regional development 
inequalities, the Chinese central government launched a grand and 
comprehensive strategic development plan, called the “Go-West Campaign” 
(xi bu da kai fa), to give impetus to the socio-economic development and 
environmental conservation of Western provinces and regions. This plan 
covers 12 provinces and autonomous regions from northwest to southwest 
China, and Sichuan is included. This policy reorientation provided massive 
development chances for these western provinces and regions, as central 
government has made huge amounts of investment, particularly in five fields: 
major infrastructure, ecological environment, economic restructuring, science 
and education and further opening to the outside world since 2000 (Tian, 
2004).  
4.3.3 Agricultural production in Sichuan Province  
Although Sichuan has gradually been switching to an increasingly industry-
dominant economy, it is still an agricultural province in terms of agricultural 
contribution to GDP compared to the average level in China, as shown by 
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Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.8. Regarding grain production, Sichuan is one of 
China’s 13 major grain producing areas. A pronounced feature of Sichuan 
agriculture is the diversity of crops, especially in terms of the varieties of cash 
crops as discussed above. The Sichuan government promotes the cultivation 
of diverse agricultural crops on the basis of specific geographical conditions, 
and basically formulates a spatial pattern of agricultural diversification. For 
instance, the west plain concentrates on high-quality rice cultivation and the 
tea areas are also mainly grouped in the west, south and east Sichuan. 
According to Sichuan Bureau of Agriculture, cash crop production contributes 
more than 50% to the crop industry of Sichuan in terms of production.  
Another feature of Sichuan agriculture is high intensification due to its 
humid climate and complicated landscape. According to the government 
website, the multiple-cropping index 5  (MCI) of land, an indicator of land 
utilisation rate, is 248.9%. However, the agricultural mechanisation of Sichuan 
is relatively low due to the geographical conditions again, 35.8% for the major 
crops according the government annual report of 2012. Hence, most farming 
work in Sichuan is done manually.   
According to the government annual report of 2011 and the provincial 
Twelfth Five-Year Master Plan, agricultural policies of Sichuan Province over 
the most recent ten years have mainly included four aspects: investing in 
agricultural infrastructures, modernizing agriculture, developing agricultural 
                                                             
5
 Multi-cropping index (MCI), the ratio of total sown area of crops to cultivated land area in the 
current year, is one of the most important indices to measure agricultural land use intensity 
and widely used in China, (Li and Wang, 2003). 
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industry and transferring rural labours. Additionally, under the national rural 
development strategies of reinforcing urban-rural integration and constructing 
socialism new countryside, Sichuan will continue to put “modernising 
agriculture” at the top of policy priorities. As the Master Plan proposes, the 
province will make efforts to promote agricultural sciences and technologies, 
research and development, to build various crop demonstration zones, like 
potato, vegetables, fruits, tea and so forth, and to invest more in agricultural 
infrastructures, especially irrigation works. An important pathway of 
modernising agriculture for Sichuan is to promote agricultural industrialisation, 
for which the government encourages modern agricultural companies to 
contract with farmers, the so-called “company + farmer” model. In 2010, there 
were 3223 agricultural enterprises above the designated size in Sichuan. In 
2015, the target is to develop 1000 “dragon-head” agricultural enterprises with 
sale incomes of above 100 million Yuan, and 70% of rural households will be 
involved in this form of contract farming (Sichuan Master Plan, 2011-2015). 
Besides, under the umbrella of modernising agriculture, the province also 
promotes the modernisation of livestock and fishery sectors, especially pig 
breeding, mainly focusing on standardisation and modernisation of livestock 
production.  
4.3.4 The migration economy of Sichuan Province 
An outstanding characteristic of Sichuan in terms of agriculture and rural 
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development is the migration economy, the scale of which is so large and 
dynamic that this province attracts scholars’ constant interest on the topic of 
Chinese internal migration (e.g. Zhao, 1999; Fan, 2004, 2008, 2009). 
According to China’s Sixth Census in 2010, migrants of Sichuan, which are 
divided almost equally between flow-inside and flow-outside of province 
migrants, numbered nearly 22 million in 2011, or up to 26% of the whole 
population of the province and almost 10% of nationwide migrants. From 2011 
to 2015, transferring 23 million rural labourers is listed as an important 
development target by the Sichuan government (Sichuan Master Plan, 2011-
2015). Alongside the declining agricultural contribution of the province, 
employment in agriculture has also declined dramatically since the 1978 
reform (see Figure, 4.9). In 2010, the rural-urban migration income reached 
176 billion Yuan, with an annual growth rate of almost 20%. Labour transfer 
has been considered as the primary approach to improve farmers’ income, as 
well as an important rural development strategy.  
 
Figure 4.9 Changes in Employments Composition of Sichuan from 1978-
2011(%) 
Source: SSY (2012) 
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To fully implement the government-driven rural labour transfer, every 
county has established a labour transfer office (Li, 2012).  Furthermore, an 
important approach for Sichuan to facilitate labour transfer has been to 
conduct various job and skills training projects for rural labour, covering both 
migrants and those left-behind. Moreover, some reforms loosening the Hukou 
system will be adopted to encourage the agriculturally-registered population, 
especially rural-urban migrants, to be converted to urban residents formally. 
The increasing amounts of labour moving out of rural areas and out of 
agriculture have also caused an important issue regarding land transfer. 
Sichuan has also attempted to deal with potential land abandonment by 
exploring various land transfer mechanisms. These processes discussed 
above will be reflected in the review of smaller regional scales, like the county 
or even the village, as will be shown in the following two sections.   
4.4 Agricultural production in Qingshen County 
This section introduces Qingshen County. An outline of Qingshen County’s 
socio-economic profile in 2011, including a comparison relative to the whole 
province is given first, providing a general understanding of Qingshen’s 
position in the broader background. As illustrated in Table 4.5, in 2011 the per 
capita GDP and per capita income of urban households of Qingshen were 
slightly below the average level of Sichuan Province, while per capita income 
of rural households of Qingshen was evidently higher than the average found 
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in Sichuan province. Referring to residents’ living standards, the Engel 
coefficient of urban households in Qingshen was much higher than the 
average in Sichuan, but in rural areas Qingshen was slightly lower than the 
provincial average in 2011. As for the development of three industrial sectors, 
similar structures occurred in Qingshen and across the province, and the 
averages in 2011 are shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 Qingshen County’s Socio-economic Position in Sichuan 
Province (2011) 
 
Indicators 
Qingshen 
County 
Sichuan 
Province 
Per capita GDP (Yuan) 25401 26133 
Per capita income of urban households 
(Yuan) 
15513 17899 
Per capita income of  
rural households (Yuan)  
7061 6129 
Engel coefficient of urban households (%) 48.6 40.7 
Engel coefficient of rural household (%) 44.6 46.3 
Per capita land (ha) 0.06 0.05 
Agricultural population as a percentage of 
total population  
82.4 72.8 
Urbanisation rate (%) 31.9 41.8 
Primary sectors proportion (%) 15.3 14.2 
Secondary sectors proportion (%) 59.7 52.4 
Tertiary sectors proportion (%) 25.0 33.4 
 
Source: SSY(2012); Qingshen Statistical Bulletin (2012) 
 
In 2011, the secondary sector contributed the highest proportion in both 
the County and the Province, and the agriculture-related sector contributed 
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the least, and the development of the tertiary sector of Qingshen was poorer 
than the average for Sichuan. As the following sub-sections show, Qingshen 
has also been experiencing a dramatic socio-economic transition and is thus 
an appropriate site for observing how different forces are influencing 
agricultural production at the community level.   
4.4.1 Geography of Qingshen County 
Qingshen County is located in southwest of Chengdu Plain. Qingshen covers 
387 square kilometres, and is populated by 206 thousand inhabitants.  The 
landscape of Qingshen is dominated by shallow hills, with a small proportion 
of flat land. Qingshen is well-known for two honorary titles, respectively, the 
“Chinese Town of Bamboo Weaving Art” and the “Chinese Town of Citrus”. 
This county is especially distinctive for bamboo weaving, which has a two-
thousand-year long history. Bamboo cultivation weighs significantly in the 
agricultural development of Qingshen. Qingshen is 100 kilometres away from 
Chengdu and 67 kilometres from Meishan. The climate is affected by the 
Sichuan Basin sub-tropical humidity, with clear four seasons, moderate 
temperature and abundant rainfall, which is suitable for many plants. Main 
grain crops which thrive under these climatic conditions include, rice, wheat, 
corn, rape, sweet potato and cash crops include citrus, tea, vegetables.  
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4.4.2 Socio-economic development of Qingshen 
The overall development level of Qingshen is below the average of Sichuan 
Province. Per capita net income of urban residents in 2010 was 12.6 thousand 
Yuan and rural residents 5.7 thousand Yuan (QY, 2011), both slightly less than 
the provincial level per capita, where net income for urban residents was 17.9 
thousand Yuan and for rural residents was 6.1 thousand Yuan (SSY, 2011). 
According to Qingshen Yearbook 2011, the urbanisation rate of Qingshen 
County in 2010 was 28.8%, and in terms of the Hukou system, the 
agriculturally-registered population is 160 thousand and the non-agriculturally-
registered population was 45 thousand.  Therefore, Qingshen is largely an 
agriculturally-based or rural county. The overall development strategy held by 
the Qingshen government is the “three-isations”: industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and agricultural modernisation. 
In 2010, the GDP of Qingshen was 3.4 billion Yuan with the 
composition of GDP in terms of three industry sectors (primary, secondary 
and tertiary) 17.6:53.5:28.9. Qingshen has focused on industry development 
as the dominant development strategy, especially focusing on machinery 
industry, chemical medicine, textile industry, and bamboo paper manufacture. 
Industry development is enthusiastically considered as the backbone of the 
whole county development process. 
Under the national slogan of urban-rural integration, Qingshen has 
taken measures to bridge the urban-rural gap, with major focuses on 
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promoting the real estate industry, transferring rural residents to township and 
county communities, facilitating farmers’ non-farm activities and investing in 
town infrastructures. According to the county’s planning for 2011-2015, 
improvement of the urbanisation rate is one of the top priorities.  
4.4.3 Agricultural development of Qingshen 
As one of the fundamental development strategies, agricultural modernisation 
has been listed as the priority for agricultural development in Qingshen. Grain 
crops like rice and corn; and cash crops like rape, citrus, tea and mulberry; 
and livestock like pigs, chickens and silkworms constitute the main crop 
patterns in this county. The main indicators of agricultural development in 
2010 as reported by the county government are shown in Table 4.6.   
Table 4.6 Agricultural Production of Qingshen in 2010 
Indicators Scale 
Changes compared with 
2009(%) 
Grain sown area (ha) 17,239 0.05 
Oilseeds sown area (ha) 4,086 _ 
Vegetable sown area (ha) 2,779 0.5 
Grain output (1000kg) 96,301 0.7 
Rape output (1000kg) 5,930 0.2 
Fruit output (1000kg) 53,412 8.7 
Vegetable output (1000kg) 81,938 -4.3 
Pork output (1000kg) 17,099 -2.4 
Source: QY (2011) 
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Agricultural development of Qingshen adopts a top-down approach, in 
which the government sets up and implements the framework and planning of 
agricultural development. As a part of Sichuan province, Qingshen has taken 
measures on agriculture which are consistent with provincial policies. For 
instance, the county has focused on investments in infrastructure, especially 
irrigation works, agricultural technology promotion, contract farming, 
agricultural industrialisation, land use regulation and agricultural subsidies 
distribution. An important strategy for Qingshen to develop agriculture is 
agricultural industrialisation, which includes constructing a modernised 
agricultural demonstration zone, which would feature citrus production, 
bamboo planting and weaving, modernising livestock cultivation and fisheries. 
One important approach is to build agricultural bases with specific 
characteristics, as is implied in the specification of, “one town one industry, 
one village one specialty” (yi xiang yi ye; yi cun yi pin).  As is shown below, Hu 
Village is planned as citrus and sericulture village.  
Regarding land use policy, the county insists on the basic national 
policy of arable land protection for food security. In 2010, Qingshen invested 
58 million Yuan to restructure rural land (transforming hills into flat land), and 
Hu Village is within the area of project coverage. Qingshen also encourages 
land transfer to enhance agricultural productivity, because rural-urban 
migration is very pronounced in Qingshen and this factor influences 
agricultural production to a significant degree. In 2010, 1.2 thousand hectares 
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of land was transferred into larger scale cultivation (QY, 2011). 
As discussed above, the migration economy is a characteristic of 
Sichuan, and this is also reflected in Qingshen County. As the government 
figures show, 67 thousand rural labourers participated in migration in 2010, 
and the income from migrants was 464 million Yuan in 2010 (QY, 2011). A 
specific institute was created to identify job opportunities and provide skills 
training for rural labourers, both migrants and the left-behind. The training 
covers specific skills like service skills, cooking, hairdressing and so on for 
migrants, and agricultural management technologies, like pesticides 
application, sericulture technologies and so on for the remaining rural 
population. During fieldwork, I twice encountered training sessions organised 
in Hu Village. In addition, due to the pronounced rural out-migration, Qingshen 
was nominated as the only county where education protection was offered to 
left-behind children by Sichuan in 2006, and as the national demonstration 
county of rural left-behind and migrant children working in 2009. There have 
been several projects targeting left-behind children and women in Hu Village.  
4.5 Hu Village as the study site 
The village is at the grass-roots level in the whole Chinese administration 
system. The state policy and regulations stand “as a key structural boundary 
within which political, social and economic decisions are taken that, in turn 
‘trickle down’ to community level” (Wilson, 2013: 299). Therefore, the study 
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community, Hu Village, is embedded in the policy arrangements of the county, 
the province and the whole of China. This section introduces the basic socio-
economic aspects of Hu Village.  
4.5.1 Geography of Hu Village 
Hu Village is a huge administrative village, with about 4.5 square 
kilometres, and is populated by 882 households with 2938 residents in 2010. 
The landscape of Hu village is no less complex than the whole province, with 
many hills, some flat land, and a few mountains. Hu Village owns 173 ha of 
agricultural land area, of which 142 ha is cultivated land. The cultivated land 
includes 135 ha of paddy field and 8 ha of dry land. The per capita paddy field 
is 0.05 ha and per capita dry land is 0.003 ha, meaning 0.053 ha in total, 
which is slightly more than the per capita cultivated land of Sichuan Province, 
0.05 ha. In terms of the amount of land individuals are entitled to, Hu Village 
farmers are real smallholders. Geographically and administratively, this village 
is divided into 8 groups, with slightly differences in population, land area, 
landscape, crop patterns and livelihoods. The map of Hu Village is shown by 
Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10 Map of Hu Village 
 
Source: Hu Village map from Hu Village Committee and Qingshen Map 
adapted from Google Maps.  
As the only available village report reveals, the per capita net income of 
Hu Village households was 5700 Yuan in 2009 (HVCAR, 2010), while the per 
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capita income of rural households of Qingshen in that year was 5070 Yuan 
(QY, 2010), and that of Sichuan Province  4462 Yuan (SSY, 2010).  From this 
perspective, the overall level of wealth in Hu Village is situated above the 
average of the County and the Province. Main income sources for Hu Village 
residents include agriculture, livestock, migration, local enterprises and a 
range of self-employed enterprises.  Hu Village is 10 kilometres away from the 
town of Qingshen County. There is a county-level road through the village. All 
the households have telephones, and there are more than 100 computers in 
the village, which makes communication very convenient. 
4.5.2 Agricultural production of Hu Village  
Hu Village agriculture is a hodgepodge of various forms of farming styles 
driven by various forces across the local, provincial and national scales. The 
following section provides an overview first, and more specific details will be 
presented and discussed in following chapters.  
Agricultural system of Hu Village 
Hu village has long practiced two growing seasons within the sub-tropical 
humid climate. In the first season (generally from April to September), major 
crops are rice, corn, sweet potato, soybean and vegetables. The second 
season (generally from October to March) grows rape, fava bean, green peas 
and wheat. Rice and rape are the two predominant crops in the two growing 
seasons. Due to the high demand for labour input and low-level of 
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mechanisation, wheat cultivation has been almost abandoned by Hu villagers, 
to the extent that during fieldwork the author only saw two plots of wheat in 
the whole village. In addition, every household has different but similarly small 
amounts of bamboo, which generally surrounds the house. The mode of 
intercropping is widely used, sweet potatoes are intercropped with corn, or 
corn with fruit trees or mulberry. Sericulture has been a most important 
sideline for Hu Village for several decades, however, fewer and fewer villagers 
are willing to conduct sericulture due to the low payoff and high technological 
requirements. Most sericulture farmers are the elderly and household wives 
who cannot migrate or conduct other off-farm activities. In addition, Hu Village 
is planned as a citrus base through the County’s policy of “one village one 
specialty”. In recent years, farmers, if not always at a loss, have not made any 
profit, but citrus planting is still encouraged by the government. 
The general agricultural technologies here include hybrid varieties of rice, 
corn and other crops, chemical fertilizers supplemented by a small amount of 
farmyard manure, and chemical pesticides and herbicides. Agricultural 
mechanisation includes harvesting rice and ploughing land. Mechanised 
ploughing has totally replaced ploughing with cattle for several years. Most 
farming work remains manual work.  No tillage has been adopted here, except 
some traditional or so-called “stubborn” farmers are still ploughing the land 
every year. Regarding agricultural facilities, 80% of the farming land in Hu 
Village has been connected with a cement road, which has been realised 
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through a project conducted in 2010 as is shown in Table 4.7. Irrigation works 
have been renewed since 2009 and irrigation water is drained from a reservoir 
about five kilometres away.  
Livestock cultivation is widespread in Hu Village, mainly pigs, chickens, 
rabbits and ducks. Most livestock farming is undertaken by farmers’ family at a 
relatively small scale. According to the village annual report, in 2009, 600 pig 
breeding farmers sold 3,008 pigs. Most households keep a few chickens and 
ducks for home consumption. About two hundred households raise rabbits, 
with three households raising more than two hundred. It is very common here 
that every household cultivates several breeding pigs for cash, several 
chickens and ducks for their own consumption.   
Briefly, the agricultural production of Hu Village can be considered typical 
and representative in the whole province, without specialising on any 
particular area of production. The cultivation of grain crops, cash crops, 
livestock, fisheries and sericulture in Hu Village are all important and typical 
throughout the province. 
Agricultural policies and projects in Hu Village 
Many agricultural policies have been implemented in Hu Village, including 
various agricultural subsidies, agricultural insurance and so on. Hu Village 
farmers now do not submit any agricultural taxes and fees to upper levels of 
government, but instead receive various subsidies, like direct grain subsidy, 
agricultural input subsidy, seeds subsidy and so on. The amount is varied 
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every year, generally about 1500 Yuan per ha. Agricultural insurances are 
implemented here to cope with natural disasters and livestock diseases, 
giving farmers at least a minimum level of security for their farming and 
livestock cultivation. These insurances cover rice, corn, pigs and so on, 
however, the effectiveness is poor because of the miscellaneous procedures. 
To protect arable land, a restricted land protection policy is operated in Hu 
Village, under which any action of transferring agricultural land-use into other 
types of land-use, like building workshops or houses, is strictly controlled. This 
policy means that farmers have to cultivate crops on their land or leave it idle, 
without any option for land-use changes.   
Apart from these policies, there are also many projects related to 
agricultural production in Hu Village as is summarised in Table 4.7. It can be 
seen that the stakeholders of these projects are diverse and complex. The 
county government, village cadres, farmers, businessmen and so on are all 
involved. The projects implemented in Hu Village can be roughly categorised 
into two types: infrastructure construction and contract farming, which is also 
consistent with the agricultural development strategies set by the county 
government as discussed above.  One point which deserves to be mentioned 
is that these projects are initiated by the government or commercial 
companies, following a government-dominated and market-dominated 
pathway. What these projects have meant for agricultural production in Hu 
Village will be discussed in the following chapters. Overall, as Chapter 3 
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argued, Hu Village can be seen to be an ideal case study community for this 
research.  
Table 4.7 Agriculture-related Projects in Hu Village 2008-2012 
Projects Time Stakeholders Details 
Land levelling 
project 
 
2011 
County Agriculture Bureau, 
village cadres, farmers, 
construction company. 
To increase arable land through 
flattening hills due to the arable land 
decrease caused by urbanisation 
and industrialisation. 
Road construction 
and irrigation works 
 
2011 
County Agriculture Bureau, 
village cadres, farmers, 
construction company. 
To improve the rural infrastructure 
under the umbrella of “constructing 
socialism new countryside”, many 
cement roads and cement irrigation 
channels were constructed.  
Rape seedling 
contract farming 
 
2009-
2012 
Seeding company, rape 
farmers, village cadres 
To enhance farmers’ income, village 
cadre introduced a seedling 
company to contract farming land, a 
part of farmers have been involved. 
Modernizing 
livestock cultivation 
 
2010 
County Animal Husbandry 
Bureau, village cadres, 
livestock farmers 
Under the grander project of 
modernizing agriculture, the 
government subsidises pig breeding 
farmers for hoggery construction. 
Sericulture contract 
farming 
 
From 
1990s 
County silk company, 
sericulture farmers, village 
cadres 
This project is contract farming 
between the county silk company 
and sericulture farmers in a 
monopolistic way for almost twenty 
years.  
Cash tree planting: 
(red toona) 
 
2008-
2012 
County forestry Bureau, 
farmers, village cadres 
To improve forest coverage rate and 
farmers’ income, fast-growing 
economic tree, red toona was 
introduced to farmers. 
Land transfer and 
Chinese medicine herb 
planting 
2009-
2012 
Farmers, village cadre, 
medicine company 
One village cadre contracted 13 ha 
land from farmers to plant Chinese 
medicine herb in collabouration with 
external medicine company. 
Labour transfer 
training project 
2008-
2012 
County Agriculture Bureau, 
farmers, village cadres 
To train farmers about essential 
skills related with migration, and 
farming skills. 
Source: Author’s interviews with village head and village account, 2012 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the background for this research at 
different geographical levels. In accordance with the theoretical approach this 
research adopts, this chapter targeted the overall framework and structure of 
agricultural production at the community level through a top-down approach, 
highlighting the coherence of the socio-economic transition occurring at the 
national, provincial, county and community level. Three characteristics can be 
identified through the discussion above. Firstly, irrespective of whether it is the 
nation, the province or the county which is examined, a similar transition from 
an agriculture-based economy and rural society to an industry-based 
economy and urban society has been underway. Secondly, industrialisation 
and urbanisation have been set as the development priorities by both the 
whole country and the local governments. Thirdly, despite an overwhelming 
emphasis on industrial development, all levels of governments, with 
considerations for political justice and balanced development, have made 
arduous efforts to focus on agricultural and rural development, and the most 
prominent pathway is agricultural modernisation.     
Furthermore, attention has been paid to the transition occurring in the 
agricultural sector and agricultural policies, indicating that agricultural 
structures have begun to change driven by various forces, and agricultural 
policies have seemed to be greatly favourable to farmers in recent years. 
However, a common feature can be identified which is that the governments 
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at all levels adopt a top-down approach to promote agricultural development. 
Finally, it can be observed from the presentation above that the 
national policies and regulations in China have established parameters for 
regional, local and community agency, and vice-versa, that local actors have 
to cope with these regulations and will thereby influence how the “structure” is 
implemented.  These points will be discussed further in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 5 Who is farming?—
Demography of Hu Village  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter attempts to fulfill the first objective of this research: to investigate 
the demography of Hu Village more specifically from a village-level 
perspective, to portray a clear picture of the people who are living in the rural 
area and what people are farming. As demonstrated in previous chapters, 
Chinese rural communities have tightly interacted with broader socio-
economic transformations and national political reforms, thus, as the 
protagonist, the rural population has also kept evolving, as has been identified 
in other cases in both developed and developing countries (Woods, 2005). As 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, booming levels of urbanisation and 
industrialisation in China have long drawn a significant proportion of rural 
population to seek work opportunities in the cities.  This has driven Chinese 
economic prosperity, but at the same time has caused a dramatic but steady 
decline in agricultural population. Thus, a fundamental question has come to 
the fore, especially from the policymakers’ perspective, about how to 
guarantee food security, most particularly sufficient grain supply given this 
scenario. The paradox between continual urbanisation and sufficient 
agricultural production has drawn heated debate among scholars (Huang and 
Peng, 2007; Chen, 2007). Thus, given this academic debate, to examine what 
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kind of farmers are currently farming in China and what kind of influence this 
agricultural population has on agricultural production is of great importance. 
This chapter will put Hu Village under the microscope as a specimen, to 
examine the demographic characteristics of the village and further to shed 
light on the implications this demography may have for land-use changes and 
agricultural production. This chapter will elaborate on various aspects of the 
demography of Hu Village.  
Section 5.2 describes the basic demographic profile of Hu Village, 
drawing on secondary data from the village committee which covers the whole 
village population, giving an overall picture of the age and gender of the Hu 
Village population. Section 5.3, using the survey data, firstly illustrates the 
sample population by more specific characteristics, like age, gender, 
education, marriage and then presents the employment status of sample 
respondents, farming time of different residents and finally focuses on 
migrants. Section 5.4 concludes the whole chapter.  
5.2 Basic demographic profile of Hu Village 
This section provides an overall profile of the whole population of Hu Village 
based on a set of secondary data collected in 2011. This data was collected 
by village cadres for implementation of various rural policies relating to every 
village resident, so its accuracy can be largely assumed. One limitation of this 
data is that it only includes the gender and age of the population.  
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According to the data, there are 2680 residents in Hu Village in 2011 of 
which, 1353 (50.5%) are male and 1327 (49.5%) are female, so there is a 
gender ratio of 102 (female=100). Compared with gender ratios of Sichuan 
Province (103.1) and China (104.9) in 2010 (China’s Sixth Population Census, 
2010), Hu Village’s is relatively moderate. Seeing gender ratios as correlated 
with age groups more specifically (Table 5.1), a distinction can be clearly 
observed that for the adult age groups of 31-45 and 46-60, males are more 
than females with 0.5 % and 1.2% respectively, while for the other age 
groups, the gender ratios are the other way around, in which females are 
more than males, though with slight percentages all below 0.5%. More 
surprisingly, the gender ratio of male to female in the youth category (aged 
below 30) is lower than 100 (female =100). However, for China, the gender 
ratio of male to female in the early ages (0-29) is the highest (109) among all 
the other age groups because of the One-Child policy 6  since the 1970s 
(Hesketh et al., 2005) and the long-term dominance of patriarchal mentality in 
China (Wen, 1993; Murphy, 2003; Wang, 2005 ). An explanation is that the 
social customs and cultural values related to male-preference are relatively 
weak in Hu Village and even in other regions of Sichuan. During fieldwork, the 
                                                             
6 Chinese One Child policy, also referred as Family Planning policy, was issued by central 
government in 1979 to control the overpopulation of China. Under this policy, urban couples 
are strictly regulated to have only one child and are allowed more than one child only in a few 
cases, including twins, if the first child is disabled, couples who are in dangerous jobs and 
couples who are both only children themselves. Rural couples are allowed to have a second 
child if their first-born is a daughter
 
or if the child has physical disabilities or mental illnesses 
(see Hesketh et al., 2005). 
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author quite often captured discussions by Hu villagers on opinions regarding 
gender preference. It was common to get a strong feeling of gender equality 
or even a preference for females.  In addition, judging from the gender ratio of 
new births in the most recent five years, there is no strong tendency of 
preference for sons here, indicating that the gender discrimination in this 
region is not as strong as other regions.  
Table 5.1 Age and Gender of Hu Village Population 2011 (% in Total) 
Age ranges Gender Total 
male female 
    
 0-15 4.1 4.5 8.6 
16-30 9.1 9.3 18.4 
31-45 15.2 14.7 29.9 
46-60 11.6 10.4 22 
60+ 10.5 10.6 21.1 
     Total 50.5 49.5 100 
Source: Hu Village Committee (2012) 
Seeing from the population pyramid (Figure 5.1), the age structure of 
the population is quite clear. The age group of 31-45 holds the largest 
proportion (29.9%) and the smallest group is the youngest group (aged 0-15) 
representing only 8.6%. The labour group aged between 16 to 60 accounts for 
70.3% of the whole population, which is roughly consistent with the wider 
demographic patterns in China (age group 15-59, 70.1%) and Sichuan 
province (age group 15-64, 72.1%) in 2010. In addition, the small youngest 
group is also part of the similarities, with this accounting for similar proportions 
in China (16.6%) and Sichuan (16.1%). Especially if ten years of Chinese 
demographic history are reviewed, a trend of a shrinking lowest age group 
can be observed since 2000, when the proportion of youth aged between 0 
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and 14 accounted for 22.9% of the total. This phenomenon can be explained 
by the long-term low natural growth rate of Chinese population because of 
Chinese One Child policy, under which the natural population growth rate of 
China has continually decreased.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Population Pyramid of Hu Village in 2011 
Source: Hu Village Committee (2012) 
Another significant observation is that people aged above 60 represent 
a substantial part of the population, 21.1%. There is an aging tendency in 
Chinese society, and the population aged above 60 of China in 2010 makes 
up 13.3% of the whole national population. Narrowing down to Sichuan 
Province, the proportion of the aging category is 16.1% in 2010, substantially 
above the national average, ranking the second of the whole country. 
Furthermore, the figure of Qingshen County in 2010 is 19.7%, higher than the 
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provincial average by 3.6%. To explain the high aging proportion of Sichuan, 
several possible explanations can be advanced. First, under the restrictive 
implementation of One-Child policy, the natural growth rate of population in 
Sichuan has long been low, and substantially lower than the national average. 
Second, due to the significant improvements in economic development, per 
capita income and social medical care, the average life expectancy in Sichuan 
(also for the whole of China) has risen greatly to 74.8 years old in 2010. Third, 
the high number of out-province migrants from Sichuan, who are mainly 
constituted by the middle-aged, may considerably influence the aging ratio if 
the calculation was based on the resident population rather than the Hukou 
registered population. In addition, the relatively higher aging ratio of rural 
areas like Hu Village may be accelerated by the increasing rural-urban 
migration undertaken mainly by young adults who may then manage to 
permanently reside in urban areas and never return to source rural 
communities. It can thus be predicted that the aging tendency of rural areas 
may continue speeding up, driven by the long-lasting net out-flows of young 
adults in the near future.   
According to the data, the family/household scale of Hu Village in 2011 
is 3.02 persons, with the provincial family average of 2.95 persons and the 
national family average of 3.1 persons in 2010 (China’s Sixth Population 
Census, 2010). As is widely known, family scale in China has been greatly 
miniaturised, driven by the family planning policy and modernisation and 
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urbanisation processes, and featuring increasingly nuclear families (Hussain, 
2002). The family scale in Sichuan is even smaller, partly due to the same 
reasons discussed above. But there is another interesting cause, as the 
government has explained, in that there are some compensation policies 
which are implemented at the level of the household rather than to individuals 
and these encourage the division of households (Sichuan Government, 2011). 
This is also evidenced by Hu Village case. As noted by the village head, the 
number of households in Hu Village before 2008 was around 700, but after 
2008 and  the Sichuan Earthquake, central government distributed a great 
deal of compensation money to households in Sichuan.  This meant that a 
number of extended families were broken into smaller households, although 
they may still live together as a cohesive household/family7.  
In terms of Hukou, there are 45 non-agricultural Hukou residents in Hu 
Village, although this is a small proportion of 1.7%, it indicates the diversity of 
rural residents. The non-agricultural residents include government officials 
employed in higher level government sectors, formal teachers, formal workers 
employed in state-owned factories, and young adults who successfully shifted 
their agricultural Hukou registrations to non-agricultural ones through higher 
education and then by formally working in cities. Because they have got social 
                                                             
7 Therefore, it is noteworthy that the officially registered Hu Village households after 2008 may 
be different with (more than) the real household number. In this research, to be closer to the 
real situation, the household membership in the sample are based on the number reported by 
the interviewees, which may cause the average family size in the sample to be higher than 
3.02, as will be discussed in following sections.  
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insurance from their occupations, there is no land entitlement for these 
individuals.  
5.3 Agricultural demography of Hu Village 
Having examined the overall demographic profile of Hu Village, this section 
presents the data collected by a survey in 2012 to portray more specific 
characteristics of the Hu Village population, with more emphasis on the 
agricultural population.  
5.3.1 General demographic characteristics of the sample  
Age, gender and education 
Table 5.2 shows that 53.4% of the survey respondents are males and 46.6 % 
are females, and the gender ratio is thus slightly higher than the village 
gender ratio. However, the overall structure in terms of age and gender of 
survey respondent families is consistent with the whole village. As Table 5.2 
shows, the youngest age group remains the smallest (14.9%), while the 
labourer group aged between 16 and 60 is 64.4%, and the elderly group, 
aged above 60, still occupies a substantial part, 20.7%. Table 5.3 shows that 
the average age of all family members surveyed is 40.6, the median age is 41. 
The average age of the sample household heads is 51.3, with median age 49. 
From the comparison, we can see that the household heads are the relatively 
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aged member in the family.  
Table 5.2 Age Groups and Gender of Sample Respondents of Hu Village 
(% in total) 
 Gender  Total 
male female 
age range 0-15 
16-30 
31-45 
46-60 
60+ 
8.9 
9.5 
13.9 
9.3 
11.8 
6.0 
8.5 
12.9 
10.3 
8.9 
14.9 
18.0 
26.8 
19.6 
20.7 
     Total 53.4 46.6 100.0 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
 
Table 5.3 Age of Sample Respondents and Sample Household Heads of 
Hu Village 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
All family 
members 
854 1 94 40.6 41 20.89 
Household 
Heads 
225 30 81 51.3 49 11.98 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
Table 5.4 shows the education and age groups of sample respondents. 
49.4% of the sample respondents have primary education, 30.8% have 
education from secondary school. 12.5% are illiterate, but if children under 15 
are excluded, the illiteracy rate is 7.2% (compared with Sichuan where it is 
5.44% and the whole of China where it is 4.08%). High school respondents 
are 6.2% and those with undergraduate education represent the least 
proportion at only 1.1%, which may reflect the under-development of 
Sichuan’s education systems. Seeing education according to age groups, the 
illiteracy rate of the age group 60 and above is the highest among adult 
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groups. In the category of primary education, no obvious disparities appear 
among the age groups of 31-45, 46-60 and 60 above. It is noted that very few 
of the lowest adult age group 16-30, only 2.6%, have received primary 
education, which indicates that the education of younger generations has 
been enhanced compared with older ones. Furthermore, in high school 
education, young people aged under 30 make up the majority of total high 
school participants (62.3%), and at the same time, all the undergraduates of 
sample respondents are aged between 16 and 30. In addition, more than half 
of young adults (aged between 16 and 30) have received high school 
education (59.4%).  More than half the individuals aged between 31and 45 
have received primary education (53.5%), but in this age group, a substantial 
proportion have also received a secondary education (44.2%).  While in the 
age group 46-60 and 60 or above, a primary level of education is held by the 
majority, 63.3% and 65.2% respectively. Overall, higher education (high 
school and undergraduate level) is dominated by young adults aged under 30 
(67.1%), secondary school by adults aged between 16 and 45 (72.1%), 
primary school by adults aged above 30, (80.6%), illiterate mainly by the 
elderly aged above 60 (72.6%). This reveals that there are education 
disparities between different age groups, in which elderly people are severely 
disadvantaged.  
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Table 5.4 Education8  and Age Group of Sample Respondents of Hu 
Village (% in total) 
 Age range Total 
0-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 60+ 
 Illiterate 5.3 0.1 0.1 1.8 5.3 12.5 
Primary school 
 
7 2.6   13.9 12.4 13.5 49.4 
Secondary school 
 
2.3 10.7 11.5 4.8 1.5 30.8 
High school 
 
0.2 3.6 1.3 0.6 0.5 6.2 
Undergraduate 
 
0 1.1 0 0 0 1.1 
 Total 14.9 18 26.8 19.6 20.7 100 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
Figure 5.2 clearly shows the educational situation of Hu Village, and 
places this data in the context of Sichuan and China. Hu Village and also 
Sichuan have fallen behind the national average on education above 
secondary school, which indicates the relatively backward nature of education 
in Sichuan. Furthermore, the primary school and illiteracy rates in Hu Village 
are considerably higher than Sichuan and national averages, suggesting a 
poorer level of education in Hu Village. It may be inappropriate to overstate 
the gap between Hu Village and the provincial and national averages because 
of the small sample, but these factors can help to sketch an outline of the 
context of Hu Village. Figure 5.3 clearly shows the results of sample 
respondents’ education cross-correlated by gender. For high school education 
(above secondary school), male success rates are higher than female, while 
in respect of primary education and illiteracy, females rate more highly than 
                                                             
8
 Secondary school is also called primary middle school in China, and the students generally are aged 
between 12 and 15. High school is for students aged between 16-18 before university level education. 
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males.  Therefore, the educational levels of males, on the whole, are higher 
than for females. This observation may indicate gender disparities on 
education.  Indeed, gender disparity in education in transitional China has 
long been recognised as a problematic social issue, which the Chinese 
education department has made great efforts to alleviate (Hannum, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The Education Situation of Hu Village in Sichuan and China 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire; China Sixth Census, 2010. 
Note: The illiteracy rate of Hu Village only calculates the respondents aged above 15 
to conform to national statistical standards. The three sets of data are from different 
years: Hu Village is 2011; Sichuan and China are 2010.  
 
Figure 5.3 Education and Gender of Sample Respondents of Hu Village 
(% in total) 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
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Marriage and family types  
Regarding the marital status of sample respondents, as Table 5.5 illustrates, 
71.1% of all the respondents are married, 24.9% unmarried, 0.5% (4 
respondents) divorced and 3.5% (30 respondents) widowed. What is more 
interesting is that, grouping marital status through age ranges, in age group 
16-30, 51.9% are married (including the divorced), 48.1% unmarried, which 
may indicate that the marriage age is pretty young. The divorce rate is 0.5%, 
consistent with Sichuan in 2011 where the divorce rate was 0.47% (SSY, 
2012). 13.6% of the elderly (aged above 60) are widowed, and there are more 
widowed females than widowed males by 1.4% (4 respondents), and it should 
be noted that these elderly single people, especially females, may face great 
issues in everyday life due to the lack of support from spouses. The single 
elderly people without family in rural areas have been an increasingly serious 
social concern in China due to long-lasting and increasing patterns of 
migration (Ye and He, 2008).  
Table 5.5 Marital Status and Age Groups of Sample Respondents of Hu 
Village (% within age group) 
Marital 
status  
Age range Total 
 
0-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 60+ 
 
Married 
 
50.6 97.8 93.4 84.2 71.1 
Unmarried 100 48.1 1.7 2.4 2.3 24.9 
Divorced 
 
1.3 0.4 0.6 
 
0.5 
Widowed 
   
3.6 13.6 3.5 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
Alongside the dramatic rural transformation of China, rural families 
have experienced tremendous changes. As Figure 5.4 clearly shows, for the 
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225 sample households, two family types9 are the mainstay of Hu Village, 
nuclear family (46.7%) and the linear family (44.4%). This figure is also to 
some degree consistent with China’s basic rural family pattern: dominant 
nuclear family and secondary linear family (Wang 2006). It has been largely 
accepted that Chinese family structures have become increasingly nuclear 
family-oriented, featuring small scale, simple structures and considerable 
autonomy. Particularly for rural China, nuclearisation of rural families, the 
process by which the nuclear family becomes dominant, has been occurring 
since the 1960s (Wang, 2007). Along with the implementation of family 
planning policy since the 1970s, the situation of fewer children in families had 
caused a moderate decline of nuclear family by 2000 (Wang, 2007). For 
instance, the prevalence of the nuclear family in Sichuan was 71.23% in 1990, 
while by 2000 the rate had dropped to 57.8%, showing the largest decline in 
the whole country (Wang, 2007). Although the latest data of 2010 has not 
been analysed yet, the trend towards a decreasing frequency of rural nuclear 
                                                             
9 Based on different standards, there are different family types. The classification used in this 
research is based on the concrete situation of rural China and roughly outlines five major 
family categories (Wang, 2006).  
Nuclear family is a family group consisting of a couple and their children. Nuclear family 
includes standard nuclear family and couple nuclear family (a couple without children).  
Linear family is a family group comprised of three generations, parents, married children and 
grandchildren.  
Joint family is comprised of parents, married children, unmarried children, grandchildren, 
great grandchildren and so forth.  
One-parent family is a family group consisting of divorced, widowed or unmarried single father 
or mother and children. 
Single family is a family consisted with only a single adult who is not married and has no 
children. 
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families may still remain.   
 
 
Figure 5.4 Family Types of Sample Families of Hu Village (%) 
Source: Author’s questionnaire 
At the same time, the occurrence of the linear family, especially three-
generation linear family, has remained relatively stable (Wang, 2006). One 
explanation is that under the One-Child policy, more and more one-child-
families emerged, and they have chosen to remain close to their nuclear 
family for close family support (Wang, 2006). On top of that, the long-term 
rural-urban migration has also contributed to the rising popularity of the linear 
family household (Wang, 2009; Ye and He, 2008). Through crossing family 
types and migrant statuses of sample households, it is found that 77% of 
linear families are migrant families, but only 23% are non-migrant, while for 
nuclear families, the proportions of migrant and non-migrant families are fairly 
similar, 46.7% and 53.3 respectively. Furthermore, through a Chi-Square test 
on family types and the migrant status of households, as shown in Table 5.6, 
p=0.000; therefore, it can be concluded that there exists a dependent 
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relationship between migration and linear family arrangements. As Wang 
(2007) contended, married migrant couples often rely on linear family 
relationships which can provide invaluable help with the custody of children 
when they are absent. This conclusion can also be supported by fieldwork 
observations. Many young migrants choose to stay with their parents as a 
household for support around child custody and farming management when 
they are away.  
Table 5.6 Family Type and Migrant Status of Sample Households of Hu 
Village in 2011 (%) 
 
Migrant status (% within family type group) 
Total 
No Yes 
Nuclear family 53.3 46.7 46.7 
Linear family 23 77 44.4 
Joint family 28.6 71.4 3.1 
One-parent family 75 25.0 1.8 
Single family 88.9 11.1 4 
Total 40.9 59.1 100 
Pearson Chi-Square=30.912            df=4                                     p=0.000 
Source: Author’s questionnaire 
Note: significant level at 0.05. 
Behind the increasing popularity of linear family structures are 
institutional reasons. Due to the restriction of the Hukou system, young 
migrant couples cannot permanently reside in urban areas, so they have to 
rely on their rural community, and more specifically on rural family members. 
In addition, linear family living arrangements are also related to current 
conditions of Chinese land tenure. Rural migrants who move to cities are still 
entitled land, so that migrants have multiple choices for security. These 
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institutions also rationalise the choice of leaving children with aging parents, 
who are unable to participate in migration. As scholars have predicted, as long 
as the institutional constraints on migration remain, rural linear families will 
continue to thrive (Wang, 2009). Thus in linear families, the left-behind elderly 
stay with left-behind children while migrant couples work outside of rural 
communities, forming a very prominent family pattern in contemporary rural 
China (Ye and Pan, 2008; Ye and He, 2008). However, the migrant linear 
family greatly increases the labour burden for the left-behind elderly, in terms 
of farming work and everyday attendance of grand-children, which has in 
many cases proved to be a great challenge (Ye and He, 2008). This type of 
family at the same time highlights the fact that land is still of great importance 
to migrant families, although the income from migration is far higher than that 
from land (Fan, 2009). Therefore, within the context of transitional China, the 
high proportion of rural linear families can also be seen as a striking 
representation of rural transition. 
Combined, the other three family types are in an absolute minority, 
8.9% of the total, which reflects China’s overall situation. As scholars noted 
from the 2000 population census, the rates of single family, joint family and 
one-parent family are 8.57%, 0.57% and 6.35% respectively, giving a total 
percentage of 15.5% (Wang, 2006).      
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5.3.2 Occupations, farmer types and migration population 
Occupations  
Table 5.7 presents the occupations of sample respondents cross-correlated 
with gender. For the whole sample, dedicated farmers make up the highest 
proportion, 32.3%, followed by migrants, 25.8%, unemployed people 
(including students, retirees, and kids), 23.1%, and the other minor 
occupations.  
Table 5.7 Occupations and Gender of Sample Respondents of Hu Village 
(% in total) 
  Gender  
     Total Male Female 
  Dedicated farmer 12.1 20.3 32.3 
Part-time agricultural 
worker 
4 1.2 5.2 
Employee in local 
enterprise 
2.6 2.2 4.8 
Self-employed enterprise 3.9 2.1 6 
Government official 0.8 0.1 0.9 
Household wife 0 2 2 
Migrant 17.8 8 25.8 
Retiree 1.9 3.3 5.2 
Student 7 5.6 12.6 
Kid 3.4 1.9 5.3 
 Total 53.4 46.6 100 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire  
Note: Dedicated farmer refers to the rural resident who works full time on agriculture without 
other occupations. Part-time agricultural worker refers to the rural resident who works partly 
on farming work and partly on other agriculture-related paid work, generally around the 
resident community.  
Carter et al. (2012) conducted a rural survey covering 5 populous 
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provinces including Sichuan, 121 counties, 203 villages, 7317 households, 
and 28021 individuals, and they found that dedicated farmers represented 
34% of the total rural labour forces (aged above 15). Compared with their 
figures, if only rural labour forces aged above 15 were counted from this 
sample, the rate of dedicated farmers in Hu Village is 38%, slightly higher than 
that found by Carter et al., indicating that Hu Village is a more agricultural 
village than the 203 villages in their study. 
The difference among age groups is significant. As Table 5.8 shows, 
the level of dedicated farmers in the age group 16-30 is only 1.1%, only one 
fifth of the number found in age group 31-45 (5.4%), one tenth of the age 
group 46-60 (11.4%), and roughly one fourteenth of the elder group, 60 
above. Thus, most of the farming population currently in Hu Village is people 
aged above 45, especially people aged above 60. This indicates a status of 
aging in agricultural production. By contrast, age groups 16-30 and 31-45 
constitute the majority of migrants, while the people aged above 45 have only 
a very slight probability of taking part in migration. Interestingly, there are no 
people aged under 30 doing part-time agricultural work, and no people aged 
above 45 being employed in local enterprise. Furthermore, the middle aged 
people (30-60) take the most varieties of jobs, which may be due to their 
responsibilities to family.  
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Table 5.8 Occupations and Age groups of Sample Respondents of Hu 
Village (% in total) 
 
0-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 60+ Total 
Dedicated farmer 0.2 1.1 5.4 11.4 14.3 32.3 
Part-time  
agricultural worker 
 
 
 
 
0.9 2.6 1.6 5.2 
Employee in local 
enterprise 
 1.3 2.9 0.6 
 
4.8 
Self-employed 
enterprise 
 0.6 3.9 1.1 0.5 6 
Government official  
 
0.7 0.2 
 
0.9 
Household wife  0.7 0.6 0.6 0.1 2 
Migrant 
 
10.4 12.1 2.7 0.6 25.8 
Retiree 
 
0.7 0.4 0.5 3.6 5.2 
Student 9.5 3.2 
   
12.6 
Kid 5.3 
    
5.3 
Total 15 17.9 26.8 19.6 20.7 100 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire  
Table 5.9 clearly shows that villagers with different levels of education 
hold different jobs. Most of the dedicated farmers have primary education 
(67.4%). Most of the part-time agricultural workers are also educated to 
primary level (63.6%). However, most employees in local enterprise have 
secondary education (56.1%), and the same is found with self-employed 
enterprise. More than half the migrants hold secondary education (50.9%).  
Therefore, respondents doing agriculture-related work (full-time and part-time) 
are mostly limited to primary education, while respondents doing more non-
farming work, like migration, working in local or self-employed enterprise, are 
more likely to have secondary education. The low-education of agricultural 
practitioners may be an obstacle to the successful promotion of new 
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agricultural technologies.  
 
Table 5.9 Occupations and Education Levels of Sample Respondents of 
Hu Village (% within job groups) 
  
Education  Level  
  
Illiterate 
Primary 
school 
Secondary 
school 
High 
school 
Undergraduate 
 
Dedicated farmer 
15.2 67.4 16.3 1.1 
 
Part-time 
agricultural worker 
9.1 63.6 22.7 4.5 
 
Employee in local 
enterprise  
34.4 56.1 9.8 
 
Self-employed 
enterprise  
35.3 56.9 7.8 
 
Government 
official  
37.5 62.5 
  
Household wife 11.8 58.8 29.4 
  
Migrant 0.5 37.3 50.9 10 1.4 
Retiree 31.8 45.5 15.9 6.8 
 
Student 1.9 53.7 25 13.9 5.6 
Kid 100 
    
Source: Author’s Questionnaire  
Farmer types by farming time  
It is obvious that rural residents in the case study community often do various 
and multiple jobs simultaneously. For instance, some migrants return at peak 
times for agriculture and then return to cities. The temporal dynamics of 
farming work has given residents great flexibility for allocating their working 
time and thus maximising the payoff in terms of their everyday life. According 
to farming time in 2011, the respondents are  divided into three categories: 
full-time (dedicated farmer, working on farming for 12 months without 
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distractions from other jobs), part-time (multiple job holding farmers working 
partly on farming, ranging from 1month to 11months), non-farming 
(respondents did not worked on farming in last 12 months). As Table 5.10 
shows, it is found that, the highest proportion of the sample is the non-farming 
population at 45.6%, while full-time farmers are only 32.9%, and those who 
participated in farming for varying periods in 2011 stood at 21.5%. In total, the 
population who did at least some farming work only comprises 54.4% of all 
respondents. Further to this, of the labour force aged above 15, 38.7% had 
worked 12 months on farming work in 2011, while 25.3% had done some 
farming work, indicating that 64% of this age group undertook at least some 
farming in 2011. 36% of the sample labour forces had done no farming work in 
2011. The overall demographic structure in terms of farming time of Hu Village 
accords with national averages. According to the 2012 Blue Book of China’s 
Society, 46.6% of agricultural population has been conducting completely non-
agricultural work, while only 40% are dedicated farmers without doing any 
other non-agricultural jobs and 13.4% are conducting part-time farming 
(CASS, 2011). It seems that both nationally and locally the tendency of 
deagriculturalisation of rural residents has occurred and has become more 
and more overwhelming, although most are still connected with land. A 
substantial proportion of rural residents cannot completely leave their land, 
indicating that in contemporary rural China, for most rural families, land and 
agricultural production are still of strategic importance for  livelihoods.  
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Table 5.10 Farming Time of Sample Respondents of Hu Village and 
National Averages in 2011  
 
As a percentage of 
all sample 
respondents        
(%) 
As a percentage 
of sample 
respondents 
aged above 15 
(%) 
As a percentage 
of national 
agricultural 
population (%) 
Full-time  32.9 38.7 40 
Part-time  21.5 25.3 13.4 
Non-farming 45.6 36.0 46.6 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire; CASS, 2011.   
In addition, as Figure 5.5 shows, there are differences among different 
age groups. In the youngest adult group 16-30, 83.1% are non-farming 
residents, while only 3.9% work on farming for 12 months and 13% work 
partly on farming, making 16.9% in total working on farming. This may be 
related to the finding that most of this age group are migrants as shown 
above. 40.2% of age group 31-45 partly worked in farming in 2011, the 
highest part-time farming proportion among all the groups. This is consistent 
with the finding that this age group is the most diversified in terms of 
occupations as discussed above. 61.1% of age group 46-60 worked full-time 
on farming in 2011 and 27.5% partly, indicating that 88.6% of this group 
worked on farming in 2011, almost 5 times the proportion of the youngest 
adult group 16-30. Lastly, 69.5% of age group 60 above did full-time farming 
work, while 15.8% of them did not farm at all, which is slightly higher than that 
of age group 46-60. This may be possibly explained by the fact that some of 
the elderly group, 60 and above, are retirees who are not able to do any 
farming work. Nonetheless, the trend is roughly clear that as residents get 
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older there is more likelihood for them to undertake farming work, while the 
younger rural residents are, the more possibility there is of them doing off-
farm jobs. This finding is not contradictory with other studies about Chinese 
rural demography. Along with increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, 
increasing rural-urban migration has driven the youngest rural adults off the 
land to towns, cities, factories and so forth, leaving the elderly to farm.  
 
Figure 5.5 Farming Time Distribution on Different Age Groups in Hu 
Village in 2011 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire  
Examining the gender division, as shown by Figure 5.6, a difference in 
amounts of time spent farming exists between males and females, although 
not in a striking way. More females than males worked full-time on agriculture 
in 2011 (44.7%). However, more males than females did part-time farming 
(29.8%) and non-farming work (47.6%), and this is probably due to more 
males being involved in migration and other non-farm activities as Table 5.8 
shows. This may indicate an increasing feminisation in farming in which, more 
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and more females are undertaking most of the farming work with perhaps 
some assistance from males during peak times. Nonetheless, the overall 
proportions of both genders working on farming are fairly close, with 56.8% of 
females and 52.4% of males. In addition, the absolute farming male 
population in the sample is 239, slightly higher than females, 226. This may 
indicate that, although there exists a tendency of farming feminisation, the 
pace of the change is not so dramatic in terms of farming time.  Most males 
did not drop farming completely, but chose a more flexible schedule to cope 
with livelihood diversification. Besides, if Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 are 
examined more closely, most full-time farming is concentrated in age groups 
46-60 and 60 and above, and in the female group. Indeed, it appears that 
middle-aged females (aged 46 and above) are most likely to be dedicated to 
full-time farming. For the youngest age group, both genders have tended to 
move out of agriculture.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Farming Time and Gender Division of Sample Respondents of 
Hu Village in 2011 
Source: Author’s Questionnaire 
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Migrant population  
Outmigration, which is fuelled by modernisation and urbanisation, has long 
driven changes to the demographic profile of rural areas around the 
developing world (Lynch, 2005). As demonstrated in previous chapters, rural-
urban migration in China has been no less dramatic. The characteristics of 
rural demography may have significant implications for land-use patterns and 
agricultural production, as many empirical studies have shown (e.g. Taylor et 
al., 2003; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2003). Rural-urban migrants have become 
such an important issue in contemporary rural China that to understand who 
they are is of great importance to understand the comprehensive profile of 
rural demography. As Table 5.11 clearly shows, migrants of Hu Village are 
dominated by males (68.4%), mainly aged between 16 and 45 (87%). The 
majority of migrants (88.4%) have secondary (51.6%) and primary school 
education (36.8%), and only 0.4% are illiterate. Compared with the non-
migrants, it appears that rural migrants are generally from the elite of rural 
residents, with higher education and good physical health. These 
characteristics of rural migrants in Hu Village are similar to provincial trends. 
According to the latest National Agricultural Census in 2006, 44.8% of 
Sichuan rural migrants are under 30 years old. 61.7% are males and 38.3% 
are females. Only 0.8% are illiterate, and more than four-fifths have a primary-
level education or above (Lu, 2011). Compared with national averages, 
according to a nationally representative survey covering 16 provinces in 2006, 
   
177 
 
it was found that 64.7% of rural migrants are males, with a mean age of 29, 
and 61.4% are married. Only 2.3% are illiterate, and 83.8% of the sample 
have a primary school or higher level of education (Hu et al., 2011). These 
characteristics of rural migrants described above are also similar to the 
findings of more previous studies on China’s rural migrants (for example, 
Zhao, 1999; Lei and Lu, 2005; Maëlys et al., 2009).  
Table 5.11 General Characteristics of Migrants of Sample Respondents 
of Hu Village in 2011 (%) 
 Migrant status (% in each group) 
Total   
no yes 
Gender    
Male 48 68.6 53.4 
Female 52 31.4 46.6 
    
Age ranges    
 0-15 20 0.4 14.9 
16-30 10 40.8 18 
31-45 20 46.2 26.8 
46-60 22.8 10.3 19.6 
 60+ 27.3 2.2 20.7 
    
Education    
Illiterate 16.8 0.4 12.5 
Primary school 53.9 36.8 49.4 
Secondary school 23.5 51.6 30.8 
High school 4.9 9.9 6.2 
Undergraduate 1.0 1.3 1.1 
    
Marital status    
Married 68.6 78 71.1 
Unmarried 26.8 19.7 24.9 
Divorced 0.2 1.3 0.5 
Widowed 4.4 0.9 3.5 
    
Farming 
participation 
   
Full-time farming  44.5 0 32.9 
Part-time farming 19 26.9 21.5 
Non-farming  36.5 73.1 45.6 
Total  73.9 26.1 100 
Source: Author’s questionnaire  
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For the sample migrants, most of them (73.1%) did not take part in 
farming work in 2011, which may indicate that they stay almost all the time on 
jobs in remote cities, though they may return Hu Village for festival or other 
occasions. Although as Table 5.11 shows, 26.9% of Hu Village sample 
migrants still did part-time farming in 2011, so it is undeniable that the more 
physically capable and educated rural residents are migrating between 
villages and cities, which may have considerable influence on land use or 
agricultural production in villages of origin.   
5.4 Conclusion  
To fulfill the first objective of this research, this chapter presents the 
demographic profile of the case study village through locating it within both 
national and regional transitional contexts. The demography of Hu Village has 
both similarities to national and regional averages, and specialties due to its 
specific geography, socio-economy and history. Through examining Hu 
Village’s demography based on official village population data and the survey 
data collected by this project, several general demographic characteristics of 
Hu Village can be identified: 
 Consistent with regional and national demographic changes, Hu Village 
faces an aging tendency amongst the population with a substantial 
proportion of elderly people compared to that of young people.  
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 The gender ratio of Hu Village is fairly balanced compared with both 
regional and national high imbalance in this regard.  
 Within a region which is recognised for under performance in terms of 
education, the overall educational levels of Hu Village are even lower. 
Generally, the youngest males are more likely to possess higher 
education, whereas elderly females are more likely to have lower levels 
of education, or to be illiterate.  
 Regarding marital status, there is a high proportion of married people in 
Hu Village, but marriage amongst young people is less prevalent and 
adult males are more likely to be unmarried than females.   
 Hu Village families are dominated by the nuclear and linear family 
structures. The existence of massive linear families is driven by land 
requirements, population changes, institutional initiatives and high 
levels of rural-urban migration.   
 As for occupations, migration and dedicated farmers are the two major 
job holdings for Hu Village residents, with other small proportions going 
to massive varieties of non-farm activities. The young and males, those 
with high education, are more likely to take part in migration and other 
non-farm jobs. The elderly and females with poorer education are more 
likely to do farming work.  
 Although there is a tendency of deagriculturalisation judging from the 
occupations, land and agricultural production is still strategically 
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important to most rural families. Part-time farming may increase since 
the multiple-job holding tendency of rural residents continues 
expanding in the future.   
 Most migrants are younger people with good physical health and higher 
education, leaving the elderly, females and children behind in the 
village. This type of farming population may influence land-use 
patterns.   
Broadly, it is found that the population of Hu Village is not solely an 
agricultural population but is more mixed, with both agricultural and non-
agricultural residents. Obviously, the static Hukou registration deters accurate 
representations of rural demography at a highly mobile time. Under the 
dramatic transformation of the Chinese economy and society, rural space has 
been opened to the outside at an unprecedented scale, leading to high 
mobility patterns for rural residents. More and more rural residents scatter all 
around the county, the province or the whole country. The village can never be 
the boundary for residents. In addition to the spatial heterogeneity of rural 
residents, temporal dynamics is another important characteristic of 
contemporary rural populations. More and more rural residents are commuting 
between urban destinations and rural hometowns, between factories or 
modern services and agricultural production.   
These demographic characteristics of Hu Village are tightly 
interconnected with macro socio-economic transformations. Transitional China 
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has long prioritised industrialisation and urbanisation, providing massive 
opportunities for rural residents and leading to an overwhelming trend of 
deagriculturalisation, pushing the most energetic and ambitious people out of 
land, agriculture and villages. The farming population has been dramatically 
changed. At the same time, as an ongoing transition society, many relevant 
institutions and policies on land tenure and social security are still incomplete, 
so that most rural residents still greatly rely on land. When highlighting the 
side of deagriculturalisation, migration and urbanisation, the other side of 
strong attachment to land cannot be underestimated. To better understand the 
real situation of agricultural production in contemporary China, both sides 
need to be carefully and fairly examined. Therefore, as long as the institutional 
barriers for migration remain, the part-time farming population will continue to 
exist, or even to expand with increasing young people joining in migration or 
other non-farm jobs.   
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Chapter 6 Economic Drivers of 
Agricultural Production in Transitional 
China: the Case of Hu Village  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter has demonstrated the demographic characteristics of 
contemporary Hu Village, which to a certain degree also represent an epitome 
of rural China. To fulfill the second objective of this project, the ensuing 
chapter will explore the economic drivers of agricultural production, or more 
specifically, identifying underlying economic factors and showing how they are 
influencing agricultural production at the micro-level of the household. 
Fundamentally, the process of agricultural production is constituted by both 
physical elements (e.g. climate conditions, soil characteristics, biotic 
resources and pollutants) and anthropogenic factors (e.g. socio-economic and 
political factors). Either part can influence the performance of agricultural 
production significantly (Hoang, 2013). With respect to economic factors, as 
many researchers have revealed, agricultural production has been driven by 
international trade and globalising agricultural markets at the global level, and 
at the national level by per capita income growth, urbanisation and 
commercialisation/market chains (Hazell and Wood, 2008). Agricultural land-
use has also been influenced by drivers like urbanisation, market 
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development and so on (Lambin et al., 2001).  China’s agriculture has been 
primarily driven by economic growth, urbanisation, agricultural markets, 
transportation infrastructure and irrigation, and subsidy incentives (Huang et 
al., 2010), as well as non-agricultural sector development, per capita income 
growth and consumption pattern changes (Huang, 2010), all of which together 
have significantly changed various aspects of China’s agriculture (e.g. output 
growth, crop pattern, organisation and operation mode). If translating these 
macro-level economic forces into the local level, into rural communities, rural 
households or even individual farmers, key characteristics can be identified in 
terms of: the changing agricultural demographic structure (driven by 
increasing industrialisation and urbanisation in China’s case as detailed in 
Chapter 5); economic diversification of rural households (non-farm economic 
opportunities); and rural community infrastructure and market access 
(including agricultural input and output markets).  These can be seen as local 
economic drivers for agricultural production in a global assessment (Hazell 
and Wood, 2008), or more particularly for developing countries (Rigg, 1998; 
Reardon, 2000; Davis et al., 2009; Haggblade et al., 2010). 
For transitional China, the dramatic socio-economic transformation of 
the rural space has primarily surrounded the process of agricultural 
adjustments (namely the substantial reduction in employment in agriculture) 
as experienced by many other developing countries (Johnson, 2000). 
Furthermore, China’s agricultural adjustment has synchronised with the 
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process of rural economic diversification, reflecting at the household level 
namely in the diversification of livelihoods. Rural income sources have greatly 
expanded and become more varied, propelled by a huge amount of non-farm, 
especially migrant, opportunities (Huang, 2010). As the previous chapter 
revealed, the continuous de-population of the agricultural sector may be just a 
representation of the changing Chinese rural economy. Besides, rural 
markets, like agricultural input and output markets have been greatly 
developed to optimise the allocation of agricultural resources. Farmers obtain 
agricultural technological inputs (e.g. seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, and machines) from input markets, and sell agricultural products to 
markets. Additionally, to assist agricultural development and enhance rural 
households’ income, the Chinese government has also initiated numerous 
economic projects and policies. Therefore, as discussed above, the drivers 
that affect agricultural production at the local level are all prominent and 
prevailing in rural China, and this chapter, based on the case of Hu Village, 
examines economic diversification of rural households, agricultural markets 
and government rural economic policies and projects specifically.  
There are five sections in this chapter. Section 6.2 examines how 
economic diversification of rural households changes or influences agricultural 
production on aspects of productivity, agricultural structure and technology 
use. Section 6.3 investigates agricultural markets, including how both 
agricultural input and output markets are functioning on agricultural production 
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in Hu Village. Section 6.4 analyses influences on government economic 
policies, like agricultural subsidies and modern agricultural development 
projects, and considers what effect these may have on Hu Village agriculture. 
Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.  
6.2 Economic diversification and agricultural 
production 
It has been widely accepted that rural households, whether in developed or in 
developing countries, have long been economically diversified. As many 
researchers have revealed, livelihood diversification has been the most 
notable characteristic of rural economies in developing countries (Bernstein, 
1992; Ellis, 1998; Rigg et al., 2012). For rural households in China, 
diversification has been no less dramatic, as various terminologies for 
contemporary Chinese rural households or farmers keep emerging, for 
instance, “semi-worker, semi-cultivator” by Philip Huang (2006), “multiple job 
holdings” by Ploeg and Ye (2010), and “part-time farmer” by Xiang and Han 
(2005). The increasingly diversified livelihoods mean re-allocation of labour 
forces spatially and temporally (Jonson, 2000), which inevitably would 
influence the labour inputs and arrangements in respect of agriculture. This 
section will first present the current state of household economic 
diversification in Hu Village, and then further explore the effects of diversified 
rural livelihoods on the performance of agricultural production, as measured 
   
186 
 
by agricultural productivity, agricultural structure and agricultural technology 
usage.  
6.2.1 Household income structure 
Chapter 5 has shown that the residents of Hu Village are undertaking diverse 
occupations, but how these varied jobs contribute to rural households 
economically in terms of income has not been discussed. To remain 
consistent with national statistics, two sets of household income are 
calculated as Table 6.1 shows. For Hu Village in 2011, the per capita total 
household income is 11042 Yuan, substantially higher than the provincial 
average and also higher than the national average.  However, in comparison 
with eastern advanced regions of China like Shandong Province, with 12146 
Yuan per capita, Hu Village is in a medium position. The per capita household 
cash income of sample households in 2011 is 9978 Yuan, comparing with 
Sichuan province, 7249 Yuan, China, 8639 Yuan (NBSC, 2012). Thus, Hu 
Village is well above the national and regional average in terms of household 
income.  
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Table 6.1 Household Income Distribution of Sample Households of Hu 
Village in 2011 
 
Total 
Household 
Income 
(Yuan) 
%of Total 
Household 
Income 
Household 
Cash 
Income 
(Yuan) 
% of Total 
Household 
Cash Income 
Agricultural  
income 
16323 38.9 11097 29.3 
Crops 5665 13.5 1591 4.2 
Rice 2602 6.2 379 1.0 
Rape 1175 2.8 568 1.5 
Corn 420 1.0 - - 
Sweet potato 672 1.6 - - 
Citrus 797 1.9 644 1.7 
Livestock 10658 25.4 9506 25.1 
Pig 8057 19.2 7726 20.4 
Cattle 42 0.1 76 0.2 
Rabbit 210 0.5 114 0.3 
Chicken 462 1.1 38 0.1 
Duck 336 0.8 - - 
Silkworm 1301 3.1 1326 3.5 
Fish 252 0.6 227 0.6 
Non-agricultural 
income 
25638 61.1 26777 70.7 
Local non-farm 
business and 
employment 
8518 20.3 9241 24.6 
Migration 
remittance 
17120 40.8 17460 46.1 
Total 41961 100 37874 100 
Per capita of Hu 
Village in 2011 
11042  9967  
Per capita of 
Sichuan in 2011 
8656  7249  
Per capita of 
China in 2011 
-  8639  
Source: Author questionnaire and NBSC (2012)  
Note: Agricultural income (or farm income) refers to all the income inflows derived from the 
production of crops, livestock, forest or fish products from natural resources. Non-agriculture 
income (or non-farm income) refers to all the income inflows derived from all the other income 
sources, part-time local labouring, wage or self-employed works, governmental jobs and 
migration and other non-farm work. Total household income includes all the agricultural output 
(calculated by multiplying output by market price of the year) and all non-agricultural income. 
Total household cash income includes all the cash made from selling agricultural output by 
sample households and all the non-agricultural income. There is also a small amount of 
subsidy income (about 1500 Yuan per ha) from government for every household, which is not 
included here.  
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Examining further the income structure for Hu Village in 2011, 
agricultural income occupies 38.9% of total household income, with 61.1% 
non-agricultural income. Comparing globally, Reardon and his colleagues 
calculated from 54 rural income surveys from the 1990s and 2000s and found 
that for the whole developing world the non-farm share of rural income 
occupies about 35 - 50% in various continents, with Asia (not including China) 
holding the largest proportion, 51% (Reardon et al., 2007). Therefore, in 
broader contexts, Hu Village is quite a non-farm-dominated community. More 
strikingly, with regard to cash income of Hu Village households, only 29.3% 
comes from agriculture while non-agricultural sources contribute up to 70.7%.  
Within the high non-farm income share of Hu Village, migration 
remittance contributes most heavily, 40.8% out of 61.1%, or 46.1% out of 
70.7%. Local non-farm business and employment only take a minor 
proportion, 20.3% of total household income or 24.6% of total household cash 
income. Clearly, migration is the most significant income generating activity for 
Hu Village households, which explains why Hu Village has a much higher 
non-farm share of rural income in comparison with the average for the whole 
developing world. In contrast to Hu Village, transfers and remittances only 
contribute 11% of Asian rural income on average, with local non-farm 
business and employment being up to 40% (Reardon et al., 2007). Rural-
urban migration features heavily in Hu Village, as revealed in previous 
chapters, and a large proportion of migrants (70%) from Hu Village undertake 
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construction work, driven by the soaring Chinese real estate industry in recent 
years. The wage of construction workers is about 150 Yuan to 200 Yuan per 
day, and for skilled ones, even up to 300 Yuan to 400 Yuan per day, so that 
the monthly income of migrant construction workers may be 3000 Yuan with 
only 20 working days. This is substantially higher than national average 
migrant monthly wage, which was 2049 Yuan in 2011 (NBSC, 2012). Attracted 
by these high wages, many young people, many even under 18 and dropping 
out of school, follow their fathers to conduct construction work around 
Chengdu or other cities and hope to become skilled workers.  
Another substantial non-agricultural income source in Hu Village is self-
employed enterprises, contributing 13% to total household cash income. This 
can be explained by various small private businesses in Hu Village: 5 retail 
departments, 2 barbershops, 4 chemical fertilizer retail shops, 2 seeds and 
pesticides shops, 3 commercial feedstuff shops and 5 tea bars.  
Within agricultural production of Hu Village, cash earned from crops 
only contributes 4.2% to the total household cash income, while livestock cash 
income represents 25.1%, almost six times the amount from crops. From 
these two sets of data, it is clear that since cash income from sold agricultural 
produce only represents a small part of total agricultural output (1591 Yuan 
out of 5665 Yuan, namely, 27.4%), farming in Hu Village is still largely for 
subsistence. The primary reason lies in the small farm land size per capita. In 
Hu Village, each resident is distributed roughly 0.046-0.053 ha paddy land 
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(with slight differences among 8 groups), and if all is cultivated by rice, only 
about 400kg rice is produced for one person for a whole year and almost no 
surplus is left. Additionally, due to the land tenure system, new births and 
married-in wives after 1998 10  were not entitled to land, which makes 
population/land pressure more serious. As many farmers said in interview, if 
all their family members stay home, the grain produced from their own land 
could not sustain themselves. Therefore, the land tenure and population 
pressure in this region is the main cause for the dominance of subsistence 
agriculture.  
Citrus, as the most important cash crop in Hu Village, and in Qingshen 
County, used to be a major source of household income, but the prices in 
recent years have been so low that most citrus farmers have stopped 
attending and managing their citrus trees. And within the livestock cash 
income sector, pig farming is the most prominent activity contributing most of 
the livestock income (20.4%). One thing worthy to mention here is that pig 
farming is very risky in China, given very unstable pig prices and various 
swine diseases. In 2011, the pig price was very favourable and most pig 
farmers made a good profit from pig raising. In normal years, the proportion of 
pig income may be less. Chicken and ducks in Hu Village are primarily for 
self-consumption so that they only occupy a very small part of household 
income.  
                                                             
10
 From 1998, central government issued the second land readjustment, making farmers’ land 
tenure unchanged for 30 years.  
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Seeing household income among sample households as Figure 6.1 
shows, 127 households (56.4%) receive most of their income from non-
agricultural sources (located on the right side of the dotted line), and this is 
modestly more than the share of households dominated by agricultural 
income (located in left side of the dotted line), 98 out of 225, namely 43.6%. 
Furthermore, 34 households have no non-agricultural income, while only 3 
households did not undertake agricultural production in 2011, indicating that 
98.7% of sample households still conduct agricultural production and 85% 
participate in non-farm occupations. It also clearly implies that although most 
rural households progressively rely on non-agricultural income, agriculture 
does remain critically important to rural livelihoods in China. 188 households 
(83.6%) receive incomes both from agricultural and non-agricultural sources. 
In another words, they are economically diversified households. 
Comparatively, in another hilly village in northern China, Ploeg and Ye (2010) 
observed that in a sample of 52 households, 77% obtained most income from 
non-agrarian activities in 2008, which is probably due to the much less fertile 
land and hostile agroclimatic conditions in that area. Similarly, in their 
observation, 81% households are engaged in multiple job holding.  
Nonetheless, the nature of diversified households slightly varies in different 
locations of China, as Deininger et al. (2012) observed from a national sample 
(including Sichuan) in 2008, 64% are economically diversified households, 
with slight differences among sample provinces, for instance, Sichuan, 67.5%, 
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Hebei, 62.4%, Shaanxi, 71%. Behind these figures, it is evident that for 
Chinese rural households, diversification has become a prevailing and 
dominant strategy. This is also echoed by studies in other developing 
countries. Using data from 16 developing countries (not including China), 
Davis et al. (2010) found that more than 80% of sample households are 
engaged in at least one non-farm activity.  
  
Figure 6.1 Household Income Sources of Sample Households in 2011 
(Yuan) 
Source: Author questionnaire 
With respect to income quantity, most households’ non-agricultural 
income averages between 20,000 Yuan and 50,000 Yuan (117 households, 
52%), with agricultural income of under 20,000 Yuan (146 households, 65%), 
indicating that non-agricultural occupations are more lucrative and stable than 
agriculture. For the cash income source distribution as Figure 6.2 shows, cash 
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earning from agriculture is strikingly minor compared with the substantially 
higher proportion of non-agricultural income. This gives the notion of   
comparatively low benefits from agricultural production. Nonetheless, referring 
back to Figure 6.1, 9 households obtain non-agricultural income above 80,000 
Yuan and, notably, 8 households have agricultural income above 80,000 
Yuan, while only 3 households have both high non-agricultural income and 
high agricultural income, which may imply two conclusions. Firstly, agricultural 
production can make as much profit as non-agricultural activities do. Second, 
most high income households (14 out of 17) tend to specialise on agricultural 
production or non-agricultural occupations, rather than diversifying evenly 
within both. This also partly accords with the cross-country analysis of  Davis 
et al. (2010), which concluded that rich households tend to specialise, but they 
are “more likely to specialise in non-agricultural wages and less likely to 
specialise in farming” (Davis et al., 2010:57). Another explanation could be 
that 8 higher agricultural income households of Hu Village all specialise in pig 
farming and, as discussed earlier, pig prices were very favourable in 2011.  
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Figure 6.2 household Cash Income Sources of Sample Households in 
2011 (Yuan) 
Source: Author questionnaire 
More specifically, rural households are often classified into several 
subcategories according to different perspectives on diversification. For 
instance, Démurger et al. (2010) grouped rural households by their 
diversification strategies into four types: no diversification, on-farm 
diversification, local off-farm diversification and migration. To measure the 
diversification (and specialisation) degree of rural households in 16 
developing countries, Davis et al. (2010:56) defined “a household as 
specialised if it receives more than 75% of its income from a single source 
and diversified if no single source is greater than that amount”. As they further 
pointed out, the threshold of how much percentage of income from a single 
source is changeable, but the broad patterns remain.  Joining together non-
agricultural jobs as an indicator of specialisation is also possible, and this 
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would increase the share of households defined as specialised. Bearing these 
comments in mind, and considering the purpose of this research, the sample 
households of Hu Village in terms of economic diversification can be basically 
grouped into four categories:  
 dedicated farming households where agricultural income accounts for 
more than 80% of total household income;  
 I Part-time households: with agricultural income constituting between 
50% and 80%; 
 II Part-time households: with agricultural income constituting between 
20% and 50%;  
 Non-farming households: defined as rural households with agricultural 
income lower than 20%.  
The threshold of specialisation used here is 80% and all the non-agricultural 
income sources are joined together to fit the research purpose. The degree of 
part-time farming among households is further differentiated by the middle line 
of 50% agricultural income. This criterion is consistent with that of China’s 
national statistics, and is thus convenient for purposes of comparison (see 
Table 6.2). Furthermore, to explore the relationship between household part-
time farming, household total income, and household job holding situation, the 
household total income quartile and household job diversification types are 
listed in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Household Types Classified by Household Income 
Diversification of Sample Households in Hu Village 
 
Dedicated 
farming 
households 
I Part-time 
farming 
households 
II Part-time 
farming 
households 
Non-farming 
households 
% of sample 
households 
21.3 21.3 39.2 18.2 
Sichuan in 2008 
(%) 
17.9 21.7 49.8 10.6 
Sichuan in 2000 
(%) 
22.6 36.4 38.7 2.3 
Sichuan in 1996 
(%) 
28.8 51.7 18.4 1.1 
Mean of household 
Income (Yuan) 
27168 52075 54032 54671 
Household total income quartile (%) 
Quartile I 66.0 25.0 10.2 8.5 
Quartile II 14.9 16.7 28.6 40.6 
Quartile III 10.6 29.2 31.6 21.9 
Quartile IV 8.5 29.2 29.6 29.0 
Household job diversification (%) 
No diversification 70.2 0 0 0 
Only local non-farm 
activities 
25.5 37.5 22.4 30.6 
Only migration 4.3 35.4 46.9 37.5 
Both local non-farm 
and migration 
0 27.1 30.6 31.9 
Source: Author Questionnaire and Sichuan data from Liao (2012).  
Note: For household job diversification, “no diversification” refers to households without any 
non-farm jobs. “Only local non-farm activities” refers to households exclusively undertaking 
non-farm jobs in local area. “Only migration” includes households with only migrant members. 
“Both local non-farm and migration” refers to households with members undertaking both 
local non-farm and migration activities.    
As Table 6.2 shows, for the 225 sample households, only 21.3% are 
dedicated farming households. Most are part-time farming households 
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(60.5%), out of which most are households with non-agricultural income of 
more than 50%. 41 households (18.2%) specialise in non-agricultural income. 
Regardless of the specific definition threshold, the overall pattern of Hu Village 
households can also be found in many other developing countries as Davis et 
al. (2010) argued. It is more striking to note the income gaps among the four 
household types, as part-time farming and non-farming households receive 
around two times more income than dedicated farming households do, with 
non-farming households earning the most. The correlation between higher 
household income and higher specialisation in non-agricultural occupations 
has been confirmed in other parts of China (Ploeg and Ye, 2010; Démurger et 
al., 2010) and also in other parts of the developing world (Ellis and Freeman, 
2004; Davis et al., 2010).  
Table 6.2 shows that the basic structure of Hu Village household types 
is roughly consistent with the average across Sichuan. Historically, a trend 
has been identified at the provincial level that numbers of dedicated farming 
households and I part-time farming households have kept declining, with II 
part-time farming and non-farming households increasing in prevalence. This 
indicates that in terms of income sources, rural households have kept moving 
towards further reliance on non-farm activities. Therefore, non-farm jobs have 
been and may continue to be of great importance to the economic status of 
rural households (Liao, 2012).  Nonetheless, seeing the share of part-time 
farming households as a whole, it has largely remained above 70% during the 
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twelve years from 1996 to 2008, although the shares of specialised 
households have varied. Therefore, economic diversification of rural 
households in Sichuan has become predominant, which is a process also 
greatly echoed in other developing countries. Davis et al. (2010:61) concluded 
after reviewing 16 countries’ data, “diversification, not specialisation, is the 
norm, although most countries show significant levels of household 
specialisation in non-agricultural activities as well”. As most non-farm jobs are 
found in urban areas, in industries and service sectors, the fortunes of more 
and more rural households have become tightly bound with macro-economic 
conditions. It is safe to predict that non-farm income has become established 
as the engine for increasing rural incomes, whether for China or more 
particularly for Sichuan.  
Considering household income levels and employment conditions, the 
picture is a little more complex. Not surprisingly, dedicated farming 
households mostly feature in the lowest income quartile (66%) and are mostly 
without any non-farm jobs (70.2%). More than half of diversified households (I 
part-time and II part-time households) belong to income quartile III and IV, and 
their occupations rely on local non-farm activities or migration or both. 
Especially, migration is significant for both types of diversified households, II 
part-time (77.5%) and I part-time (62.5%). Nonetheless, local non-farm 
activities also play a significant role, especially for I part-time farming (64.6%). 
Interestingly, non-farming households occupy the least percentage of quartile I 
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(8.5%), with many belonging to income quartile II (40%) and only 29% to 
quartile IV. Given that non-farming households have the highest average 
household total income, this indicates a considerable income gap within non-
farming households. This is understandable in Hu Village, as some non-
farming households receive very high income (often more than 20 thousand 
Yuan) for doing businesses. The complex relationships between income and 
household specialisation have also been found in other countries (Davis et al., 
2010). In terms of occupations, non-farming households seem to specialise 
equally in local non-farm activities, migration or both, implying that local non-
farm activities can also provide good opportunities for households to make 
considerable income. Overall, crosstabulations among the three household 
classifications indicate that with such diverse and dynamic rural households, 
any single classification is not able to capture the complex picture.  
So far it can be seen that rural households are not only taking 
advantage of non-agricultural activities, but that they are also increasingly 
relying on them. In China, the fundamental reality of a very large population 
with relatively small amounts of land, abundant surpluses of rural labour 
forces, a fast pace of industrialisation and urbanisation and the land tenure 
system all contribute to the tremendous phenomenon of diversification of rural 
households (Xiang and Han, 2005). Additionally, as argued by researchers, 
the economic diversification of rural households virtually signifies a kind of 
integration between the specialisation of labour at the individual level and the 
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professional diversification of livelihoods at the household level (Xiang and 
Han, 2005; Tong and Wen, 2010). Therefore, with removing more and more 
adults into various non-farm sectors and greatly enhancing labour efficiency in 
terms of income, the amount of labour and time left for farming may have 
reduced considerably. The spatial and temporal labour restructuring driven by 
economic diversification of rural households may bring substantial implications 
for agricultural production as many researchers have argued (Jonson, 2000; 
van den Berg, 2007).  The following three subsections will specifically explore 
the linkages between economic diversification and agricultural production in 
terms of agricultural productivity, agricultural structure and technology usage.  
6.2.2 Economic diversification and agricultural productivity 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, literature on the linkages between economic 
diversification of rural households and agriculture has been primarily focused 
on the side of agriculture as a determinant of livelihood diversification, while 
the impacts of non-farm activities on agricultural production has received little 
attention (Davis et al., 2009). Even within the literature on the later issue, 
efforts have been made in respect of selected aspects of agriculture, 
especially on whether non-farm income enhances agricultural output value or 
income through, for example, releasing farmers’ credit constraints (Evans and 
Ngau (1991) for Kenya; de Janvery et al. (2005) and Huang et al. (2009) for 
China; Oseni and Winters (2009) for Nigeria; Kilic et al. (2009) for Albania and 
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Hertz (2009) for Bulgaria. This research argues that the simplified model of 
“non-farm income raising farming capital input and thus increasing farm 
revenue” exclusively focuses on cash flows between the two sectors and 
cannot capture the complex picture of the interactions between economic 
diversification of rural households and various aspects of agriculture. 
Therefore, this research, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data of Hu 
Village, will present a more comprehensive picture on the impacts of 
economic diversification of rural households on agriculture through breaking 
agricultural production down into three aspects: agricultural productivity, 
agricultural structure (crop pattern, diversification and so on), and the 
production process (technology input and labour).Some researchers have 
analysed one or two of them (e.g. Ellis and Freeman, 2004 on crop 
productivity in four African countries; Huang et al., 2009 on fruit cultivation in 
China). This section will first examine how the progressive economic 
diversification of China’s rural households influences agricultural productivity.  
Before specifically exploring crop productivity variation in different 
levels of economically diversified households, it is essential to examine what 
position Hu Village crop productivities hold in broader backgrounds through a 
simple comparison with provincial and national averages for 2011. It can be 
seen from Table 6.3 that all the crop productivities of Hu Village are well 
between provincial and national averages, with different crops holding 
different specific positions. Rice productivity is almost equal to the national 
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average, but is well below the provincial average, while rape productivity is 
much higher than the national average but slightly lower than the provincial 
average. The weather and soil type of Sichuan are not perfect for corn, so the 
productivity for this crop is well below the national average.  
Most studies on linkages between rural economic diversification and 
crop productivity at the household level group households primarily by 
household income. For example, Evans and Ngau (1991) and Ellis and 
Freeman (2004) compared crop productivities according only to household 
income quartiles, which is only one indicator of  household economic 
conditions and may easily omit other important aspects of households. This 
research adopts a multiple classification strategy to compare crop productivity 
variations among households. Davis et al. (2009), Evan and Ngau (1991) and 
Reardon et al. (1994) argued that the degree of rural household 
diversification, household total income magnitude, non-agricultural income 
magnitude, and labour diversification all may influence agriculture production. 
Although these four aspects often correlate with each other, the relationships 
are varied and not straightforward. For instance, diversified households are 
not necessarily richer than specialised households (Davis et al., 2009). 
Therefore to comprehensively understand the productivity variation among 
rural households, four different group standards are used here. To compare 
the difference among multiple groups, the Kruskal Wallis test was run to test 
statistical significance to a level of 0.05 as Table 6.3 shows.  
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Table 6.3 Crop Productivity Variation in Different Household Types in 
2011  
 
Rice  
(kg/ha) 
Rape 
(kg/ha) 
Corn 
(kg/ha) 
Citrus 
(kg/ha) 
Gross 
value of 
crops 
(Yuan/ha) 
Productivity of 
Hu Village in 
2011 
6750 2160 5445 26235 14955 
Productivity of 
Sichuan in 
2011 
7605 2220 5145 - - 
Productivity of 
China in 2011 
6690 1830 5745 - - 
Household income diversification level   
Dedicated 
farming  
6720 2100 5190 31470 14460 
I part-time 
farming  
6795 2190 5565 27630 15555 
II part-time 
farming  
6765 2160 5430 25230 14325 
Non-farming  6615 2175 5700 24990 15885 
p-value 0.973 0.892 0.739 0.322 0.237 
Household by job diversification 
No 
diversification  
6765 2115 5340 30465 13905 
Only local 
non-farm 
activities 
6900 2160 5490 26085 16035 
Only 
migration  
6660 2145 5535 24690 14520 
Both local 
non-farm and 
migration  
6705 2145 5460 29955 15150 
p-value 0.512 0.557 0.974 0.123 0.638 
Household total income quartile   
Quartile I 6555 2070 4860 29010 14025 
Quartile II 6615 2160 5415 25845 15465 
Quartile III 6810 2085 5805 22125 15750 
Quartile IV 7005 2190 5655 27900 15840 
p-value 0.017 0.262 0.107 0.370 0.103 
Household non-agricultural income quartile   
Quartile I 6735 2055 5250 29820 14460 
Quartile II 6615 2205 5175 24495 15015 
Quartile III 6765 2115 5760 27735 15165 
Quartile IV 6900 2130 5655 26505 15195 
p-value 0.296 0.469 0.379 0.670 0.685 
Source: Author questionnaire and national and provincial data calculated from 
NBSC (2012).  
Note: One-way ANOVA is a sound test to compare group means but it requires normal 
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distribution of data. Through normality test, most data in this research was found not to have 
normal distribution patterns. Therefore, the Kruskal Wallis test is used here which does not 
require normal distribution. Gross value of crops is calculated by all the agricultural output 
value, divided by land sown area.  
Table 6.3 shows that different crops perform differently for different 
groups of households.  For the two most important crops, rice and rape, there 
are no significant yield gaps in all four classification groups, with the largest 
gap being 450 kg/ha of rice between household total income quartile I and IV. 
Especially for rape, the largest gap is only 150 kg/ha between household non-
agricultural income quartile I and quartile II. Interestingly, for both rice and 
rape, households specialised on farming (whether by income level or job 
diversification) are less productive than diversified households. With respect 
to income magnitude, it seems that generally households with higher total 
income and non-agricultural income are more productive than households 
with the lower two types of incomes. However, there is no statistical 
significance of group differences between rice and rape productivity among all 
groups, except rice productivity by household total income quartile (p=0.017), 
indicating that wealthier households are consistently more productive than 
poorer households. This is understandable in the case of Hu Village, because 
rice is the staple food for most households, and richer households may invest 
more material inputs to guarantee the production of rice.  
For corn and citrus, the yield gaps among households are relatively 
larger than rice and rape, with the largest corn yield gap of 795 kg/ha between 
household total income quartile I and IV, and the largest citrus yield gap of 
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6885 kg/ha, between household total income quartile I and III. This probably 
can be explained by the fact that their cultivation is more casual than rice and 
rape in Hu Village. For example, corn is often cultivated in different conditions, 
some in dry upland, some in fertile paddy field and some intercropped with 
fruit trees. As mentioned in previous chapters, due to very unfavourable prices 
in recent years, citrus has been less intensively managed by Hu villagers, and 
the input intensity varies greatly among households. Table 6.3 shows, for corn 
production, households specialised in farming (whether by income level or job 
diversification) again are not as productive as diversified households, and 
households with a larger magnitude of total household income and non-
agricultural income seem to be more productive than households with smaller 
magnitudes of the two types of incomes. While citrus productivity does not 
follow the route of the other three crops, with households specialised on 
farming and less income producing more citrus than diversified and richer 
households doing. This can be explained by the fact that farming-based, and 
often poor, households usually keep attending citrus trees even in these 
unfavourable years, as they have relatively enough labour and time. This is 
also echoed by the research of Huang et al. (2009) regarding off-farm 
employment and fruit production in Shandong Province of China, and the 
finding that households with off-farm working labourers tend to have a lower 
likelihood and intensity of fruit production compared with households without 
off-farm income streams. Be that as it may, there is still no statistically 
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significant difference between corn and citrus among all types of household 
groups (all the p-values >0.05).  
So far, for individual crop productivities in Hu Village, two main 
observations can be drawn. First for rice and rape, there is no significant 
productivity gap among households grouped by various standards, and the 
productivity levels of most households are statistically close. Second, although 
without significant variational disparity, occupationally diversified and richer 
households tend to be slightly more productive than households 
predominated by farming and with less income. This may be related to the fact 
that dedicated farming and poor households are mostly old families, or old 
singles who own small areas of land.  Such households produce mainly for 
self-consumption and in the producing process often invest less inputs than 
other households do. This is to some degree consistent with the findings of de 
Janvry et al. (2005) in China that participation in non-farm activities has a 
positive spillover effect on household farm production.    
To further examine the overall crop productivity in terms of value as 
many researchers have done (Evans and Ngau, 1991; Ellis and Freeman, 
2004; Lin and Deng, 2012), gross crop revenue per ha is also calculated as 
the last column of Table 6.3 shows. Without a significant gap, diversified 
households again tended to be more productive than households specialised 
on farming. Research on crop productivity in Hubei Province of China by Xia 
and Luo (2012) presents similar findings, namely that land productivities 
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among households with different degrees of income diversification are quite 
close and without statistically significant differences. Furthermore, households 
with higher total income tend to have higher gross crop productivity which 
seems consistent with an observation from four African countries (Ellis and 
Freeman 2004), although in the African cases, the productivity gaps among 
different quartiles (the highest and the lowest ratio more than 3) are much 
higher than that of Hu Village (highest and lowest ratio only 1.1), indicating 
that in Hu Village, the overall productivity level is relatively close among 
different income quartiles. The non-agricultural income quartile household 
group shows a similar trend, that households with higher non-agricultural 
income tend to be more productive in terms of gross crop revenue per unit. 
Through statistical testing, again, gross crop revenue per land unit of Hu 
Village is not significantly different among various households.  
Ultimately, whether measured by individual crops or for gross crop 
revenue, agricultural productivity of Hu Village households, diversified or 
specialised, rich or poor, does not differ to the extent of statistical significance. 
This indicates that although economic diversification of rural households 
diverts a great deal of household labour into non-agricultural occupations, it 
also, instead of negatively influencing agricultural productivity, has actually 
maintained statistically equal farming productivity to that of households solely 
specialised on land. Although agricultural performance is greatly influenced by 
natural conditions, in a region with common climatic and geographical 
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features, it is human management that often plays a deterministic role in 
levels of productivity. Given no statistically significant variance in farm 
productivity levels in Hu Village, it is necessary to consider if this is due to 
similar management approaches or input levels among various households.  
Taking rice and rape, the two most important crops, as examples, farming 
inputs among different types of households are compared and shown in Table 
6.4 and Table 6.5 may give an explanation about these relationships. The 
input variables mainly include two aspects, farming labour characteristics and 
material inputs per unit of land. To accurately record the amount of labour 
input per unit of land is unrealistic in actual research, so the comparison uses 
two qualitative features (age and education) of full-time farming labourers 
within every household as the indicator of labour input. Additionally during 
fieldwork, the author found that many Hu Village farmers used manure to 
fertilize their land and the usage intensity of different households varied based 
on labour conditions and manure accessibility. Local farmers use “rounds” to 
measure manure usage intensity, for which one round means carrying manure 
to apply on the target land once. Therefore, manure usage intensity to some 
degree implies both material and labour input. Lastly, irrigation of Hu Village 
(given the fact that it is the most hilly area of southwest China) is provided for 
all households and controlled by government,  farmers just need to hand in 30 
Yuan per capita in irrigation fees, so irrigation is not listed in the comparison. 
To examine the statistical significance of mean difference, the Kruskal Wallis 
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test was run at the significance level of 0.05. 
 
Table 6.4 Farming Labour and Material Inputs among Rice Households 
of Hu Village in 2011 
Rice households 
Age of 
full-time 
farming 
labour 
(year) 
Education 
of full-
time 
farming 
labour 
(year) 
 
Seed 
 
(Yuan/ha) 
Chemical 
fertilizers 
 
(Yuan/ha) 
Pesticides 
and 
herbicides 
(Yuan/ha) 
Manure 
usage 
 
(frequency) 
Total 52.2 4.3 519 1500 852 0.52 
Household income diversification level 
Dedicated 
farming 
57.8 4.4 563   1313 917 0.73 
I part-time 50.0 4.1 495   1500 782 0.64 
II part-time 52.4 4.5 495 1596 797 0.57 
Non-farming 44.7 3.7 588 1530 1114 0.43 
p-value 0.003 0.759 0.089 0.035 0.017 0.023 
Household job diversification 
No 
diversification 
57.7 4.2 578 1271 971 0.68 
Only local 
non-farm 
activities 
51.5 3.8 495 1404 815 0.69 
Only 
migration 
52.2 4.5 534 1625 885 0.37 
Both local 
non-farm and 
migration  
48.8 4.6 476 1593 746 0.43 
p-value 000 0.269 0.240 0.013 0.086 0.021 
Household total income quartile 
Quartile I 56.4 3.9 584 1598 927 0.38 
Quartile II 49.0 4.4 546 1512 944 0.43 
Quartile III 52.0 4.5 501 1470 797 0.61 
Quartile IV 52.0 4.3 452 1437 753 0.62 
p-value 0.004 0.636 0.221 0.680 0.031 0.241 
Household non-agricultural income quartile 
Quartile I 56.4 3.8 567 1445 908 0.66 
Quartile II 49.1 4.9 498 1506 785 0.38 
Quartile III 49.7 4.2 540 1524 944 0.52 
Quartile IV 53.7 4.2 473 1526 774 0.51 
p-value 000 0.118 0.379 0.523 0.453 0.253 
Source: Author questionnaire  
Firstly, Table 6.4 shows that the overall gaps among these variables 
are not substantial compared to the total average, with only a few variables 
showing significant differences. Specifically for household types of income 
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diversification, non-farming rice households have significant advantages in 
terms of farming labour age over dedicated farming rice households 
(p=0.003). Furthermore, it is statistically significant that farming labourers from 
households without job diversification and with the least income are 
significantly more aged than other households (all p values<0.05). If chemical 
fertilizer and manure usage intensity are considered together, there exists an 
obvious substitution effect between chemical fertilizer cost and manure usage 
intensity, as dedicated farming households use significantly less chemical 
fertilizers and a significantly higher ratio of manure to rice than II part-time and 
non-farming households, and with the oldest farming labourers. Through this 
offset, the fertilization of rice fields is balanced among these households. 
Furthermore, it shows that II part-time and non-farming households indeed 
tend to spend more cash on purchasing commercial fertilizers (p=0.035) to 
substitute labour-intensive inputs, like manure usage, indicating an 
technological usage difference driven by economic diversification. The 
question remains: why do dedicated farming households still use manure so 
intensively when chemical fertilizers can be easily obtained? Based on 
qualitative data from Hu Village, only a few farmers expressed that they 
couldn’t afford commercial fertilizers. Some farmers, especially the more 
aged, use manure because they are concerned about land preservation, while 
some use manure due to its convenience or accessibility. Referring back to 
Table 6.4, in respect of household job diversification types, it is evident that 
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households with only migration, or both local non-farm and migration, tend to 
use more chemical fertilizers (p=0.013) and less manure (p=0.021) than 
households with only local non-farm activities and households without job 
diversification. This indicates that migration causes labour shortages and 
forces the left-behind (often old) people to use more convenient modern 
inputs rather than carrying manure to fields, which are often far away from 
their houses. Interestingly, household income level does not have a significant 
influence on farming inputs, except that households with the highest total 
income tend to spend more money on rice seeds than the poorest 
households. This can be explained by the observation that rich people often 
tend to plant fragrant rice varieties which are more expensive, about 50 Yuan 
per 500g compared with normal hybrid rice seeds at about 30 Yuan per 500g.  
The more expensive types have better taste but the productivity is roughly the 
same.  
For rape households, as Table 6.5 shows, the overall pattern is very 
similar to that found with rice, that is without significant input gaps within 
various household groups. Similarly, the substitution relationship between 
chemical fertilizers (p=0.036) and manure usage (p=0.025) occurs in rape 
cultivation between non-farming households and other households, especially 
dedicated farming households. For pesticide and herbicide costs, non-farming 
households spend more on average than II part-time households do 
(p=0.014).  
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Table 6.5 Farming Labour and Material Inputs among Rape Households 
of Hu Village in 2011 
Rape 
households 
Age of 
full-time 
farming 
labour 
(year) 
Education 
of full-
time 
farming 
labour 
(year) 
 
Seed 
 
(Yuan/ha) 
Chemical 
fertilizers 
 
(Yuan/ha) 
Pesticides 
and 
herbicides 
(Yuan/ha) 
Manure 
usage 
 
(frequency) 
Total 52.4 4.3 209 1353 521 1.18 
Household income diversification level 
Dedicated 
farming 
58.1 4.3 200 1200 551 1.41 
I part-time 50.3 4.1 204 1286 494 1.41 
II part-time 52.3 4.5 207 1451 492 1.02 
Non-farming 45.3 3.5 249 1434 651 0.9 
p-value 0.008 0.477 0.835 0.036 0.014 0.025 
Household job diversification 
No 
diversification 
57.6 4.2 198 1160 593 1.24 
Only local 
non-farm 
activities 
51.3 3.8 215 1260 491 1.49 
Only 
migration 
52.9 4.5 224 1460 540 1.01 
Both local 
non-farm and 
migration  
48.6 4.5 188 1427 464 1.02 
p-value 0.017 0.590 0.562 0.031 0.113 0.025 
Household total income quartile 
Quartile I 56.6 3.8 209 1367 438 1.00 
Quartile II 50.0 4.4 234 1418 564 1.12 
Quartile III 52.1 4.5 210 1410 491 1.31 
Quartile IV   51.5   4.3 185 1212 446 1.29 
p-value  0.031 0.617 0.425 0.228 0.045 0.337 
Household non-agricultural income quartile 
Quartile I 56.7 3.8 198 1289 585 1.29 
Quartile II 49.3 4.9 209 1379 498 1.13 
Quartile III 50.0 4.2 230 1341 537 1.20 
Quartile IV 53.5 4.2 216 1400 464 1.10 
p-value 0.006 0.155 0.081 0.869 0.137 0.688 
Source: Author questionnaire 
Again, households with only migrants tend to use more chemical 
fertilizers than other households, especially those without any job 
diversification (p=0.031), which may offset their lower manure usage intensity 
compared with households participating in only local non-farm activities 
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(p=0.025). This seems to confirm once again that household income (whether 
total income or non-agricultural income) does not significantly affect the input 
level for rape production.  Combining the substitution effect between chemical 
fertilizers and manure usage in Hu Village, it seems that the labour loss 
(especially driven by migration) causes less intensive manure usage and this 
is supplemented by more cash input in the form of commercial fertilizers. 
However, households with higher income do not necessarily spend more on 
commercial fertilizers or use less manure.  
Overall, as can be seen with respect to the two most important crops, 
with similar productivities, many aspects of qualitative farming labour 
characteristics and main material inputs among households are very close as 
well. Nonetheless, there indeed exists an obvious substitution effect of capital 
and labour on land fertilization procedures driven by migration-caused labour 
shortage. In addition, neither household total income nor non-agricultural 
income has a significant influence on farming material inputs. In other words, 
richer people do not invest significantly more capital on land than poorer 
people do,  which is not entirely consistent with observations from various 
other countries, where it has been shown that economic diversification or non-
farm employments of rural households could help farmers overcome credit 
constraints and enhance farming investments and thus improve land 
productivity (e.g. Ellis and Freeman, 2004 for four African countries; de Janvry 
et al., 2005 for China; Oseni and Winters, 2009 for Nigeria; Hertz, 2009 for 
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Bulgaria; Stampini and Davis, 2009 for Vietnam). According to the situation of 
Hu Village, the model indicating “non-farm employments release farming 
credit constraints and improve productivity” does not seem feasible. More 
specifically, although non-farming employments indeed provide more cash for 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides for some households, this need is created 
by labour shortages or other reasons, rather than on the reduction of farming 
credit constraints. In other words, households investing more cash per unit of 
land do so because they could not carry more non-cash inputs, as they have 
less or older farming labourers, rather than because they have more income. 
The farming credit constraints assumption as used in other studies is not a 
prominent issue in Hu Village. Many people, especially richer people, even 
tend to reduce the intensity of pesticides usage for the sake of health. 
Furthermore, given the smallholder-scale production in Hu Village agriculture 
(even in the whole of China) with only 0.16 ha rice land and 0.12 ha rape land 
per household, the overall cost of material input per ha rice is about 2850 
Yuan and for rape 2100 Yuan, which means that every household’s cash input 
on rice could be about 450 Yuan and rape about 260 Yuan, so 710 Yuan in 
total.  This amount of cash would not be a big problem for contemporary Hu 
Village farmers, given that their per capita cash income is nearly ten thousand 
Yuan. As revealed in the qualitative interviews, very few farmers think that 
they could not afford inputs, with the exception of three extremely poor 
households. What they are really concerned about is the constantly shrinking 
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number of farming labourers, and who will do farming in the future. Compared 
with the fact that about 43.9% of rural households could not afford agricultural 
inputs in Nigeria (Oseni and Winters, 2009), the situation in Hu Village is 
much better. It is not surprising that in African countries, non-farm 
employments often facilitate farming investments through cash inputs. Another 
important reason for the close levels of productivity in Hu Village is that, as 
farmers often commented, the farming procedures have been stylised or 
standardised among all village households. Namely, how much seed is sown, 
how much fertilizer is used and what pesticides to use has become common 
knowledge to most farmers and farming is more like a routine labouring 
procedure rather than a sophisticated and complex process requiring 
experience and intelligence. It was often heard expressed by farmers in Hu 
Village that they were conducting “simpleton agriculture” or “lazy agriculture”. 
This phenomenon has also occurred in other regions of China and as Lin and 
Deng (2012) observed in Zhejiang Province, the farming labourer age and 
level of education have no significant influence on land productivity, likely due 
to the standardised agricultural practices.  
Hence, a conclusion can be drawn regarding the effects of economic 
diversification on agricultural productivity based on Hu Village that economic 
diversification has not significantly influenced the performance of crop 
production in terms of productivity. Nonetheless, it has indeed exerted 
influences on farming fertilization processes, driven more by labour loss than 
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by credit constraints. The case of Hu Village to some degree interrogates the 
farming credit constraint thesis on this issue, and presents another possibility 
that under the conditions of China’s smallholder agriculture and the fast-
growing non-farm cash income of rural households, farming credit is probably 
not a major constraint on farming anymore, rather the labour shortage driven 
by migration is becoming an increasing threat to levels of agricultural 
production.  
6.2.3 Economic diversification and agricultural structure  
Researchers have argued that rural non-farm employment may facilitate 
agricultural diversification through encouraging the farming of higher-value 
crops, thus changing the basic agricultural structure (Davis et al., 2009). This 
subsection examines the impacts of economic diversification of rural 
households on agricultural structure based on the circumstances of Hu 
Village. Many relevant studies in developing countries mostly focus on farming 
investments and technological usage, with little specific examination of 
impacts on agricultural structure or crop patterns, although some researchers 
have observed some qualitative changes on crop patterns and land-use 
driven by migration or other non-farm activities in developing countries (e.g. 
Rigg, 2001 for crop patterns and land-use changes in the whole Southeast 
Asia; Mckay, 2005 for the remittances landscape of the Philippines; Radel and 
Schmook, 2008 for linkages of migration and land-use change in Mexico). 
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This section will first investigate agricultural structural changes at the village 
level, driven by economic diversification of rural households, and then further 
examine the variance of land-use intensity, crop diversity and agricultural 
diversity at the household level.  
Overall changes to the smallholder crop/livestock system 
Essentially, the overall pattern of China’s agriculture, as also prevailing 
in many other developing countries like India, is largely a mixed crop/livestock 
smallholder system, which is characterised by “all smallholders with farm 
sizes of a couple of hectares or less in which family labour is used to grow 
crops and keep livestock” and “these integrated systems make efficient use of 
natural resources; animals often provide dung that is used to fertilize crops, 
while crop residues are fed to livestock ”(Wright et al., 2012:1010). Hu Village 
agricultural patterns have reflected the mixed smallholder system until some 
changes have arisen recently driven by various factors, in which economic 
diversification of rural households has played a critical role as will be shown 
below. As Table 6.6 shows, for the constitution of crop land in Hu Village, rice 
takes the largest part (66.4%), followed by rape (50.6%). Corn, sweet potato 
and vegetables are marginally cultivated in Hu Village. The above five crops 
are primarily for home consumption and only the surplus is sold to markets. 
The following three crops: citrus, cash forest tree and mulberry are the main 
commercial crops, with citrus being the most important (21.1%).  
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Table 6.6 Basic Agricultural Structure of Hu Village Households in 2011 
 
Mean 
value  
% of 
household land 
Household 
participation 
(%) 
Changing 
trend 
Total land (ha) 0.24    
Crop     
Rice 0.16 66.4 91.1 - 
Rape 0.12 50.6 87.5 - 
Corn 0.04 15.3 78.7 - 
Sweet potato 0.02 9.7 65.8 - 
Vegetable 0.01 7.2 96.4 - 
Citrus 0.05 21.1 85.8 - 
Cash forest tree 0.03 11.4 62.7 + 
Mulberry 0.04 14.2 41.8 - 
Livestock     
Pig 15.4  77.3 - 
Chicken 7.2  83.6 - 
Duck 2.7  48.4 - 
Rabbit 6.0  6.2 + 
Sericulture  1.8  36.9 - 
Source: Author questionnaire and interviews  
Note: - refers to decrease and + refers to increase in overall tendency during 
the most recent 10 years.   
With respect to participation rate, subsistence-oriented crops have 
been cultivated by more households than commercial crops. However, 
according to interviews with farmers, except cash forest trees, all the crops 
have actually been less and less cultivated in the last 10 years. The reasons 
underlying this phenomenon vary among farmers. For instance, some 
wealthier people have stopped farming and have started to buy rice and 
vegetables completely from markets. Some households entirely rely on non-
farm activities and withdraw most labourers from agriculture, dropping some 
crops like sweet potato and corn, which also reserves great room for fast 
acceptance of cash forest trees. As revealed in other Asian countries, to 
replace conventional crops like rice with cash forest trees is a popular 
alternative to deal with a lack of agricultural labour (Rigg, 2001). In Hu Village, 
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cash forest trees, mostly Toon trees, with a small proportion of gardening 
trees, like Osmanthus Fragrans tree or the Maidenhair tree, have been quickly 
and widely accepted by Hu villagers and there has shown a great tendency to 
expand in the cultivation of these crops in the near future. As Toon trees 
provide the raw materials for the papermaking industry, and other gardening 
trees are required for fast expanding urban landscape development, the 
emergence of trees as cash crops is primarily driven by the rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation of China. Furthermore, these perennial trees 
ought to be planted in upland or hilly areas, leaving paddy fields and flat land 
for main crops like rice and rape.  However, in recent years many households 
have been planting them in the best soil in the paddy field, and this is 
reflective of the labour shortages associated with economically diversified 
households.  This is illustrated by Mr Z as shown in Box 6.1.  
Box 6.1 Shifting Rice Land into Cash Tree: the Case of Mr Z 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author interviews 
In Hu Village, when asking why cash trees are planted even in paddy 
Mr Z’s household is highly diversified with his wife operating a small shop and 
raising 50 pigs; his father having a fertilizer and commercial fodder business; 
his mother undertaking most of the farming work; and he himself with a 
transportation business and sometimes undertaking some factory work in the 
county. His family has suffered from a lack of labour for a long time, and in 
2012 he decided to shift 0.07 ha rice land into Maidenhair trees as he heard 
that Maidenhair was very popular in the horticulture market. 
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fields, the most prevalent answer is that there is not enough labour or not 
enough time for attending intensive crops. Furthermore, citrus has been less 
and less intensively managed because of unfavourable prices, and many 
farmers have planted Toon trees in citrus fields, and have decided to cut down 
citrus trees when Toon trees grow up. The fate of citrus also happens to 
mulberry as sericulture has dramatically declined, which will be further 
explained in the following parts. Another point worthy of mention here is that 
the emergence and popularity of cash forest trees in Hu Village is brought 
about not only by farmers’ motivated agency but also by encouragement from 
governments. Toon tree planting is a pertinent example, targeting dual 
objectives for the government: enhancing forest cover and farmers’ income, 
both of which are considered politically and economically important by the 
current Chinese government. A Toon tree planting project was initiated by 
Qingshen Forest Bureau in 2008 and farmers just could not wait to accept this 
alternative. The cooperation between farmers’ incentives and governmental 
planning is the most important reason for the fast promotion of cash tree 
planting in Hu Village as well as other places in this county, as an official told 
the author. The government-dominated agricultural development approach 
with Chinese characteristics has dramatically and quickly changed the crop 
pattern and land-use pattern in Hu Village, and in Qingshen County.  
In terms of livestock, pigs produce the most, and other animals like 
chicken, duck, rabbit and sericulture are all raised but on much smaller scales. 
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However, most traditional livestock sidelines have shown a decreasing 
tendency. Farmers often recalled that at the beginning of the 1990s, before 
villagers started to seek non-farm activities, almost every household 
husbanded pig, chicken, duck and sericulture. With more and more people 
undertaking other activities since then, and especially with rates of rural-urban 
migration, less and less households undertake these sidelines. 77.3% (174) 
households undertook pig farming in 2011 and of the remaining 51 
households, only 15 did not undertake any non-farm activities, indicating that 
diversified households seem to be more likely to exit pig production probably 
due to labour shortages. Furthermore, with respect to pig farm scale as Table 
6.7 shows, most pig households are veritable smallholders with 66.7 % raising 
less than 10 pigs, and 87.4% less than 30 pigs. Nonetheless, there have 
emerged several relatively large scale households with more than 100 heads 
in recent years. As village head calculated, there have been about 20 
households that are specialised on pig farming with specific and modernised 
piggery facilities. Additionally, there are 3 specialised chicken households and 
2 large commercial duck enterprises with scales of more than 20,000, which 
were all established in recent years. Rabbit breeding is a relatively new 
sideline for Hu Village, which has been initiated by an NGO project to 
encourage the left-behind women to participate in more cash-generating 
activities. 
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Table 6.7 Livestock Scale Distribution of Sample Households in 2011 
Items   Scale range 
Pig 0 1-10 11-30 30-100 101-300 
No. of 
households  
51 116 36 12 7 
Chicken 0 1-10 11-30 31-50 50+ 
No. of 
households  
37 140 45 3 0 
Duck 0 1-10 11-30 31-50 50+ 
No.of 
households 
116 102 5 2 0 
Sericulture 0 0.5-5 5.5-8 8.5+  
No. of 
households 
142 54 22 4  
Rabbit 0 5-50 51-100 101-300  
No. of 
households 
211 8 2 4  
Source: Author questionnaire 
More interestingly, for the specialised pig farming households, their 
livelihoods are also highly diversified as the case of Mr S shows (Box 6.2). Mr 
S’s case is not special among the specialised pig farming households in Hu 
Village, as the other three specialised pig households are all undertaking 
other non-farm activities, whether at local bases or in remote cities. Given the 
unstable market conditions of rural China, no households would entirely rely 
on this risky sector, and it demonstrates again that diversification, not 
specialisation, is the norm. Furthermore, a complex, and often seemingly 
conflicting, picture of economic diversification and livestock emerges which 
indicates that the impacts are both negative and positive. On the negative 
side, increasing non-farm opportunities create competition with the livestock 
sector for labour resources, with the former being generally more attractive. 
On the positive side, diversified household livelihoods can reduce risk and 
provide certain amount of capital to subsidise livestock where necessary, as 
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Kilic et al. (2009) found in Albania and Hertz (2009) in Bulgaria.  
Box 6.2 A Diversified Pig Farming Household: Mr S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author interview 
Linking to the macro-level, the tendency towards livestock farming in 
Hu Village is actually an epitome of contemporary China’s livestock sector, 
which has been experiencing structural changes under the context of 
“livestock revolution”11 affecting all developing countries. Researchers clearly 
commented, “A feature of China’s livestock sector is rapid structural change 
toward larger, more commercial and more intensively productive systems. As 
specialisation has developed over the last two decades, the share of backyard 
                                                             
11
 Livestock revolution refers to the unprecedented growth of livestock products in developing 
countries, driven by population growth, increasing urbanisation and rising incomes (Delgalo et 
al., 1999).  
Mr S is operating the largest pig farm in Hu Village with 400 heads of pigs 
and about 10,000 Yuan income in 2011. His wife is working in a chemical 
factory in Meishan City. His 17-year-old son is working in a restaurant in 
the same city. His father is a migrant construction worker in Jiangsu 
Province in east China, with his mother primarily working on land. His 
family shows a very clear and distinct labour division within the household. 
When asking why his family members don’t work together on such a large 
pig farm, the answer from him is that pig production is a highly risky sector, 
with very unstable pig prices, and rising grain prices keep lifting the feed 
cost and squeezing the profit, therefore, other family members working 
separately reduces the risk, and also sometimes subsidises pig production 
with cash when necessary. He also expressed that he was thinking of 
exiting pig farming and going for migration as a construction worker for the 
high wage of 300 Yuan per day if pig prices kept shaky in the near future. 
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livestock production has declined and the shares of specialised households 
and commercial enterprises have increased” (Rae et al., 2006:681). The 
structural changes to livestock production in China have seen a downward 
trend in the proportion of rural households that husband livestock (Zhang, 
2006; Rae and Zhang, 2009).  Drawing on a national sample, Rae and Zhang 
found that compared with 1995, 39.2% households have exited livestock 
farming, with the least exit proportion in southwest China (12.9%), probably 
due to relatively less off-farm opportunities in these backward regions. What is 
happening in patterns of livestock farming in Hu Village is to a great degree 
consistent with their findings.  As non-farm diversification in Hu Village or in 
Sichuan is no less pronounced than any other regions of China, probably 
more smallholder pig farming households will cease to operate and then 
specialised pig farming households, also more commercial livestock farms 
may continue to scale up.  
This means that the traditional smallholder crops and livestock mixed 
system may be progressively replaced by a more specialised, modernised, 
large-scale and market-oriented livestock industry. It has been revealed by 
researchers globally that smallholder mixed crop and livestock systems are 
more productive and more environmentally-friendly (Wilson, 2007; Wright et 
al., 2011), so the structural change to livestock production occurring in China 
thus seems to be directed in an unsustainable manner. In this process, rural 
household non-farm diversification indeed plays an important role (Rae and 
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Zhang, 2009; Delgado et al., 2008).  In addition, favourable livestock markets 
and government policies certainly are key elements driving livestock sector 
development, but given highly unstable livestock markets, recurrent disease 
outbreaks and other unexpected risks, Chinese smallholders would probably 
tend to exit livestock production and join other more lucrative and more stable 
non-farm occupations. People who are more skilled and knowledgeable, and 
who have sufficient access to credit will undertake livestock farming in a 
specialised way.  
Through an examination of the agricultural patterns of Hu Village 
households, several observations emerge. For crop patterns, subsistence-
oriented crops still outweigh cash crops in terms of cultivation area in Hu 
Village, indicating that Hu Village agriculture is largely subsistence farming. 
Traditional cash crops (citrus and mulberry) have been going downhill due to 
losses of labour and unfavourable prices, while new forest trees are becoming 
preferable alternatives, suggesting a labour-loss effect on crop pattern 
change. Generally, livestock sidelines have experienced a  decline, but there 
has also been an emergence of more specialised livestock households, which 
to some degree may represent the future direction of smallholder livestock 
production, as researchers have found both in China (Rae and Zhang, 2009) 
and in other countries (Delgado et al., 2008). Finally, the overall changes to 
agricultural patterns at the village level may vary for different households.  
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Land-use intensity, Crop diversity, and Agricultural diversity  
At the household level, because of labour shortages, land may be extensively 
used and crop diversity may be reduced by farmers as Rigg (2001) has shown 
in many Southeast Asian countries. Households with different labour and 
other economic conditions may have different strategies for agricultural 
pattern adjustments. Given the dramatic economic diversification of Hu Village 
households, land-use intensity, crop diversity and overall agricultural diversity 
may have changed across different households. Three variables reflect 
agricultural structural changes at the household-level. MCI (see Chapter 4) is 
calculated to reflect land-use intensity variance among different households. 
Two diversification indicators: crop diversification, the total variety of crops 
cultivated by every household in 2011; and agricultural diversification, 
referring to how many varieties of occupations related with agriculture 
(including farming, pig, cow, chicken, duck, rabbit, sericulture, and fish and so 
on) every household undertook in 2011, are calculated to represent the 
diversification degree of different households. In addition, the Kruskal Wallis 
test was run to find the statistical significance of the differences among groups 
at a significance level of 0.05. As Table 6.8 clearly shows, the average MCI of 
Hu Village is 2.20 with different levels of variance among different households. 
The MCI of non-farming households is significantly lower than other three 
household types (p=0.005), suggesting that non-farming households tend to 
have less land-use intensity compared with other three household types. The 
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MCI of households with only migration is significantly less than households 
without any job diversification (p=0.012), indicating that migration households 
probably leave less labour to attend land thus reducing the land-use intensity. 
Interestingly, the household income factor has no statistically significant 
association with land-use intensity, implying that it is labour rather than 
income that more evidently impacts land-use intensity. 
Table 6.8 Land-use Intensity, Crop Diversity, and Agricultural Diversity 
among Different Households in 2011 
 
MCI 
 
Crop diversity 
 
Agricultural 
diversity 
 
Total 2.20 6.38 3.59 
Household income diversification level 
Dedicated farming  2.42 6.53 3.66 
I part-time  2.02 6.69 3.88 
II part-time 1.99 6.48 3.71 
Non-farming 1.79 5.17 2.62 
p-value 0.005 0.002 000 
Household job diversification 
No diversification  2.31 6.52 3.55 
Only local non-farm 
activities 
1.99             6.30 3.87 
Only migration 1.78 5.82 3.52 
Both local non-farm 
and migration  
1.88             6.47 3.76 
p-value 0.012 0.018 0.421 
Household total income quartile 
Quartile I 1.85  5.82  3.21 
Quartile II 1.86 6.37 3.65 
Quartile III 1.94 6.65  3.81 
Quartile IV      1.94 6.62 3.71 
p-value 0.894 0.031 0.011 
Household non-agricultural income quartile 
Quartile I 1.95 6.29 3.59 
Quartile II 1.87 6.25 3.61 
Quartile III 1.85 6.39 3.48 
Quartile IV 1.92 6.54 3.70 
p-value 0.711 0.870 0.722 
Source: Author questionnaire  
The average crop diversity of sample households is 6.38, meaning that 
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the sample households cultivated 6.38 different crops in 2011 on average. 
Non-farming households cultivated significantly less crops than other three 
household groups in 2011 (p=0.002), and households with only migration 
cultivated significantly less crops than other households, especially those 
without job diversification (p=0.018), which once again confirms the potential 
labour shortage effect caused by migration. Furthermore, households with 
higher income tend to cultivate significantly more crops (p=0.031) which is 
probably because more crop varieties also increase household income. Non-
agricultural income has no significant impact on crop diversity.  
The agricultural diversity of sample households is 3.59 which refers to 
the fact that the sample households undertook 3.59 different agricultural 
enterprises in 2011. Non-farming households again undertook significantly 
less agricultural sidelines than the other three households (p=000). There is 
no significant difference among households with different job statuses, 
although households with only migration conducted on average less 
agricultural sidelines than other household groups. This is probably because 
in Hu Village, as long as some family members are left behind for farming, it is 
a prevailing trend that they always conduct some sidelines, although mostly in 
very small scale, like five chickens and three ducks for home-consumption 
and so on. Furthermore, richer households tend to undertake more 
agricultural sidelines (p=0.011) probably because more agricultural sidelines 
increase household income. Non-agricultural income has no significant 
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impacts on agricultural diversity.  
Another two observations from Table 6.8 are worthy of mention here. 
There is no significant difference in MCI, crop diversity and agricultural 
diversity among dedicated farming households and I part-time and II part-time 
households. This probably indicates that most households tend to conduct 
similar agricultural patterns and only the non-farming households, which 
almost tend to move out of farming, use land significantly less intensively and 
conduct fewer sidelines. Another observation is that no significant difference 
occurs among households with local non-farm activities, households with both 
local non-farm and migration, and households without job diversification as 
well, probably because non-farm activities at the local base do not significantly 
impact labour available for agriculture, as the labourers are easily accessible. 
This further confirms the labour loss effects exerted by migration.   
Overall, the case of Hu Village suggests that the impacts of economic 
diversification on land-use intensity, crop diversity and agricultural diversity 
are complex. Basically, most households remain within a similar mode of 
agriculture, while only the highly specialised non-farming households tend to 
significantly reduce land-use intensity, crop diversity and agricultural diversity. 
Besides, caused by the obvious labour-loss effects, only-migration 
households significantly reduce land-use intensity and agricultural 
diversification. Echoing other studies (e.g. Rigg, 2001), the findings here show 
that the labour shortage effect significantly affects agricultural land use and 
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diversification in Hu Village. Nonetheless, economic diversification of rural 
households does not necessarily mean labour shortage, and as this research 
shows, in that households with local non-farm activities tend to be more 
productive, use land more intensively, and undertake more agricultural 
sidelines.  
6.2.4 Economic diversification and agricultural technologies 
changes 
With changes in agricultural patterns as discussed above, agricultural 
technologies have experienced even more dramatic transformations driven by 
the economic diversification of rural households, as has been widely found in 
many other countries. The most prominent technological tendency on the 
agricultural stage identified globally is a shift from traditional technologies to 
modernised labour-saving, and often capital-intensive, technologies to deal 
with labour loss and with relatively more cash-investments available from 
various non-farm employments. This trend has been identified by Rigg (2001) 
in most southeast Asian countries; Qin (2010) in Chongqing of China; Pfeiffer 
et al. (2009) in Mexico and Takahashi and Otsuka (2009) in the Philippines. As 
has been discussed above, the obvious substitution effect between 
modernised chemical fertilizers and labour-intensive manure use among 
migration households in the Hu Village case is just part of the picture. This 
subsection will further investigate the impacts of economic diversification on 
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use of agricultural technologies.   
Overall technological changes in Hu Village 
As Table 6.9 shows, since the 1970s, modernised agricultural technologies 
have begun to embrace Hu Village agriculture in all dimensions, from seeds 
and pesticides to various forms of mechanization.  
 Table 6.9 Main Agricultural Technology Changes in Hu Village  
Alternative 
technologies 
Time 
Adoption 
rate (2011) 
 
Characteristics 
Traditional 
technologies 
Hybrid varieties  1970s 100% 
Land-saving 
 
Traditional and 
home selected 
seed varieties 
Chemical 
fertilizers  
1970s 95% 
Land-saving 
 
Manure, oil 
cake and other 
organic 
fertilizers 
Pesticides 1980s 100% Land-saving 
Physical 
methods  
Herbicides 1990s 100% 
Labour-saving 
 
Weeding 
manually 
No tillage 1990s 70% 
Labour-saving 
 
Cattle tillage 
Tractor tillage 1990s 23.2% 
Labour-saving 
 
Cattle tillage 
Commercial 
fodder 
1990s 100% 
Labour-saving 
 
Weeds, grain, 
and kitchen 
leftovers 
Combine 
harvester 
2005 45.4% 
Labour-saving 
 
Harvest 
manually and 
later small 
threshing 
machine  
Rice seedling-
throwing12 
2010s 25.6% 
Labour-saving 
 
Traditional 
transplanting 
Source: Author questionnaire and interviews with village cadres and farmers  
                                                             
12 Rice seedling-throwing is a simplified technology of rice transplanting, which just 
requires farmers to stand and throw the rice seedling in the paddy field without squatting 
down and inserting seedling in every single hole as traditional transplanting does. As farmers 
estimated, this new technology saves about 50 % labouring and is less physically painful and 
operationally simpler than traditional transplanting. 
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Certainly, the emergence of many new technologies was primarily 
driven by government promotion and market development, while diffusion and 
adoption rates vary among different households. Labour loss driven by 
increasing economic diversification has played a vitally important role as will 
be further investigated later. It is useful to review the overall technological 
changes of Hu Village agriculture first. 
Hybrid rice, chemical fertilizers and pesticides were the three first 
innovations in Hu Village, dating back to the 1970s even before the rural 
reform was launched. Their adoption substantially improved crop productivity 
to a level which shocked Hu Village farmers. The traditional seeds varieties 
have been gradually abandoned, and currently 100% farmers purchase all 
crops seeds from markets, except a few farmers who reserve sweet potato 
seed for the next year. Before chemical fertilizers, livestock manure was 
intensively used on Hu Village land, and this was an important task of all the 
males of every household. Although it is still widely but disproportionately 
used by Hu Village farmers as shown by Table 6.10, manure has undoubtedly 
become secondary to chemical fertilizers for land fertilization, with only 
intensive application on small plots of vegetable garden. In the 1990s, many 
labour-saving technologies including herbicides, no tillage technology, tractor 
tillage and commercial fodder for livestock, appeared one after another, at the 
time when rural labourers begun migrating to seek non-farm activities. In this 
period, technologies, like no tillage, were promoted by the government as they 
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have appreciated the importance of facilitating the move of rural labour away 
from agriculture and the rural area to enhance farmers’ income and the 
prosperity of the local economy. In spite of great doubts regarding no tillage 
methods at the beginning, as many farmers recalled, Hu Village quickly 
accepted this convenient and labour and capital saving technology, since they 
saw the same productivity as long as enough fertilizers and herbicides are put 
in the soil. Currently, most farmers have not tilled their land for years (70% in 
2011), and only a few farmers till every few years by tractor (23.2% in 2011).  
Table 6.10 Manure Usage of Different Crops of Sample Households in 
2011 (%) 
Manure usage 
frequency 
Rice  Rape Corn 
Sweet 
potato 
Vegeta
bles 
Citrus 
0 62.2 37.3 32.4 43.1 9.8 61.8 
1 29.3 27.6 17.3 31.1 6.7 24.4 
2 7.6 30.2 33.3 22.2 16.4 12.0 
3 0.9 4.9 15.6 3.6 65.8 1.8 
4 0 0 1.3 0 1.3 0 
Source: Author questionnaire  
The combine harvester has brought about another farming revolution 
for Hu Village farmers. With conditions of the bumpy and terraced landform in 
this area of Sichuan, giant machines, like combine harvesters, are actually 
impractical (Tilt, 2008). While practically all the farmers could not wait to 
embrace the combine harvester because of labour shortages and the 
widespread and obvious unwillingness to undertake labourious rice harvest in 
the hot sun. Although the current combine harvester adoption rate is barely 
half in 2011 (45.4%), it is already substantially higher than the Sichuan 
average rice combine harvester adoption rate of 27.9% in 2011 (Farmers’ 
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Daily, 28th March, 2012). Moreover, almost all the farmers that haven’t used a 
combine harvester expressed with strong willingness that they would use if it 
were possible and available. The general price of a combine harvester is 
about 1200 Yuan to 1500 Yuan per ha.  For the smaller land plots, the price 
could be 2250 Yuan per ha, but farmers are still willing to use it. The irrational 
usage of the combine harvester in Hu Village is partly due to the increasing 
agricultural wage rate driven by prosperous non-farm employments. Many 
farmers said that even the price of combine harvester at 2250 Yuan per ha is 
still much cheaper than hired labour, at the price of 4500 to 6000 Yuan per ha. 
The combine harvester as a labour-saving technology, is an exceptional 
instance of labour-shortage induced technological change as predicted by 
induced innovation theory (Hayami, 2001), as Rigg (2001) has similarly 
revealed in Southeast Asia.  
Researchers have widely observed in other countries that the entry of 
the combine harvester often triggers uneven consequences for different 
people, especially in traditional poorer communities. For instance, displacing 
on-farm employment opportunities of the poor as Scott says, the combine 
harvester is the “machine that eats work” (Scott,1985:154), marginalising 
women in farming and thus leading to a”‘masculinised” agriculture (Rigg, 
2001:113). However, the observation from Hu Village does not seem 
consistent with previous findings, and even the poorest people in Hu Village 
strongly hope to use combine harvesters. The overwhelming preference 
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towards the combine harvester in Hu Village is particularly driven by ample 
non-farm opportunities, an increasingly aged farming population and looser 
farming credit constraints subsidised by various income sources. As farmers 
most frequently commented, with the help of the combine harvester, migrants 
do not need to return home to assist at harvest time, as in many cases, the 
travel cost is even more than that of using the combine harvester, letting alone 
the missed working payments.  
Another recently emerging technology, encouraged by government and 
demonstrated by experienced farmers, is rice seedling-throwing. One 
essential condition of this technology is ample water for several weeks from 
initial transplanting. This will potentially put more pressure on the increasingly 
poor water resources of Sichuan, due to frequent droughts in recent years in 
southwest China. As a new technology, the adoption rate of rice seedling-
throwing is already 25.6%, and despite most farmers waiting to see how it 
performs, an increasing adoption rate can be safely predicted in the future. 
Furthermore, as seedling planting and transplanting are highly labour-
intensive procedures in rice cultivation (Zeng, 2005), a far less labour-
intensive rice direct seeding technology has been widely adopted in some 
other rice countries, driven by labour shortages (see Rigg, 2001 for southeast 
Asia; Jie Fang Daily, 26th October, 2012 for other parts of China; and Sichuan 
Daily, 4th September, 2012 for other parts of Sichuan). Although, Hu Village 
has not gone that far yet, the shift from intensive traditional transplanting to 
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seedling throwing can be seen as a transition step to further labour-saving 
technology as China’s government has been promoting this new technology 
nationwide.  
Although agricultural technologies have been advanced substantially, 
there are still some agricultural procedures that have not been facilitated or 
replaced by modern technologies, and for these points, farmers have to 
mobilise various potential resources to cope with labour shortages during 
peak agricultural times. Table 6.11 shows that in the three typical peak times, 
almost half households lack sufficient labour and need supplementation.  This 
is mainly achieved through family migrants returning and mutual help with 
others, which is evidence of widespread labour shortages for farming. 
Besides, of almost 60% migrant households, only about 20% returned to help 
with farming work in 2011, indicating the low and undervalued status of 
agriculture in migrant households. Hired labour is poorly utilised by Hu Village 
farmers for two reasons. First, there are actually not enough labourers ready 
to hire in the village, as ordinary labourers have already engaged in non-farm 
activities. Secondly, driven by prosperous non-farm labour markets, the labour 
wage has been lifted unexpectedly higher than the threshold that farmers can 
afford for agriculture, which already produces only low-levels of remuneration. 
Similar situations have been identified in other countries (e.g. Rigg, 2001 for 
southeast Asia; Takahashi and Otsuka, 2009 for the Philippines).  
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Table 6.11 Hu Village Farmers’ Strategies of Labour Provision in 
Agricultural Peak Times in 2011 (%) 
 
Rice 
transplanting 
 
(n=205) 
Rice harvest 
 
 
(n=161) 
Rape 
harvest 
 
(n=197) 
Own family members at 
home 
53.3 54.0 60.0 
With migrants returning 
back 
20.1 22.4 23.5 
Labour exchange with 
relatives or villagers 
23.5 17.4 14.5 
Hiring labour from other 
villagers 
3.1 6.2 2.0 
Source: Author questionnaire  
Note: Farmers harvested rice in 2011 totally manually or partly manually, with 
some parts of rice land using a combine harvester, so n=161, excluding the 44 
farmers that only used a combine harvester.  
High-levels of hired labour wages are also an important driving force 
towards the use of labour-saving technologies, as farmers have to calculate 
which one is more worthwhile in deciding to use hired labour or modernised 
technologies, as Table 6.12 roughly shows. Taking the scarcity of hired labour 
into account, it is not difficult to understand why combine harvesters are so 
desirable to Hu Village farmers. A minimal amount of hired labour is a 
characteristic of contemporary China’s agriculture and this is contrary to many 
other developing countries like India, where hired labour contributes about 
45% of the agricultural workforce (Rawal, 2008; Huang et al., 2012). The 
primary reason in the contemporary context, as explained by Huang et al. 
(2012), is the fundamental “semi-worker-semi-cultivator” mode of rural 
households, most of whom rely on both subsistence farming and non-farm 
employments, often leaving women and the elderly to farm. This greatly 
reduces the necessity of hiring labourers. In addition to fundamentally 
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exemplifying the household dual livelihood mode, the case of Hu Village 
provides another perspective, that it is not because farmers have sufficient 
labour that hired labour is so minimal in contemporary rural China but 
because of the disadvantages of hired labour compared with the use of 
modern technologies and the poor availability of hired labour. Labour 
shortages, especially in peak agricultural times, do exist. 
Table 6.12 Selected Cost Comparisons between Hired Labour and 
Modern Technologies in Hu Village 
 
Option1: hiring labour 
(Yuan/ha) 
Option 2: using modern 
technologies 
(Yuan/ha) 
Rice harvest 4500-6000  1200-2200  
Tillage            1200-1800 45013  
Fertilization 1500 1200-1500 
Source: Interviews with Hu Village farmers 
To sum up, through qualitatively examining the overall technological 
changes to agriculture in Hu Village, it becomes clear that, as has occurred in 
other countries and in other regions of China, the trend is for agricultural 
technologies to be shifting away from traditional, labour-intensive, and often 
environmentally-friendly technologies to more modernised, capital-intensive, 
labour-saving and often environmentally unfavourable ones. The traditional 
sustainable intensive smallholder agricultural system of China as Netting 
(1993) has encouragingly demonstrated (see Chapter 2), has begun to be 
disintegrated driven by increasing labour losses from agriculture.  It is being 
replaced by a mixed and even seemingly paradoxical smallholder agricultural 
                                                             
13
 450 is calculated by the herbicides cost in case of no tillage.  
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form, which is technologically modernised, increasingly capitalised but without 
proletarianisation (Huang et al., 2012), and largely subsistence-orientated.  
Technological usage variance at the household-level 
This part explores technological usage differences among different 
households groups, to further examine if economic diversification affects 
technological usage at household level. Previous studies primarily use 
expenditure on farming inputs (often chemical inputs) per unit of land as the 
main independent technology variable, to estimate if there is a statistically 
significant difference among differently diversified households (e.g. Kilic et al. 
2009; Oseni and Winters, 2009; Takahashi and Otsuka, 2009; Pfeiffer et al., 
2009; Miluka et al., 2010). However, this single variable cannot 
comprehensively represent the technological practices of farmers. Therefore, 
this research uses four variables to present data on the overall technological 
usage patterns of farmers: expenditure on farming chemical inputs (chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides) per ha and expenditure of machinery per 
ha, to represent the usage intensity of farmers on modern labour-saving 
technologies; and the number of traditional farming practices applications14 
and the frequency of manure application to represent usage intensity of 
labour-intensive technologies. The Kruskal Wallis test was used to test the 
statistical significances among household groups at the level of 0.05 as Table 
                                                             
14
 Here based on the concrete status of Hu Village, only calculating 5 main traditional farming 
technologies: 1. Tillage; 2. Intercropping; 3. Multiple cropping; 4. Manure; 5. Traditional 
transplanting) 
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6.13 shows. 
Table 6.13 Technological Usage Difference among Different Household 
Groups in 2011 
 
Chemical 
input 
(Yuan/ha) 
Machinery 
input 
(Yuan/ha) 
Traditional 
technology 
usage 
Manure 
frequency 
Total 4265 1179 3.67 7.23 
Household income diversification level 
Dedicated 
farming 
 4389 1131 3.68 8.23 
I part-time  4496 1299 3.87 8.50 
II part-time  4074 1103 3.67 6.65 
Non-farming  4338 1344 3.24 5.14 
p-value 0.919 0.766 0.016 000 
Household job diversification  
No diversification 4500 1261 3.54 7.82 
Only local non-
farm activities 
4209        951      3.68 8.05 
Only migration  4152 1319 3.76 6.54 
Both local non-
farm and 
migration  
 4337        1131 3.60 6.76 
p-value 0.879 0.548 0.576 0.038 
Household total income quartile  
Quartile I 4947        1194         3.50 6.53 
Quartile II 4139        1340         3.64 6.55 
Quartile III 4056        1082         3.91 8.04 
Quartile IV    3935        1122         3.60 7.70 
p-value 0.245        0.564         0.181 0.072 
Household non-agricultural income quartile  
Quartile I 4536 1113           3.65 7.52 
Quartile II 4266 1379  3.72 7.21 
Quartile III 4100 1175  3.70 7.00 
Quartile IV 4161 1046  3.61 7.19 
p-value 0.973 0.993   0.918 0.769 
Source: Author questionnaire 
Table 6.13 shows that there is no statistically significant difference on 
chemical inputs and levels of machinery input per unit of land among various 
household groups, which is to some degree consistent with the finding from 
Qin (2010) in four villages of Chongqing Municipality, located just east of 
Sichuan. This indicates that modern labour-saving technologies, as long as 
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they are available, are desirable to all farming households, which also 
confirms the discussion of the overall technological changes at the village 
level. With respect to traditional technology usage, non-farming households 
significantly applied less than I part-time farming households do (p=0.016), 
and this may be because, as revealed in previous sections, non-farming 
households cultivate less crops, use land less intensively, and tend to move 
out of agriculture. For other household groups, traditional technologies are still 
evenly and widely adopted. 
This echoes the previous discussion of “standardised” farming, or the 
notion that most farming practices have become routinised and seen as fixed 
procedures for most households, except non-farming households. As for 
manure usage, the labour shortage effect is manifested obviously. II part-time 
farming and non-farming households used significantly  less manure, less 
intensively than other two household groups did (p=000), and households with 
only migratory income used significantly less than those without job 
diversification and those with only local non-farm activities (p=0.038). 
Household income factors have no significant impact on manure usage, 
although households with less total income tend to use less manure on land, 
which is probably because of aging farming labourers or poor manure 
availability. Manure application is a significant means that can qualitatively 
and sustainably enhance soil fertility, and as Brookfield (2001) notes, it 
belongs to “landesque capital”. Therefore, with the significant reduction on 
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manure usage driven by labour shortages, the environmental repercussions 
also deserve grave concern (Qin, 2010).      
Finally, through an investigation of technological use differences among 
households, it becomes clear that in the “standardised” forms of farming 
adopted in Hu Village (and also other parts of China, see Lin and Deng, 
2012), modernised and traditional technologies have largely coexisted and are 
utilised dynamically by farmers based on specific household socio-economic 
conditions. Driven by dramatic economic diversification, farming labour 
shortages are substantial and prevalent, with the likelihood of experiencing 
labour shortages likely to increase in the future.  For households such as this, 
the substitution between modernised labour-saving technologies and 
traditional labour-intensive technologies will inevitably occur, leading China’s 
agriculture to deeper levels of modernisation and capitalisation. Overall, 
through the dual processes of intensification of modernised technologies and 
capital, and the reduction of traditional “organisational skills” (Brookfield, 
2001) and labour, as Rigg (1998) also found in Southeast Asia, land yields 
have roughly been sustained but agricultural diversity has been significantly 
degraded, in which economic diversification of rural households has played a 
substantial role.   
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6.3 Market and agricultural production  
Since the epochal rural reform of the late 1970s, Chinese leaders have 
begun to initiate market-oriented policies firstly from agricultural products and 
this trend has continued in more than thirty years of subsequent reforms 
afterwards. Rural markets have been steadily liberalised and they have 
flourished, although in a gradual and tentative way, while agricultural 
commercialisation has been constantly deepened (Huang and Rozelle, 2007). 
During the market transition process, rural households have obtained 
substantial autonomy and flexibility to react to market signals (de Brauw et al., 
2000).  The dynamic interactions between market forces and actors’ various 
agencies have driven China’s agricultural changes in all dimensions, for 
instance, the expansion of cash crops, easy access to agricultural inputs, 
emerging land rental markets and so on. There are various forms of rural 
markets based on the Hu Village case, including the agricultural product 
market, input market, land market and contract farming, which will be further 
investigated in this section.  
6.3.1 Agricultural product and input markets 
Globally, driven by remarkable increases in agricultural productivity, 
international trade, the globalisation of markets and global organisational 
support programs, world agricultural product prices have undergone long-term 
decline for decades (Hazell and Wood, 2008). As a landmark of integrating the 
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domestic economy with international markets, China’s WTO accession in 
2001 has to a great degree evened up domestic and international agricultural 
prices, and has bound the fortunes of myriads of Chinese farmers together 
with fluctuations of global markets, which has significant repercussions for 
China’s smallholder agriculture in both positive and negative ways (Huang et 
al., 2007; Carter et al., 2012). As Huang et al. (2007) have argued, agricultural 
trade liberalisation brought by WTO accession lowers domestic prices of 
many crops like wheat, coarse grains, oil crops and soybean, but raise those 
of some labour-intensive crops like rice, vegetables, fruits, meats and 
aquaculture commodities in which China has comparative advantages. Thus, 
it can be reasonably assumed, farmer households that primarily cultivate 
negatively-impacted crops will be at loss and those that primarily cultivate 
positively-impacted crops will benefit from prices rise (Huang et al., 2007). 
However, even the limited gain from increased prices could be offset if the 
costs of agricultural production keep increasing, driven by high and rising 
energy prices (Hazell and Wood, 2008; Trostle, 2008; Timmer, 2008).  Indeed, 
in China the increase of prices of agricultural inputs has often overtaken the 
increase of some products’ prices in recent years, as is continually reported 
by national media15. China’s smallholders, as well as many other smallholders 
in other developing countries (Hazell and Wood, 2008), are facing a persistent 
decline in agricultural revenue, squeezed by both long-term decline of food 
                                                             
15
 For instances, Shanghai Securities News, 25
th
 April, 2008; International Herald Leader, 23
th
 
May 2011; Farmers’ Daily. 29
th
 March, 2013. 
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prices and continual increases in the cost, and the revenue squeeze is a fatal 
disincentive for Chinese smallholders.  
Squeeze of agricultural product and input markets 
With the overall tendencies of agricultural product and input markets globally 
and nationally, Hu Village agriculture represents a similar scenario to that 
which Table 6.14 summarises. Although rice prices in recent years have risen 
slightly, rice farmers could not gain cash income from it as rice is 
predominantly a subsistence crop for Hu villagers, with only a 12.6% 
commercialisation rate in 2011. For rape, every household obtained only 355 
Yuan on average, excluding that for home-consumption. Although citrus 
comparatively contributed the most net cash income among all crops, this 
figure, 416 Yuan, is much less than it used to be as citrus prices in recent 
years have been terribly low. Almost 80% of citrus farmers cannot make any 
profit.  
Table 6.14 Main Crops Market Conditions of Sample Households in Hu 
Village in 2011 
 
Total 
output 
(kg) 
Market 
price in 
2011 
(Yuan/k
g) 
Sold 
quant
ity  
(kg) 
Commerci
alisation 
level (%) 
Cash 
inputs 
(Yuan) 
Net 
Revenue 
(Yuan) 
Net cash 
income 
(Yuan) 
 Rice 1085 2.4 137 12.6 657 1947 -328 
Rape 258 6.8 94 36.4 281 1473 355 
    
Corn 
190 2.3 5 2.6 121 437 -110 
Citrus 1104 0.7 887 80.1 205 568 416 
Source: Author Questionnaire  
Through interviews, almost all the respondents complained of the low 
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cash income from agriculture and increasing prices of material inputs and 
machinery, often at the beginning of conversations. Although historical data is 
not available, according to interviews with fertilizer and pesticide sellers in the 
village, the prices of fertilizers in recent years have risen up at a rate of about 
10%, pesticides about 5-10%.  For some farmers, generally the middle-aged 
farmers, they actually want to focus on farming but the squeeze of high costs 
discourages them. Many also reported that if the prices of rice reached 10 
Yuan/kg, most farmers would come back to farming.  
Therefore, from the standpoint of farmers, the comparatively low 
agricultural income is the primary driver that forces them to seek non-farm 
activities. This is illustrated by the case of Mr Y in Box 6.3. People who 
entirely left the land, as Mr Y did, constitute only about one third or less of 
those in Hu Village as will be shown in the following sections. Nonetheless, 
his mode of calculation and comparison is very prevalent amongst farmers in 
the village and the author was often given this kind of calculation on rice 
output and input by farmers. Interestingly, China’s official CCTV channel 1 
broadcasted a program on 29th December 2011, titled “who will farm today?” A 
farmer from Guangdong in the program calculated the capital cost of one ha 
rice is 10320 Yuan while the net income is 9000 Yuan.  
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Box 6.3 Leaving the Land: Mr Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author interviews  
One noticeable point is that the cost calculation above does not include 
labour inputs, and if included, as farmers told, current farming practices are 
definitely running at a loss. Given high labour wages in non-farm sectors, 
farmers often have a strong feeling of being “at a loss” to farm, which also 
Mr Y and his wife have been working in Chengdu since 2010, and he is doing 
two jobs, building cleaning and gatekeeping, and his wife is working in a 
restaurant. He left all his land to his brother at home. He was disappointed by 
farming, as working all year round could not make much cash. He made a 
calculation for the author to compare the incomes between farming and jobs 
he is doing now.  
Assuming he cultivates 1 ha rice in first season with productivity 7500kg/ha 
and 2.8 Yuan/kg, then He makes 21000 Yuan/ha. The costs/ha include: 
seeds 750 +fertilizers 1800 + pesticides 600 +combine harvester 1500=4650 
Yuan/ha, and he makes net income from rice about 16350 Yuan in total. He 
cultivates 1 ha rape in the second season, with 2250 kg/ha and 4.4 Yuan/kg, 
then he makes 9900 Yuan from rice. The costs/ha include: seeds 
225+fertilziers1800+pesticides300=2325 Yuan/ha, and he makes net income 
from rape about 7575 Yuan. Therefore, in total, he makes 23925 Yuan from 
both.  
Now he and his wife are working in Chengdu, they earn: for cleaning work, 
1440Yuan/month; for gatekeeping, 1000Yuan/month; for restaurant work, 
1800Yuan/month; and in total, 4240 Yuan/month, and 50880 Yuan a year. 
For living costs they need about 20000 Yuan for the whole year, and then 
they can still save about 30000 uan safely. Furthermore, the work 
environment for him is much more comfortable than that of doing farming. In 
that case, why should he and others do farming? 
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leads to more labour-saving technologies inputs as discussed earlier. Thus, 
prosperous non-farm opportunities and unfavourable agricultural market 
conditions jointly contribute to the tendency for Chinese smallholders to move 
out of agriculture.   
Market accessibility  
With regard to market accessibility, which is identified by many researchers as 
a significant issue for rural development in developing countries, in 
contemporary Hu Village market conditions have been substantially enhanced 
due to infrastructure, especially transportation improvements, in recent years. 
Cement roads have been built to connect even the most remote households 
and the county road passes through Hu Village, with shuttle buses which 
provide great convenience in access to local markets, for instance, it is 
approximately 30 minutes to Qingshen County and 15 minutes to the nearest 
two towns.   
Moreover, market conditions have also been substantially improved 
within the village. For agricultural inputs, 3 fertilizer and pesticides shops and 
5 commercial fodder sellers can adequately satisfy the farming demand of Hu 
Village. What is more favourable for farmers is that all the fertilizer sellers 
allow farmers several months credit if they are not able to pay immediately 
and all provide free delivery services. What farmers need to do is to call the 
sellers and tell them what they want, and then they can wait at home or in the 
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field, which greatly facilitates access for aged and female farmers who are 
often not able to carry heavy fertilizers home. The easy access to input 
markets leads to “lazy farming” as farmers often termed, and also facilitates a 
more capital-oriented agriculture driven by labour shortages.  
For product markets, besides formal purchase markets in town and 
county, hordes of private traders and middlemen, as “flowing markets”, greatly 
facilitate farmers to market various agricultural products. For instance, there 
are tens of pig middlemen in Hu Village who connect large pig commercial 
enterprises and individual pig farmers. If farmers want to buy or sell pigs, they 
can contact these middlemen who will take workers and tools to load pigs and 
pay farmers on the spot. These pig middlemen connect demanders and 
suppliers not only within Sichuan, but also between Sichuan and other 
regions, like Yunan, Qinghai and Guizhou and so on, greatly facilitating pig 
farmers of Hu Village to integrate with broader domestic markets.  
For small scale livestock, like rabbits, farmers do not need to carry 
them to town or county markets, but just contact private traders and make an 
appointment, often simply carrying the rabbits for sale to the cement road and 
waiting for the traders. All these operations are manageable, especially to the 
increasingly aged farming population. For surplus farming products, like rice 
or rapeseeds, small-scale grain traders constantly visit or pass through the 
village, or farmers can sell to local markets if they have got enough labourers 
to do so.  
   
250 
 
Overall, regardless of the profit issue, accessibility and integration to 
markets has been substantially improved, and the almost zero market 
distance binds farmers tightly to market fluctuations. Combining the squeeze 
of two sides of agricultural markets on farmers, it is safe to conclude that 
without obstacles to participate in markets, the changes to agricultural factor 
prices, which are determined and connected by broader domestic and 
international markets, will directly stimulate or discourage farmers’ incentives 
on agricultural production.  
6.3.2 Land transfer market 
Driven by increasing de-population of agricultural sectors and massive shifts 
towards non-farm employments since the 1990s, the land rental market has to 
varying degrees developed across regions as induced institutional theory 
predicted (Yao, 2000; Kung, 2002). However, with rural households constantly 
deepening economic diversification, the incidence of land leases in rural 
China has been unexpectedly low as extensively found by researchers 
(Turner et al., 1998; Liu et al., 1998; Yao, 2000). This may be due to the 
“semi-worker-semi-cultivator” and “male-work-female-farm” modes of Chinese 
rural households (Qian, 2008). From the perspective of policy-makers, 
Chinese governments have long, but more enthusiastically in recent years, 
encouraged land transfer for land consolidation. The latest No.1 document of 
2013 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China particularly 
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focused on encouraging land transfer and developing family farms to deal with 
the decreasing farming population. Regionally in Southwest China, where 
non-farm activities, especially inter-provincial migration, are highly prevalent, 
land rental participation is higher than in Central China, although it is also a bit 
lower than Eastern China (Jin and Deininger, 2009).  
Until 2012, the land transfer area of China had reached 18 million ha, 
21.5% of the total rural household land area (People’s Daily, 5th March, 2013). 
And Sichuan has been one of the experimental provinces in terms of 
agricultural land transfer, due to the vast magnitude of its migration economy. 
By the end of 2012, Sichuan province had transferred 0.8 million ha, 20.5% of 
total household arable land area (Sichuan Rural Daily, 26th February, 2013). In 
line with the broader trends, Qingshen County in 2010 transferred 3.6 
thousand ha, 20.7% of total household farming land (QY, 2011). It seems that 
in recent years, the incidence of land transfer has dramatically increased 
compared with that of about 15 years ago when only 3-4% of the land was 
leased, as Turner et al. (1998) found in a survey of eight provinces. As will be 
shown below, land transfer in Hu Village presents similar and also different 
patterns compared to that of broader regions.    
There are two forms of land transfer which have occurred in Hu Village. 
One form is the commercial contract. In Hu Village, one farmer rented about 
13.3 ha flat land from villagers to cultivate medicine herbs and rice. Taking 
advantage of a favourable policy with a large grain cultivator, he made 
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contracts with about 100 households, with rent fees at 12000 Yuan per ha per 
year or 6000 Yuan per ha per half year. This is the only case that land is 
transferred with cash.  
Another form is informal land giving or receiving inter-households for 
free. As Table 6.15 shows, nearly one third of households received land from 
relatives or friends, and the receiving land occupies almost 20% of total 
farming land of sample households. Almost the only reason given for receiving 
land is that the giver had diverted all their labour to migration (32% out of 
32.9%), suggesting that migration does trigger land transfer participation 
(Kung, 2002). The magnitude of land giving in the sample is substantially less 
than land receiving, partly because the households surveyed are still doing 
farming while those who had totally abandoned farming were unavailable for 
research.  
Table 6.15 Informal Land Transfer Inter-household of Hu Village in 2011 
 
% of 
sample 
households 
Size 
(ha) 
% of 
cropping 
land 
From 
relatives 
(%) 
From 
friends 
(%) 
For 
migration 
(%) 
For  
farmer 
illness 
(%) 
Land 
Receiving 
32.9 0.05 18.9 20.4 12.5 32 0.9 
 
% of 
sample 
households 
Size 
(ha) 
%of 
cropping 
land 
To 
relatives 
To 
friends 
For 
migration 
For  
too old 
Land 
Giving 
10.3 0.03 8.2 8.1 2.2 3.5 6.8 
Source: Author questionnaire  
For the surveyed households who have given some or all their land to 
others, the primary reason was that they were too old to farm, indicating that 
the geriatrification of farming caused by household economic diversification 
has indeed brought about labour shortages in respect of farming. Seeing from 
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another angle, the fact that 32.9% households received extra farming land in 
2011 also demonstrates that land is still attractive to some households. And 
this desire also to some degree guarantees that minimal land is abandoned or 
left idle in Hu Village, and this in a sense can mitigate the negative impacts 
exerted by labour shortages in farming.  
Based on the land scale that the sample households farmed in 2011, 
the survey further asked about the willingness of farmers to cultivate more 
land or to rent out some or all their land. Interestingly, as Table 6.16 and Table 
6.17 show, most farmers (70.7%) do not want to cultivate extra land anymore, 
and even more (72.5%) want to rent out some land, implying that there is a 
large potential for land rental markets on the supply side. While seeing from 
the reverse angle again, still a rather modest number of households desire to 
cultivate more land, an obvious representation of the heterogeneity of different 
households in terms of land-demands. 
Table 6.16 Willingness of Cultivating More Land of Sample Respondents 
in 2011(%) 
Willing to cultivate more land 29.3 
Reasons   
Can increase income  21.3 
Have enough labour 13.6 
Don’t want to waste land 12.7 
Can get enough grain 12.2 
Unwilling to cultivate more land 70.7 
Reasons  
Labour shortage on farming 56.5 
Low payoff of farming 19.8 
Hate farming 10.7 
Source: Author questionnaire  
Note: Respondents often give one more reasons so that the total of the percentages given 
for reasons exceed 100%.  
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Table 6.17 Willingness of Land Rent-out of Sample Respondents in 
2011(%) 
Willing to rent out land   72.5 
Reasons   
Labour shortage on farming 49.3 
Want to do other non-farm activities  36.9 
Too old to farm  20.8 
Want more leisure time 19.6 
Rent fee is enough and attractive 4.9 
Farming is not profitable  1.8 
Hate farming 0.9 
Not depending on agriculture anymore 0.4 
Unwilling to rent out land 27.5 
Reasons   
Self-farming gains more than rent fees 20.4 
Freedom of farming on own land 10.2 
Have enough labour at home  6.5 
Source: Author questionnaire  
Note: Respondents often give one or more reasons, so that the total of the percentages 
given for reasons exceed 100%. 
Furthermore, to investigate whether households with different job 
statuses have different attitudes to extra land-cultivation and land transfer, 
crosstabulations with Chi-square tests were run as Table 6.18 shows. 
Although it seems that households without job diversification tend to be more 
willing to cultivate extra land and less willing to rent out through comparing the 
observed and the expected counts, there is no statistically significant 
association between households’ attitudes to land and household job statuses 
(both p-values> 0.05). In addition, crosstabulations between land attitudes 
and other three household types have been also operated, without statistical 
significance. These analyses reveal an interesting finding that economic 
diversification does not necessarily lead households to rent out land and that 
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households concentrating on farming also do not necessarily want to cultivate 
more land. The key probably lies in the specific household socio-economic 
conditions. For instance, according to observations and interviews, the 
households that do not want to rent out land and who desire extra land are 
often those with adequate labour at hand, often middle-aged family members 
who due to various reasons could not manage to migrate or undertake other 
local non-farm activities with higher levels of remuneration. Households with 
older farming members, or those in which a young wife is staying at home 
while the husband is migrating out, are generally more willing to rent out land. 
Table 6.18 Crosstabulations between Willingness of Cultivating Extra 
and Renting Out Land and Household Job Diversification Status in 2011 
  
Household 
without job 
diversificatio
n 
Household 
with only 
local non-
farm 
activities 
Household 
with only 
migration 
Household 
with both 
local non-
farm and 
migration 
Total 
Willingness 
to cultivate 
extra land 
No 
35 
(29.7) 
40 
(42.4) 
53 
(54.4) 
31 
(32.5) 
159 
Yes 
7 
(12.3) 
20 
(17.6) 
24 
(22.6) 
15 
(13.5) 
66 
Total 42 60 77 46 225 
Chi-square=4.077     df=3      p-value= 0.253  
Willingness 
to rent out 
land 
No 
9 
(11.5) 
16 
(15.2) 
25 
(21.2) 
12 
(12.6) 
62 
Yes 
33 
(30.4) 
44 
(43.5) 
52 
(55.8) 
34 
(33.3) 
163 
Total 42 60 77 46 225 
Chi-square= 12.198     df=9      p-value=0.202  
 Source: Author questionnaire  
Note: the expected count is in parentheses.  
Thus, overall, non-farm employments of rural households do not 
consequentially lead to land transfer which also greatly accords with the 
theoretical analysis of Qian (2008).Taking the modest amount of inter-
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household land transfer in 2011 into account and given the huge magnitude of 
non-farm employments in both Hu Village and other parts of China, it can be 
concluded that to maintain or reduce current land size through land transfer 
(rent or giving freely) is the dominant practice for most rural households. 
Agriculture plays an irreplaceable social security role for most Chinese rural 
households at present (Wang et al., 2013), and this advantage makes “don’t 
want to cultivate extra land but could not totally quit” (Qian, 2008:20) a rational 
choice for most rural households. 
Hu Village has shown a buoyant land transfer markets in recent years, 
and the attitudes of the sample households have projected a huge market 
potential on the supply side. The demand side nonetheless is not that 
optimistic. Actually, except the largest land tenant, in the sample households, 
only 5 households (2.2%) rented land from other farmers, all at a small-scale 
ranging from 0.3 to 1.3 ha. The chief reason of such low incidence of land 
renting is the low benefits of farming. Another cause is that the rugged land 
and highly scattered land plots greatly enhance the transaction costs of land 
renting and impede improvement to land scale. As a county official 
recognised, “it is impossible for Qingshen County to materialize scale 
economy of land through land transfer because of its landscape limitations, 
and the smallholder family farm will still be the mainstay of future farming” 
(Interview with Mr Z, 2012). Thus, land transfer will primarily occur through the 
informal form of small scale and flexible receiving and giving inter-households 
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in Hu Village, and other places which are geographically similar to Hu Village.  
What deserves more concern is the land productive performance after 
transfer in whatever forms. Longitudinal observations and data may be more 
appropriate to investigate this issue, while qualitative data from interviews and 
observations could provide a tentative evaluation. The largest rented farm 
performed much poorer than expected by the villagers, for instance, the rice 
productivity was only about 4500 kg/ha, substantially lower than the village 
average. The poor land performance was caused primarily by poor 
management of the farmer, for instance, not applying pesticides and 
herbicides properly and timely, no manure usage, and cheating by using hired 
labourers. In addition, the high material inputs and hired labour costs almost 
squeezed all the potential profits from the land, and the contract farmer said 
he experienced a great loss in 2011, and possibly will return the land back to 
individual farmers in very near future.   
In respect of informal land transfer, one potential concern may be the 
unequal treatments of farmers to own land and to be given land. Interviews 
reveal that this concern is unnecessary at present in the Hu Village case. 
Farmers who received land from others actually tend to enhance revenue 
from farming, and most will treat the land fairly as they agreed. Therefore, 
informal land transfer has more positive effects on current agricultural 
production, as it on one hand greatly reduces the likelihoods of land 
abandonment, and on the other hand, can sustain land fertility while the land 
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contractors pursue other non-farm activities. Most importantly, the informal 
land transfer sustains the flexibility and resilience of current household 
livelihoods, and guarantees that when the farmers return they still have fertile 
land to farm. With current political economic conditions in rural China, the 
flexibility and resilience that is endowed by informal land transfer are of 
strategic importance to rural households and levels of rural agricultural 
production.       
6.3.3 Contract farming 
Contract farming, an important pathway to integrate small family farms with 
international agricultural markets, has been extensively researched worldwide 
(Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Little and Watts, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). 
In the process of the market-based economic transition in developing 
countries like China, smallholders often face various limitations in participating 
in markets and commodity production, like information asymmetry, high risks 
and high transaction costs. “Therefore, small producers often depend on 
outside actors to bring them much-needed skills, capital and market access”, 
and “contract farming, in this perspective, is but one of the possible ways in 
which peasant households can shift from subsistence agriculture to 
commoditised agriculture of higher-value products” (Zhang,2012:464). With 
increasingly deepening marketisation in China, contract farming has been 
developed in various forms.  
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However, different from other developing countries, contract farming in 
China is mostly operated by small domestic commercial companies and 
primarily caters to domestic markets (Zhang, 2012), for China has huge 
domestic agro-food demand driven by increasing urbanisation and 
consumption pattern changes (Huang, 2010). Although contact farming is 
supposed to be linked to market behaviour, in China the state has played a 
dominant role (Zhang, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 4, local governments, 
both provincial and prefectural, have placed agricultural industrialisation as 
the top strategy of agricultural development, and contract farming organised 
by the “enterprise + farmer” model is the most popular mode of agricultural 
industrialisation (Huang, 2010; Zhang, 2012). In line with macro trends, Hu 
Village farmers have also long participated in contract farming, contract 
sericulture and contract rape seeding, so the following section will further 
examine how these two projects exert influence on agricultural production in 
Hu Village.  
Contract Sericulture 
The contract between sericulture farmers and Qingshen County Sericulture 
Company has been established since the 1980s, when most farmers in Hu 
Village undertook sericulture. The contract basically denotes that the company 
provides silkworm eggs, technological guidance and markets, and farmers 
buy silkworm eggs from the company and sell the silkworm cocoon to the 
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company. Village cadres often participate in the process as an agent of the 
company, to distribute silkworm eggs or transmit some information. The 
product prices are set by the company, and farmers cannot bargain. Because 
the company produces for both domestic and international markets, the prices 
also fluctuate with constantly changing domestic and global demand and 
supply levels. As a profit-chasing actor, to guarantee the profits of the 
company is the precondition for the prices provided to individual farmers.  
Therefore, although this contract does facilitate individual farmers to 
connect with markets, risks still remain and profits cannot be ensured. For 
instance, during the fieldwork, the first season of sericulture was disastrous 
due to unfavourable weather (too wet), and the harvest was poor and of low 
quality. The company set restricted standards for this season’s products, and 
substantially reduced the purchase price from farmers, so that many farmers 
only got tens of Yuan, or a hundred Yuan per piece whereas in normal years 
they can earn about 800 Yuan. This instance suggests the relationship and 
barriers between the two contract sides, and farmers are most often on the 
subordinate side. Furthermore, there are no formal signed contracts between 
the company and farmers, only oral informal agreements, thus, farmers’ rights 
and interests cannot be protected legally. Without guaranteed profits, many 
farmers would rather go after more lucrative jobs so there has been a steady 
decline of sericulture in Hu Village.  However, for some farmers that have to 
stay in the village and who want to make some money, participation in this 
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contract farming may be the only option.  
Contract rape seed production   
Since 2009, some Hu Village farmers have engaged in contracts with a rape 
seed company, which was introduced initially by a government official. In 
2011, due to unfavourable market demand, the company stopped for one year 
and continued again in 2012, with 186 participant households. In the contract, 
the company provides rape seeds, technological guidance and markets. The 
purchased prices are set at three times the normal rapeseed market price for 
that year. This price scheme seems very attractive to farmers. What farmers 
ought to do in this contact is to strictly follow the technological requirements 
established by the company, otherwise the productivity cannot be guaranteed.  
Due to very complicated technological procedures and higher labour 
input requirements, the benefits of this contract are selective. Younger and 
educated farmers have more advantages and thus got higher productivity, 
while older and more poorly educated farmers often failed to implement the 
requirements in a timely and effective manner, and thus had poor productivity.  
Theoretically, participant farmers can earn about 15000 Yuan/ha, much more 
than normal rape production does, although this is materialised by investing 
additional cash (about 1500 Yuan/ha) and labour (generally 8 additional 
working days) because the technological procedures of seed production 
require more fertilizers, often expensive varieties, pesticides and large 
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amounts of labouring work on land preparation and eliminating foreign plants.  
Therefore, if taking the additional investments into account, the profits 
are actually acquired through high inputs, and the net income to a large 
degree remains the same as with normal rape production. Moreover, this 
contract deepens commercialisation of rape production as most of the 
productivity is marketed, leaving a small proportion of product (the rapeseeds 
from male plants which are not seeds, generally 600 kg/ha) for home-
consumption. Some households even have to purchase rapeseed oil from 
markets. Even so, as Guo et al. (2007) found in a national survey, most 
farmers still are willing to engage in contract farming, especially for those with 
relatively sufficient levels of labour and with modest education, because at 
least it provides an opportunity to make more cash. Government officials and 
village cadres serve as coordinators between the company and individual 
farmers, which also give farmers certain credits for this project.     
The two contract farming projects in Hu Village have shown that the 
market-oriented agricultural development approach has brought various 
market agents into agriculture and has led to deeper agricultural 
commercialisation and industrialisation. In this process, smallholders, even in 
remote areas like Hu Village, have become tightly connected with domestic 
markets and even global markets. Nonetheless, given the limitations of rural 
markets and governance structures, contract farmers are often located in 
subordinate positions in this game and risks in most cases still remain. It is 
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hard to say whether the impacts of contract farming on agriculture are positive 
or negative, as many have found both effects in other developing countries. 
For instance, Little and Watts (1994) and Raynolds (2000) stress the negative 
side of the “exploitive” relationship between farmers and companies, while 
Key and Runsten (1999) focus on the positive side of income-generation. 
Even based on the two contract farming projects of Hu Village, both impacts 
have emerged, with the coexistence of a subordinate power position and 
increasing income. Without other alternatives, Hu Village farmers have no 
choices but to participate in contract farming if they expect to increase 
agricultural income. Given China’s special government-dominated 
development strategy, more efforts need to be taken to foster various 
alternatives of agricultural marketisation other than contract farming, and grant 
farmers more choices when those left-behind try to increase income from 
agriculture.  
6.4 Economic policies of agricultural production 
In transitional China, the state still plays vital roles in agricultural development 
through agricultural development schemes, policies and projects. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, governments at all levels have made a great effort to 
modernise agriculture and enhance farmers’ income through various 
subsidies, investing on infrastructure and other agriculture-related projects. 
This section will then, based on the case of Hu Village, investigate how 
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different agricultural policies drive agricultural production at the local level.   
6.4.1 Agricultural subsidies  
Agricultural subsidies have been a landmark agriculture support policy since 
the early 2000s, as it terminated the thousands-of–years’ taxation on Chinese 
farmers (Yu and Jensen, 2010; Huang et al., 2011). The subsidy quantity from 
central finance has increased annually as Chapter 4 has shown. There are 
basically four types of subsidy payments: grain direct subsidy, input subsidy, 
quality seed subsidy and agricultural machinery subsidy, and the latter three 
are usually termed “agricultural material comprehensive subsidy”. Thus 
common farmers literally receive two subsidies: grain direct subsidy and 
agricultural material comprehensive subsidy. To guarantee the effectiveness of 
the subsidy, the payments should be distributed to individual farmers 
according to the actual sown area of plants (Yu and Jensen, 2010), while local 
governments often distribute the payments according to the registered land 
area of households rather than actual sown area (Huang et al., 2011). 
Qingshen County also followed this rule and distributed 140 million Yuan for 
agricultural subsidy in 2010 (QY, 2011). With very slight changes in recent 
years, Hu Village farmers received subsidy at 1470 Yuan/ha for all agricultural 
subsidies, with grain direct subsidy 420 Yuan and the other 1050 Yuan in 
2011.  
To what degree agricultural subsidy has distorted farmers’ decisions on 
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farming has been discussed with varying conclusions, as reviewed in Chapter 
2. Qualitative data from Hu Village seems to follow the findings of Huang et al. 
(2011). When asking farmers their opinions on agricultural subsidies, the most 
prevalent response is emotional gratitudes to governments for not only 
eliminating many of the burdens of farmers but also in turn subsidising them. 
With regard to effects on farming decisions, the answers are mostly “nothing” 
or negative. Many respondents mentioned that the distribution method is 
problematic, for whether cultivating grain crops or not, all farmers can 
unexceptionally receive the subsidy. Farmers who plant trees in paddy fields 
can also receive the payments. In addition, for the more than 30% informal 
land transfer, households receive extra land without subsidy, which means 
those who give land out keep the subsidy for themselves, even though their 
whole family may have migrated out. The mismatch in land cultivators and 
contractors driven by land transfer obviously will lead to the conclusion that 
the subsidy distributed by that method cannot stimulate farmers’ farming 
incentives. 
Another associated issue identified by Hu Village farmers is the 
minimal amount of the subsidy, 1500Yuan/ha, with every household cultivating 
about 0.24 ha, so that is only 360 Yuan in total.  This is already much higher 
than the rate of 2008 when Huang et al. (2011) found that the national 
average subsidy for a typical household is 327 Yuan in total. To the great 
majority of current households in Hu Village, this amount of cash means too 
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little. As farmers often commented, it can only buy some kitchen sauces. 
Many farmers often forget to withdraw the subsidy when they buy fertilizers 
and pesticides. No migrant-farmers will return back to farming because of 
agricultural subsidy, neither will some farmers stop shifting rice land to cash 
forest trees. Nonetheless, the subsidy at least can to some degree cover the 
price increase of agricultural inputs and sustain farmers’ farming revenue.  
Instead of driving farmers to undertake grain cultivation actively, the 
agricultural subsidy is more like a bonus to farmers. As Huang et al. (2011: 69, 
emphasis is added) finally concluded, 
The subsidy programme in China is becoming a big deal. It is very popular 
in the countryside and, therefore, it is likely to be a fixture of China’s 
agriculture for a while. However, this programme, so far, is mainly an 
income transfer programme. And so far, it is being accomplished with 
few distortions to grain sown area or input use.  
6.4.2 Governmental agricultural development projects 
Various development projects are very common pathways for governments to 
directly intervene in modernisation processes, especially for developing 
countries (Scott, 1998). In China, the range and magnitude of government-led 
development projects are tremendous, as is the state-dominated development 
strategy. As has been argued by Scott (1998), however, many state-led 
development projects which are initiated with good intentions end as tragedies 
or disasters because the ossified bureaucracy and linear implementation 
systems cannot deal with diverse local situations. In transitional China, there 
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have been, especially in recent years, many favourable policies which have 
been launched to develop modern agriculture.   
In sharp contrast with the frustration on the farmers’ side, governments 
enthusiastically participate in agricultural development through planning and 
initiating various projects. As agricultural modernisation is the dominant 
development strategy of transitional China, governments from the central to 
the local levels, especially in recent years, have been endeavouring to design 
and implement multifarious development projects to modernise agriculture. 
For Sichuan, modern agriculture is a project package, including various 
aspects, like crops, land and livestock. Based on recent project experiences in 
Hu Village, an overview of two of the most influential projects, the autumn 
potato project and the modern pig farming project may provide the basis for 
an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of government-led agricultural 
development projects.  
Autumn potato project 
The autumn potato project was promoted by Qingshen County 
Agricultural Bureau in 2009, targeting adjustment of the agricultural structure 
to enhance farmers’ income. The content of the project includes the 
government providing free potato seeds and free management inputs (mainly 
pesticides), while participant farmers provide land, labour, fertilizers and other 
normal management inputs. This seems to be a well-meaning project at the 
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beginning.  
In practice however, the distribution of potato seeds was delayed for 
two weeks due to bureaucratic delays and this meant that farmers missed the 
appropriate time for planting potato according to the local weather conditions. 
Many farmers took the seeds back home and did not plant them but cooked 
them as food. For the planted potatoes, more than 80% of plants caught 
diseases afterwards because of delayed seeding. The bureau then organised 
people to apply pesticides. On that day, the bureau director took many 
reporters to propagate their project activities, while the effectiveness of the 
pesticides application was actually minimal. And soon, many farmers decided 
to remove the plants, and prepare the land for next season crops.  For those 
who did not remove the plants, the harvest was very poor. The bureau did not 
care about the outcome, as they have various methods and strategies to cope 
with project inspection and finally the project was reported as a big success.  
What the project implementers seem to be really concerned about is 
that there is a place and people to take part in the project, but the outcome is 
not the priority. Most ironically, as many experienced farmers noted, the soil 
type in Hu Village is actually not suitable for potato as many of them have 
learned before the project. Finally, the autumn potato project ended with a 
disappointing, if not disastrous, outcome.     
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Modern pig hoggery project 
To promote modern livestock production in Qingshen and to enhance farmers’ 
income, Qingshen County Animal Husbandry Bureau introduced a modern pig 
farming project in 2010. The main content of this project is to subsidise 
farmers building a modern hoggery, to encourage farmers to undertake pig 
farming. In this project, a small hoggery for 50 pigs can receive 3000 Yuan 
subsidy, a modest one for 100 pigs 5000 Yuan, a large one for 150 pigs or 
more 10000 Yuan.  Attracted by the amount of subsidy, about 100 households 
in Hu Village participated in this project, and about 70% constructed small 
hoggeries, while modest and large hoggeries only occupied a minor 
proportion.  
From the standpoint of farmers, this is a good project for them as it did 
release credit constraints on livestock production. However, out of the 100 
participant households, only about 30 undertook pig farming afterwards while 
the majority of them continued to migrate out or undertook other non-farm 
activities, leaving the hoggeries empty. As a village cadre told, about 60% of 
participant farmers had no experience of pig breeding and built hoggeries only 
for the subsidy. In addition, about 100 project hoggeries cover more than 1 ha 
paddy field, and the empty ones cover about 0.67 ha. It is hard to judge the 
effectiveness of this project, because for some pig farmers, the subsidy 
indeed provided them an opportunity to undertake scale pig farming, while for 
some who actually did not intend to farm pig at home, it was a waste of 
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resources, both in terms of capital and land. For the implementer, this project 
undoubtedly is another successful step to modernised agriculture and will be 
reported and propagated on at various government conferences.    
 Except those two, there are many other different government-led 
agricultural development projects participated in by Hu Village farmers 
currently, just to name a few: the female pig subsidy, agricultural insurances, 
forest tree project and so forth. But the implementation of all of these follows 
similar patterns to the two described above. The village head reported that,  
With the favourable agricultural and rural polices, in the future there will 
be more government projects, while on the side of farmers, their farming 
incentives kept decreasing, and less and less farmers are willing to 
undertake agriculture diligently and attentively .  
What the cadre said actually points to the overall status of contemporary 
Chinese agriculture: “enthusiastic governments” and “dejected farmers”. Due 
to discontinuities of project targets, as the above two projects show, many 
government-led projects often in the end frustrate or distort farmers’ initiatives.  
6.4.3 Infrastructure investment 
Many researchers have found that rural infrastructure construction (e.g. roads, 
irrigation facilities) could trigger all-wave rural developments in developing 
countries, for instance, enhancing both agricultural and non-farm 
productivities (Fan and Zhang, 2004), integrating the rural population with 
markets and facilitating rural mobility (Rigg, 2001), and changing land use 
patterns and livelihood strategies (Hazell and Wood, 2008). In China, for a 
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long period, rural infrastructure, especially transportation, has been greatly 
overlooked by national development strategy compared with the rapid growth 
of urban infrastructure.  
Since the 2000s, Chinese central government has strengthened rural 
infrastructure construction, including transportation, irrigation, drinking water 
security, education, health and cultural facilities. In 2011, the central finance 
office invested more than 1000 billion Yuan in rural development, and 
budgeted 160 billion Yuan for rural infrastructure, representing a 15% growth 
rate from 2010 to 2011 (Ministry of Finance, 2011). At the provincial level in 
2011, Sichuan repaired 29000 km rural cement roads, transferred 0.09 million 
ha hilly area into arable land, increased 0.16 million ha of irrigated land, and 
constructed 15000 km rural cement roads (Sichuan Government Annual 
Report, 2012). At the county level, Qingshen repaired 300 km rural cement 
roads and transferred 573 ha into arable land, while in 2006, the amount of 
newly constructed cement road was 116 km (QY, 2007, 2011). Based on 
recent central policies regarding agriculture and rural development, it is safe 
to say that the intensity and range of investments in rural infrastructure from 
the central to the local level have kept increasing in last several years and will 
continue to expand in the future. Infrastructure at community level has also 
been accordingly improved recently as Hu Village shows.  
 As a result of  two main government infrastructure projects, by 2012, 
all the 8 groups of Hu Village have become accessible by cement roads, 
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which now connect about 90% of households, and more than half of the 
paddy field area was also paved through. One county road passing through 
Hu Village was also rebuilt, further shortening the time from village to county 
and other townships. The advanced roads benefit agricultural production in 
various ways. The impact most stressed by farmers is that these changes 
significantly increase opportunities for mechanisation, as cement roads 
substantially enhance the range of combine harvester operation. Many old 
farmers clearly expressed that without combine harvesters they might have 
quitted farming and given their land to others. Newly built roads enable them 
to manage more land and thus to some degree reduce the degree of their 
households’ dependence on non-farm income. In addition, the free delivery 
service provided by fertilizer and commercial fodder sellers also benefits from 
cement roads. A seller, Mr S told, “Without hardened roads, it is impossible to 
deliver hundreds of kg fertilizers to remote and hilly paddy field by small motor 
vehicles, and the remote land might have been left idle”.  
Not only for machines and chemical fertilizers, but also manure can be 
more easily and effectively transported from farmers’ houses to remote land 
plots, as farmers can use pushcarts to convey manure on cement roads which 
is much faster than carrying on their shoulders. With cement roads, 
agricultural products can make easy and timely access to markets as is 
discussed earlier. Overall, the improved transportation reduces farmers’ 
labour intensity, better integrates farmers and agriculture with markets, and in 
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a sense, improves agricultural attractiveness.  
From the perspective of political economy, rural roads could make the 
countryside more proximate to central authorities and hinder farmers’ 
autonomy (Scott, 1998), which may lead “to an undermining of fragile 
livelihoods and dispossession of resources” (Wilson, 2004: 527) and could be 
an engine of economic stratification and social exclusion (Rigg, 2002). 
Nonetheless, for Chinese agriculture, limitations and threats mostly come from 
agricultural de-population and resource scarcities, so roads and the 
associated market integration they bring could play a more meritorious role.    
Besides, the land levelling and irrigation improvement projects in recent 
years have also to different extents improved the agricultural infrastructure. 
For instance, the land levelling project shifted about 6.7 ha hilly area into flat 
arable land. The irrigation project reinforced irrigating channels with cement 
from reservoir to individual paddy field, which increases the irrigation 
efficiency and reduces water loss in water convey. These government projects 
are imperative indeed in an era of farming being increasingly marginalised 
and despised by farmers. Combining the discussion on government 
development project above, it seems that for contemporary Chinese 
agriculture, the government can exert more positive influences through 
improvements in agricultural infrastructure than through development projects.    
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6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the roles of various economic factors which affect 
contemporary Chinese smallholder agriculture. Through investigation into the 
impacts of rural household economic diversification, agricultural markets and 
government economic policies and projects related with agriculture, three 
strands of conclusion can be drawn respectively.  
Firstly, given the long-lasting and dramatic economic diversification of 
rural households, agriculture has to be understood through non-agricultural 
activities in China as similarly found in other developing countries (Rigg, 
1998). Massive engagements in non-farm activities have diversified and 
stratified rural households economically in a decisive way, and substantially 
reduced the share of agriculture in rural households. Economic diversification 
of rural households influences agricultural production in various ways. First of 
all, agricultural productivities have largely remained due to modern material 
inputs and the standardisation of farming practices. While agricultural 
structure has been to varying degrees changed, due to the readjustments of 
family labour by non-farm employments, most crop production and livestock 
sidelines have experienced gradual decline due to overall labour withdrawal. 
Migration seems to affect agricultural production more prominently than other 
forms of non-farm employments, and tends to de-intensify land use and 
reduce agricultural diversity. Technologically, substitutions between labour and 
modern technologies, like fertilizers and machines, evidently exist, particularly 
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for migrant households. Increasing capital input and minimal hired labour 
leads Chinese smallholder agriculture to “capitalization without 
proletarianization” (Huang et al., 2012).  
All the changes lead to a special form of agriculture, not traditional 
agriculture characterised by intensive and sustainable land-use, nor purely 
modern agriculture. Taking the context of increasing economic diversification 
of rural households into account, the smallholder agriculture can be seen as 
“perfunctory agriculture” as farmers themselves and the director of the 
County Agricultural Bureau have noted. Perfunctory agriculture is 
characterised by extensive management alongside preferences for labour-
saving modern technologies.  
For a long time, a great clamour has arisen in the media and in 
academia in China regarding the question of agricultural crisis driven by 
massive withdrawals of rural labour from agriculture, and this chapter may 
respond to these concerns with a simplified argument: the overall agricultural 
outputs in the near future could largely be sustained, while the production 
process has been changing qualitatively, and presumably in an unsustainable 
way. It is agricultural sustainability, rather than outputs, that really deserves 
concern. As Rigg has similarly observed in Southeast Asia, “most of the major 
transformations in agriculture in the region are adaptations brought about—at 
least in part—by labour loss.” (Rigg, 1998:508). 
Secondly, agricultural markets of both products and inputs have been 
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substantially developed. They have greatly promoted agricultural 
commercialisation and integrated farmers with domestic and international 
markets. The rising input prices and declining or slowly rising product prices 
are squeezing agricultural revenues, and greatly discourage farmers’ 
incentives for farming. On the other hand, the market-oriented agricultural 
development approach has enlivened various fashions of agricultural 
operation such as contract farming and large-scale land contracts, as Hu 
Village has recently experienced. What these market forces may bring to 
farmers and agriculture varies according to different conditions. While, given 
the increasing deagriculturalisation of Chinese smallholders, the participation 
of various market actors in agriculture may well bring positive impacts, how to 
ensure the legitimate interests of farmers are protected deserves more 
attention, especially in a transitional economy where market imperfections and 
regulation limitations are widespread like rural China. Strong willingness for 
land transfer on the supply side and weak demands indicates the low 
comparative advantages of agriculture and also shows the imperfection of 
land transfer markets. The quite substantial magnitude of informal land 
transfer is a strategy for farmers to sustain livelihood flexibility and resilience 
under the specific conditions of Chinese political economy for farmers and 
migrants.  
Thirdly, the Chinese government has played an important role in 
agricultural development, especially in recent years. Under the favourable 
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conditions of agriculture-supportive political economy, various agricultural 
subsidies, modern agriculture and infrastructure projects have been 
enthusiastically launched and implemented to facilitate agricultural 
modernisation and to enhance farmers’ income. The influence of the 
agricultural subsidy on farming is insignificant, whether in the case of Hu 
Village or in the broader regions (Huang et al., 2011).  It is more like a bonus 
to farmers. Agricultural development projects can provide farmers with various 
opportunities to undertake high-value farming activities, while given the 
context of Chinese ossified bureaucracy, these projects with originally good 
intentions in many cases end up with disappointing consequences. It suggests 
that for contemporary rural China, agricultural infrastructure construction is 
especially desirable, as this can make agriculture more manageable for the 
increasingly aged farming population and may effectively reduce the likelihood 
of land abandonment.   
Finally, it is an overall tendency in rural China that agriculture has been 
playing a decreasing role in household livelihoods economically, and thus 
being progressively marginalised by most rural households. This chapter has 
focused on the economic factors that may exert influences on agriculture, 
while how the social and cultural changes of transitional China affect 
agricultural production are also important. As Rigg (2001:121) has argued in 
respect of agricultural changes in Southeast Asian countries: “… along with 
the importance of locality,… is the necessity of looking beyond the economic. 
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Important cultural and social changes are influencing the decisions that rural 
people are taking…” The next chapter will explore this issue in detail.  
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Chapter 7 Socio-cultural Drivers of 
Chinese Smallholder Agriculture: the 
Case of Hu Village  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores what socio-cultural forces are influencing contemporary 
Chinese smallholder agriculture, and how. In effect, economic and socio-
cultural factors are not independent from each other, but they affect 
agricultural production in various ways in contemporary rural China. Merely 
accentuating the economic drivers on agricultural production, as most studies 
have done, and simplifying agricultural production into an economic behaviour 
may omit more profound socio-cultural factors, based on how farmers think 
and exert agency in their production activities. When conceptualising the 
overall agrarian transition of Asian countries, Rigg and his associates (2012) 
casted a critical view of the “economic tendency” in rural studies that sees 
“outcomes as manifestations, primarily, of economic forces and incentives” 
(Rigg et al., 2012:2), suggesting that focusing on any particular aspect of rural 
society fails to capture the whole picture and often leads to misconstruing the 
nature and direction of agrarian transformation. Previous reviews (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.6) suggest at least two points. First, agricultural patterns indeed 
change in the wake of socio-cultural changes. Second, farmers, rather than 
being merely economically rational individuals as many studies have 
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assumed, are virtually social actors who exert agency according to 
specifically situated social relations and cultural rules (Long and Ploeg, 1994), 
so socio-cultural factors are of great significance to farmers’ livelihood 
strategies. This chapter, then, based on the specific circumstance of Hu 
Village, reveals the underlying socio-cultural forces with regard to agricultural 
production in the context of the Chinese agrarian transition.  
Besides striking economic transformations, the rural space of China 
has been undergoing dramatic socio-cultural changes as well since market 
reforms. If classifying rural society roughly into three levels: the individual 
level, the household/family level, and the community level, ample evidence 
has shown that transformations have occurred at all three levels. At the 
individual level, a tendency of individualisation has gradually come into form, 
featured by increasing individual mobility, boosting individual rights awareness 
and rise of personal lifestyles as the whole country pursues modernity (Yan, 
2010). At the household level, driven by livelihood diversification, especially 
rural-urban migration, a form of “split” household has widely emerged in rural 
China (Fan, 2009). In addition, the power of young women has kept rising up 
within household, accompanied by the decline of parental authorities and 
power (Yan, 2006; He, 2010). Gender relations seemingly have meliorated as 
gender division of labour is increasingly perceived as a collective strategy to 
improve the household economy rather than as oppression of females (Zuo, 
2004; He, 2010). This said, rural women indeed undertake more intra-
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household work and thus often have high workloads (Fan, 2003; Ye and Wu, 
2008). Inter-generational relations have drastically reversed as the status of 
the young has been greatly enhanced and that of the older generation 
substantially weakened as they have been marginalised, leading to a severe 
decline of filial piety (Ikels, 2006) and an “exploitive” relationship between 
generations (He, 2010).  
At the community level, long-term market penetration and dramatic 
migration have greatly disintegrated the Chinese village as a community 
(Mao, 2010), leading to the degradation of community values and social 
cohesion. Culturally, through discursive practices of rural/urban difference, 
rural space and rural residents have been constructed as “backward”, 
“traditional”, “lagging behind times” (Lei, 2003: 637), inferior to urban residents 
who are associated with that which is modern, progressive, promising. That is 
also why most rural young people desperately swarm to cities to embrace 
“modernity”. In addition, brought about by modernisation, the consumerism 
culture has penetrated into rural society and obliges farmers to make as much 
cash as possible (He, 2010). The brief sketch of China’s rural socio-cultural 
changes under the overarching process of the quest for modernity is also 
echoed by researchers in other countries. For instance, Rigg et al. (2012) 
outlined the overall agrarian change in Asian countries into three strands: 
delocalisation of life and living, dis-embedding of households and families and 
dissociation of the village community. 
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Informed by the literature regarding rural socio-cultural changes and 
combining the specific circumstance of Hu Village, several aspects can be 
identified which have influenced agricultural production in various manners, 
such as: villagers’ overwhelming emphasis on children’s education which 
drives the young out of agriculture; the labour division within rural households 
leads to current labour pattern in farming; cultural changes within the 
community push farmers to make more cash to satisfy their everyday needs. 
The following sections further investigate how these different factors directly 
or indirectly affect agricultural production in detail, and the final section 
concludes the chapter.  
7.2 Moving out of agriculture and the emphasis on 
education 
7.2.1 Agriculture: a low status, futile and shameful occupation  
In the process of the quest for modernity in the developing countries, 
agriculture has been widely downplayed not only by outsiders of the rural but 
also by rural residents themselves. More than a decade ago, Croll and Huang 
found in eight Chinese villages that “it was the desire to leave agriculture 
which was cited as the most important trend, with out-migration perceived as 
one means of achieving this move” (Croll and Huang, 1997:134). Agriculture is 
held “in such low esteem that the villagers would not even consider it as a 
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proper ‘work’ (gong zuo) as the latter term is reserved for permanent, stable 
and income-generating employment in the non-agricultural sector” (Lei and 
Lu, 2005: 25). The foremost reason for agriculture being considered as a low 
status, futile and shameful occupation is that agriculture cannot produce 
sufficient cash to satisfy the ever-increasing monetary demands of rural 
households in modern society, especially in countries dominated by 
smallholder agriculture like China.   
This mentality towards agriculture is also prevalent in Hu Village. At the 
beginning of almost every conversation, disappointments from agriculture 
were always expressed by farmers, such as “farming is annoying (nao huo)”, 
“agriculture is a useless work now, and we cultivate crops only for our 
consumption”, “farmers are labourious and hopeless, working hard for a whole 
year without much return”. When I introduced myself as a PhD student 
studying agriculture, many farmers teased me about the “boring” subject, like 
“there is nothing worthwhile to study about agriculture now, and no one wants 
to do farming except the elderly”. From the despondent language, the 
message is clearly delivered that agriculture is futile and people that 
undertake agriculture deem themselves inferior to others. Agriculture, which 
used to be the mainstay of household livelihoods, has affirmatively become a 
sideline of household economy for the vast majority of Hu Village households, 
except several specialist households who focus on livestock farming or cash 
crops. The inversion of the significance of agricultural and non-agricultural 
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activities in rural spaces has been widely identified in developing countries, 
and agriculture thus has been increasingly perceived as a low status 
occupation, leading to a strong willingness to move out of agriculture.   
As Table 7.1 shows, dedicated farmer is ranked as a low status of 
occupation by Hu villagers, while governmental official and successful 
businessman are the most admired jobs, as they represent wealth, security, 
power and respect in the eyes of farmers. This is consistent with other studies 
which have found that farmers gained more satisfaction from non-farm 
employment than from farming in China (Parish et al., 1995; Croll and Huang, 
1997). Interestingly, Table 7.1 also indicates that migration and other prevalent 
off-farm activities are not most valued by farmers, as in the eyes of farmers, 
working as a migration worker or in other wage employments is often seen as 
“working for others” (ti bie ren da gong), a relationship of subordination. 
Unless the migrants succeed in making a fortune, they are just “employed 
workers”, entailing “a palpable loss of status” (Lei and Lu, 2005: 31). In spite 
of that, no one denies the positive side of migration in terms of “broadening 
one’s horizons”, especially for the rural youth who are so keen to know the 
outside world. Local businessmen, often with more political capital, find it 
easier to earn respect (Lei and Lu, 2005). In Hu Village, there are several 
successful businessmen who initially were migrant workers but gradually 
established their own companies. These businessmen also invest in village 
development, like road construction, offer pecuniary aid to the poorest and so 
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on, thus earning the villagers’ respect.  
Table 7.1 Hu Village Farmers’ Attitudes towards Different Occupations 
Ranking Occupations Reasons 
High status 
Governmental official, 
“boss” of a big company 
or successful 
businessman 
Powerful, wealthy, 
respectful, providing 
children with best life 
and education 
conditions, mental 
labourer. 
Medium status 
Self-employed 
enterpriser, school 
teacher, migrant, local 
factory worker, livestock 
middle man 
Having other income 
sources for household 
expenditure, stable 
income, living an normal 
life, doing manual work 
and management work 
Low status 
Dedicated farmer, non-
skilled labour work 
within village 
No skills, poor income, 
poor life, powerless 
Source: Author Focus Groups 
Besides, agriculture as a low status occupation in China has been 
culturally aggravated through rural-urban (traditional-modern) discourse 
construction.  Lei (2003:637) has analysed that in contemporary China, due to 
the rural-urban divide in the modernising process: 
Cities are seen as civilizing centres; a land of leisure, consumption, and 
proper femininity; and China’s window on a progressive West. Villages 
are depicted as agricultural fields, a land of hard labour, and a place 
lagging behind times. 
Apart from the national discourse practices, at the individual level, in the 
process of school and parental education, China’s rural children have been 
constantly told that agriculture and the countryside have little future and the 
only fate for them is to try their best to jump out of agriculture and out of the 
villages (tiao chu nong cun). To be a modern person becomes the only fate of 
rural young generations, endowed by both socio-cultural discourse and 
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childhood education. Therefore, moving out agriculture for the rural people is 
a cultural norm, and the detrimental discourse regarding agriculture has 
served as a push power for moving out of agriculture. However, practically 
only a fraction of them have successfully left agriculture to permanently reside 
in cities. Most have to split their families between cities and rural villages due 
to institutional barriers (namely the Hukou system). In reference to the next 
generation, all the farmers would endeavour to assist their children in moving 
out of agriculture.  
The pathways for rural people permanently out of agriculture are limited 
in China, such as obtaining an urban formal job through education, making a 
fortune in cities through doing business, marrying urban citizens and so forth. 
So far, only 25 households of Hu Village have successfully moved out of the 
village and permanently reside in cities, comprising of 17 households which 
have done business in cities starting as migration workers and the remaining 
8 households succeeded because some family members have acquired 
formal jobs in cities through higher education.  
Although young people moving out of village and agriculture does not 
influence the land area of the community, it potentially affects the farming 
practices as the old parents often have difficulties to deal with land 
management when their adult children cannot return to help. For all that, rural 
parents still entrust their hope and proudness to their children and do their 
utmost to push them out of agriculture. The primary pathway is education as 
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will be further explored in next subsection.  
Another illustration of farmers’ mentality towards moving out of 
agriculture is the dominant perspective towards where the future of agriculture 
lies for Hu Village. When asking farmers what they think the future of 
agricultural production will be, almost without exception, the answer was that 
they hoped in the future external businessmen with higher and professional 
education came to rent all the land, and villagers were employed on the land 
for some cash. This viewpoint reflects the strong reluctance of farmers to 
continue farming and a clear disbelief of that the next generation will conduct 
farming in the future.  
7.2.2 Education: the way out of agriculture  
It has been widely and constantly found that there exists a positive 
relationship between education and non-farm employments in rural 
developing countries (Ellis, 1998; Reardon et al., 2000; Davis, 2003).  
Researchers have shown, according to quantitative analysis, that education 
indeed plays a significant role in providing access to non-farm working 
opportunities (Parish et al., 1995; Zhang et al., 2002; Lei and Lu 2005; 
Mohapatra et al., 2007), and can lead to higher returns in terms of non-farm 
employment wages. As de Brauw and Rozelle (2008) estimated, one year of 
education can bring an average of 6.4% higher non-farm wages and 7.8% 
higher migration wages in China.  
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Education is widely perceived by rural parents as the ladder leading to 
a better way of life and the primary way out of agriculture. Chapter 5 has 
shown that the non-farm employment, especially migratory, population of Hu 
Village has higher education. Parents generously invest in their children’s 
education, especially as most rural households have only one child. In Hu 
Village, most children usually go to local primary and secondary schools in 
nearby towns. However, in recent years, about 50 households, as the village 
head estimated, have begun to send their children directly to Qingshen 
County for a better education, as the case of Mrs S particularly shows (Box 
7.1).  
Box 7.1 Giving My Daughter Urban-level Education: Mrs S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Interview  
20,000 Yuan, which could be the whole household income for many 
households, is often invested in education, which just indicates the priority of 
the next generation’s education in the household. Due to the longstanding 
urban/rural divide, rural education conditions have been seriously lagging 
behind, so giving their children urban-level education and better integrating 
Mrs S has an 8-year-old daughter. To create the best study environment for 
her daughter, she sent her little daughter directly to the county school which 
possesses the best teaching facilities in Qingshen. She bought a new car for 
taking and picking up her daughter. To explore her daughters’ best potential, 
she enrolled on various small sessions for her daughter, like writing, singing, 
dancing and English sessions. About 20,000 Yuan, almost one third of her 
household income, is spent on education including student fees, extra 
sessions, transport costs and so on. She tries to give her daughter the same 
education as urban students, and not let her daughter lose at the beginning. 
As she said, “my daughter is the top priority of my life, and I will try my best 
to realise her dream as a professional dancer”.  
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them into urban life are the main concerns of many rural parents like Mrs S. In 
addition, the convenient transportation links facilitate this lifestyle, as students 
can take a bus to County in only about 20 minutes if their parents cannot 
afford a car as Mrs S did. 
Rural parents may move out of, or return to, agriculture for their 
children’s education as the cases of Mrs P (Box 7.2) and Mrs Y (Box 7.3) 
illustrate.  In both cases, agriculture is never the first consideration of their 
decisions; instead, the education or the future of their households comes to be 
the top priority.  
Box 7.2 Moving out of Agriculture for Son’s Education: Mrs P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author interview 
 
 
Mrs P and her husband used to concentrate on farming when three years 
ago they contracted a large citrus orchard with 2.7 ha area. Her husband 
received education from polytechnic school about agricultural production 
and is proficient at farming work. However due to unfavourable market 
prices in recent years, they stopped the contract and her husband migrated 
to Shanxi Province as a construction worker in 2010. She stays at home, 
conducts farming and takes care of their only son.  
In 2012, her son succeeded in entering a high school in Qingshen 
County. To give him a better living environment, Mrs P decided to move to 
the county and accompany his son during his study from September of 
2012, and their land will have to be given to other relatives. During the 
three-year high school education of her son, Mrs P will find a wage job in 
the county to provide for their living. Her husband’s earning from migration 
will be used as the house rent and tuition fee. She said that her son is the 
only hope of their family, and they will strain every muscle to assist him out 
of the village. After her son goes to other cities for university education, she 
will come back and undertake farming again. During the fieldwork, she has 
been trying to find a proper house or room for her future stay in the county.  
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Box 7.3 Coming Back for Son’s Education: Mrs Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author interview 
Agricultural production has been marginalised within household 
arrangements and land is never a constraint for farmers’ mobility anymore. 
Furthermore, the random retreat to and exit of agriculture to some degree 
activates the informal land transfer patterns among farmers, and in the future, 
the shift of land cultivators will probably occur more at a greater rate but what 
impacts will be brought to agriculture are still uncertain.   
As Mrs P’s case shows, a considerable number of parents, mostly 
household women, drop farming in the village and rent houses or rooms in 
Qingshen County to accompany their children during their education to 
provide better food and accommodation conditions. The expenditure of 
accompanying in the county is much higher than that of non-accompanying. 
Mrs Y, 28 year old, had worked in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province together with her 
husband for 8 years and came back in 2009. With the saving, they built a new 
house. As young migrants, they originally intended to continue working in that 
city, but considering their only son’s education, they had to return to Hu 
Village because China’s education policy regulates that college entrance 
examinations must be undertaken by residents with local Hukou registration. 
Their son would not be eligible to take college entrance examination in their 
working city, although he can receive earlier education there. Therefore, they 
decided to come back and let their son go to local school in Qingshen. As she 
said, all they had done was for her son’s education. Now, her husband is 
working in a local factory with a lower salary, coming back every week and 
she is predominantly a household wife, taking care of her son. They have a 
very small plot land with less than 0.13 ha, and most farming work is 
undertaken by her parents. As a young, modernised, woman, she never 
wants to do farming work, and she does not have much agricultural 
knowledge or skills either. What she hopes now is that she can get a part-time 
job or factory wage job nearby, so that she can attend to her son and 
simultaneously make some cash.  
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Renting a house for a year is about 3000-8000 Yuan, plus purchasing food, 
5000-8000 Yuan, and about 8000-15,000 Yuan per year in total is a 
considerable amount for most rural households in Hu Village. As Mrs P stated, 
another reason for accompanying a child is that parents have been aware that 
the three-year high school is a key period both for their children’s education 
and their growth, and to stay with them can exert adequate guardianship to 
ensure their children behave in appropriate ways.  In addition, Mrs Y’s case 
tells a typical story in rural China, that due to the Chinese education policy 
and Hukou system, migrants’ children have to participate in a college entrance 
examination in the place of their Hukou registration so that when migrants 
have children in cities, they have to return to original communities for their 
children’s education. Although there have been some informal schools in 
cities, particularly established for migrants’ children and often in poor 
conditions,  many migrants would rather return for better education conditions. 
The story of Mrs Y, similar to thousands of other Chinese migrants, 
delivers at least two messages. First, the national education policy and Hukou 
system are unequal and unfavourable to rural migrants. Second, many 
migrants would rather drop their jobs and change their work locations for their 
children’s education. Beneath Mrs Y’s decision is the keen expectation that 
education can change the fate of her son and her family. 
In the village, young people do very little farming work, without almost 
any agricultural knowledge or skills. Although this research did not target or 
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conduct interviews with children, according to observation and parents’ 
interviews, it is still safe to argue that the dreams of rural young generations 
definitely lie outside of agriculture, and in the future, who will farm or who can 
farm will be an inevitable issue faced by Chinese policy makers.  
Lastly, China’s smallholder agriculture can never provide sufficient cash 
for the ever-increasing education expenditure. For 98 households (out of the 
225 sample households) that have children in education, only 3 have no other 
non-farm jobs but farming, and within the remaining 95 households, 71 are 
migrant-households. Thus, education has become a significant driver for rural 
non-farm job diversification, especially migration, which brings about a cyclical 
effect for rural households, in that the elder generation searches for non-farm 
jobs in order to afford their children’s education, and further to send the next 
generation out of agriculture towards gaining better non-farm employments, 
and ultimately out of rural communities altogether. In Hu Village, to educate 
children as much as possible has become the foremost responsibility of 
parents, and also an element of “good farmers”. As informants told, in the 
past, good farmers referred to those who had more farming knowledge and 
experience, while at present, it is not important for farmers to own farming 
wisdom which has been largely supplanted by modern technologies. To be a 
good farmer, or even to be “qualified” parents, they have to enhance their 
children’s education, lifting them out of agriculture and rural homes. Just as 
Rigg remarked in his analysis of education in rural southeast Asia,  
Educating children takes them away from the fields… one consequence of 
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this emphasis upon education is that some families are, apparently willing 
to ‘sacrifice’ their land in order to achieve a higher educational status for 
their children. This, more than anything, illustrates the shift in priorities 
from farm to non-farm (2001:56, emphasis added). 
His remarks also precisely suit contemporary rural China, where farmers’ 
stress on education and attitudes towards the future of the next generation act 
as the socio-cultural bedding for moving out of agriculture.  
7.3 Changing rural households  
As reviewed in previous chapters, smallholder agriculture, in which the 
family/household serves as the major corporate social unit of the farming 
process (Netting, 1993), still dominates the majority of rural China. This type 
of small family farm is also the major agricultural form in many other 
developing countries, especially in east and south Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Lipton, 2005). Since family/household is the operating unit for 
organising farming labour, agricultural production is bound to be affected by 
socio-cultural changes within rural families. For instance, the emerging trends 
of agricultural feminisation and geriatrification under the context of agrarian 
transition in the developing world are interrelated with the gender and inter-
generational labour divisions, and family lifestyle of rural households (see also 
Rigg, 2001). Therefore, investigating socio-cultural changes to rural 
households can provide a more comprehensive understanding of how and 
why agriculture is being increasingly operated by specific groups of the 
population.  
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In the wake of decollectivisation since 1978, the household has 
become the primary organisational unit of agricultural production in China 
once again. Rural families have been re-activated to adapt to the subsequent 
dramatic socio-economic transformation. For instance, as Whyte (1992) 
argued, the enthusiastic participation of the family youths in non-farm 
activities, particularly in rural-urban migration, may well enhance the power 
position of the younger generation within families and weaken structures of 
parental authority. The following studies have mostly emphasised the 
modernising trend of Chinese rural family changes. As Yan’s long-term 
research on Chinese rural family and social changes has revealed, within the 
household, the importance of conjugal relationships, the power of youths 
generally and young women particularly have all kept rising, with the 
importance of the traditional parent-son relationship falling since the 1990s 
(Yan, 1997, 2006, 2010). He (2010) also observed similar phenomena in a 
wide range of villages that the traditional side of rural families has been 
dramatically weakened in the encounter with and the long-term penetration of 
modernity, characterised by increasingly rationalised family relations, an 
emphasis on material interests rather than family bonds, and the decadent 
filial piety and fraternal duty of young generations to parents and so forth.  
In addition, the massive rural-urban migration has also induced 
particular family patterns of the “left-behind household” (Ye and Wu, 2008; Ye 
and He, 2008), or “split household” (Fan, 2008). The split household pattern, 
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as Fan (2009) further argued, is the outcome not only of structural restraints, 
but also of farmers’ strategic agency to achieve flexible arrangements and 
household security. This particular household pattern manifests the gender 
and inter-generational divisions within current rural families. Similar changes 
to rural families have also occurred in other countries. As Rigg et al. (2012) 
argued within the context of Asian agrarian change, with life and living being 
increasingly delocalised, a sharp generational labour divide has emerged with 
a trend of geriatrification in farming. In addition, rural households have been 
dis-embedded from families as increasingly family members are stretched 
across space, which is greatly consistent with the “left-behind” or “split” 
household patterns of rural China. Previous studies provide the outline of the 
changing rural family/household in the context of transitional societies, 
indicating that family divisions and relations indeed exert implications on 
agricultural production. The following subsections will, based on the case of 
Hu Village, further investigate the interactions between family/household 
changes and agriculture in transitional China.    
7.3.1 Gender division: towards agricultural feminisation? 
Agricultural feminisation of Hu Village 
As has been observed worldwide, women in rural China are more likely to 
remain in agriculture than men (Jacka, 1997; Song and Jiggins, 2000; Fan, 
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2003; Mohapatra et al., 2007). As presented in Chapter 5 (Table 5.7), the 
tendency has also occurred in Hu Village that the category of dedicated 
farmers is dominated by females. The increasingly feminised agricultural 
population reveals that the traditional intra-household gender division mode of 
“male-outside, female-inside” (nan zhu wai, nv zhu nei), which derives from 
Chinese Confucian culture, still dominates rural families in contemporary 
transitional China (Fan, 2003). With increasing migration opportunities, 
women are more likely than men to stay in the village to take care of children, 
the elderly and agricultural production, and thus become “left-behind” women 
(Ye and Wu, 2008). Nonetheless, some groups are more likely to become left-
behind women, as young women are much more likely to migrate or 
undertake other non-farm activities locally than middle-aged and old women. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that in Hu Village, rural young women have similar 
possibilities to migrate out as young men. This is also supported by the 
observation that there are only a few young women under 30 years old 
staying in Hu Village to take care of kids, and many of them will migrate out 
again in the near future, leaving the children to their parents or particularly 
with mothers-in-law.  
Agricultural production is primarily undertaken by women in the left-
behind women households, but it is actually not because of agricultural 
production that women are left behind. Taking care of children, especially 
when they are in education, and supporting elderly family members are the 
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foremost reasons. Within the 64 migrant households with women left behind in 
the sample households, 27 have children in education, 15 have aged people 
to support and 22 have both children and aged people to take care of. Many 
interviewees mentioned that, “if there are no old people to support, I definitely 
will go out with my husband” and “I stay for my son’s education, otherwise I 
would also go out work”. Therefore, women stay home mainly to fulfill family 
obligations, and agriculture has been substantially marginalised in farmers’ 
work decisions. One pertinent illustration is that many left-behind women 
always try to seek other income-generating activities locally. As the following 
two cases indicate (Box 7.4 and Box 7.5), agriculture is never the reason for 
women to stay and never the only means for left-behind women to live. 
Rather, left-behind women have shown initiative in creating diverse and 
buoyant livelihood diversification on a local basis. Moreover, the status of left-
behind women is often provisional as Mrs X shows. As long as conditions 
permit, left-behind women may well join their husbands and migrate to cities, 
leaving land to older generations. Despite the fact that there is a trend of 
agricultural feminisation in terms of the constitution of the farming population, 
agriculture is still marginal even in the work profile of the female agricultural 
population.  
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Box 7.4 Wanting to Stay in the Village: Mrs H 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Interview  
Box 7.5 Never Stop Seeking Other Jobs: Mrs X 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Interview  
As mentioned above, the power of rural young women in rural China 
has been considerably enhanced, which also has implications for agricultural 
feminisation. Most young women in Hu Village, who may just get married, or 
who are ready to get married, do farming rarely even though they have to stay 
home. These women often have migration experience, with middle-school or 
higher school education, and they yearn for urban, modern lifestyles. When 
they return to villages, they cannot bear dirty and tough farming work and 
often consider farming to be the job of older people. In addition, having spent 
most of their lifetime in schools and cities, they have little knowledge or skills 
Mrs H is 38 years old. She used to migrate with her husband in other 
provinces. 5 years ago, she returned as she had a new child and her father 
was not well, and her husband remained working outside alone. She has a 
high school education, and really wants to develop her livelihood based on 
this village as she cannot migrate again. She tried many agricultural sidelines, 
like planting mushrooms and raising rabbits, but all failed because of 
unfavourable market prices. Now she is learning bamboo weaving, and hopes 
to make some cash through it. She said, now she knows that agriculture can 
never make a profit and can only be for subsistence. She really hopes there 
will be a factory in the village that can recruit people like her.     
Mrs X, 43 years old, really wanted to work with her husband in Jiangsu 
Province. But she had to stay home for her 15-year-old son. Besides farming 
work, she never stopped seeking other jobs locally, and as she calculated, 
she has tried no less than 10 short-term local jobs, like wage worker in 
house construction, bamboo weaving, and so forth. She thinks it is a waste 
to stay home but she has to. In 2012, her son passed the exam to high 
school and would go to Qingshen High School for three years. Then, Mrs X 
decides to migrate out with her husband, leaving land to their parents.  
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regarding farming. As the following two cases show (Box 7.6 and Box 7.7), 
many young women retreat to households as the “princess of the house” 
(Rigg, 2006b), or undertake other local non-farm jobs, leaving the dirty, 
drudgery work of farming to their parents-in-law. Besides, taking care of kids 
sometimes becomes their bargaining chip as the one-child policy encourages 
rural households to greatly value their only child.  
Box 7.6 I Hate Farming: Mrs Z  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Interview 
Box 7.7 Eating “the Communist Party”: Mrs J 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Interview  
 
To support their new married adult children to get along, older people 
have to undertake household farming work. As Mrs J explained, young women 
Mrs Z is 24 years old and gave birth to a child one year ago. She used to work 
in a shopping mall in Chengdu before she got married two years ago. After 
marriage, she stayed home and prepared to give birth. Her husband is still 
working in Chengdu. All the farming work of her household is done by her 
parents-in-law. What she does every day is to take care of her kid and surf the 
internet. Sometimes, she also does some housework, like cooking or laundry, 
especially on agricultural peak times. But she never goes to the field. She 
hates farming, as she reported and would rather do housework. When her kid 
grows up a bit, she will go to work outside again, leaving the kid to her 
parents-in-law.   
Mrs J is 28 years old, and her husband works in Qingshen County, coming 
back every day. Her parents-in-law take care of their kid. Her household land is 
taken care of by her parents-in-law as well. What she and her husband do is to 
make money to raise their child.  She does farming very rarely, and their 
foodstuff comes from parents-in-law, eating “the Communist Party” as she 
named her situation. The Communist Party here refers to her parents-in-law. In 
the future, she maybe has to do farming when the old people cannot farm, but 
currently, she hopes to stay out of agriculture as long as possible.   
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will stay out of agriculture until the older generation cannot farm anymore. In 
fieldwork, the author heard many times the saying “Eating the Communist 
Party”16 , suggesting that this phenomenon has become a social norm. If 
dividing women’s time-use roughly into three patterns: full-time farming 
(without other off-farm activities), part-time farming (with other off-farm 
activities) and non-farming, according to the survey and as Table 7.2 shows, 
the most majority of young women under 30 years old did not participate in 
agriculture (86.3%). In stark contrast, the majority of middle-aged women 
aged between 46-60 work exclusively on agriculture (87.5%). Therefore, 
discussing agricultural feminisation has to exclude the group of rural young 
women. In other words, as de Brauw et al. (2008) similarly found in China, 
agricultural feminisation, if any, predominantly centres on middle-aged 
women, and in the case of Hu Village, on women aged 46-60. Overall, due to 
intra-household gender and generational divisions, young women’s migration, 
and subsequently left-behind young women’s rejection of farming, means that 
middle-aged women are perpetuated as the primary farming population.   
Table 7.2 Different Age Groups of Females’ Time-use Pattern on Farming 
of Hu Village in 2011 (%) 
 
Full-time 
farming 
Part-time 
farming 
Non-farming Total 
16-30 6.8 6.9 86.3 100 
31-45 38.2 25.4 36.4 100 
46-60 87.5 8.0 4.5 100 
60+ 56.1 10.5 33.4 100 
Total 44.7 12.1 43.2 100 
Source: Author questionnaire  
                                                             
16
 Communist Party here is a metaphor that Hu villagers use to refer the parent (older) 
generation in a household. “Eating the Communist Party” means that younger generation 
relies on older generation for food as they are reluctant to do farming themselves. 
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The performance of feminised agriculture 
Another important issue regarding agricultural feminisation is the productive 
performance. As revealed by other research worldwide, female-dominated 
agriculture is generally less productive than male-dominated agriculture due to 
women’s constraints on access to inputs, resources and services (World 
Bank, 2001; Andre et al., 2013). However in China, researchers recently found 
that women are as productive in agriculture as men, with approximately equal 
access to inputs and resources (de Brauw et al., 2012).  According to gender 
participation differences in farming, the sample households of this research 
can be divided into two categories: female-farming households and non-
female farming households. Female-farming household refers to households 
for which women provide the principal farming labour on a full-time basis, with 
men only partly participating in farming or not at all. Non-female farming 
household refers to households in which men are the principal source of 
farming labour, with women only partly participating in farming or not at all. In 
Hu Village, women dominating farming in a household is mainly due to men’s 
migration, although there are also some other reasons like men’s illness or 
death. In non-female farming households, generally men, sometimes men and 
women together, dominate farming work. As Table 7.3 shows, in the sample 
households, one-third are female-farming households (75, 33.3%), with most 
being non-female farming household (150, 66.7%). For farming labour, there 
is a significant difference in respect of age and education between two 
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household groups as the first two rows of Table 7.3 shows. Females who 
dominate farming (47.3 years old) are significantly younger than men or 
women from non-female farming households (60.3 years old).   
Table 7.3 Comparison of Agricultural Production between Female-
farming Households and Non-female Farming Households of Hu Village 
in 2011 
 Female 
farming 
household 
Non-female 
farming 
household 
M-W U Test 
(p) 
Age of farming 
labour (year) 
47.3 60.3 000 
Education of 
farming labour  (year) 
5.2 4.6 0.049 
    
Rice productivity 
(kg/ha) 
6702 6780 0.123 
Rape productivity 
(kg/ha) 
2124 2132 0.198 
Crop  gross 
productivity (Yuan/ha) 
15194 14556 0.178 
Crop diversity 6.36 6.37 0.660 
Agricultural 
diversity 
3.61 3.59 0.240 
MCI 1.91 1.94 0.517 
Agricultural 
income (Yuan) 
24748 19340 0.036 
    
Chemical input 
(Yuan/ha) 
4266 4343 0.569 
Machinery input 
(Yuan/ha) 
1190 1271 0.182 
Traditional 
technology  
3.67 3.72 0.275 
Manure intensity 7.29 7.26 0.970 
    
No. of cases* 75 150  
 
Source: Author questionnaire  
Note: * the numbers of cases here cover the whole 225 sample households. In 
calculating different items above, the case number may vary according to specific 
cultivation patterns. For instance, rice households and rape households are slightly 
different.  
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This is consistent with the finding discussed above that feminised 
agriculture particularly centres on the middle-aged women cohort. The 
education of women working on agriculture is also evidently higher than that 
of men and women from non-female farming households, indicating a human 
capital advantage of feminised agriculture. One explanation can be that 
middle-aged women are more likely to take over agriculture because the 
majority of middle-aged men (the husbands) tend to migrate out or undertake 
other non-farm activities.  
With regard to agricultural performance, female operated agriculture 
performs almost the same as non-female operated agriculture in terms of crop 
productivities, crop diversity, agricultural diversity and land-use intensity, as 
well as producing significantly more income than non-female agriculture 
(p=0.036). In addition, there is no significant difference between the two 
groups on agricultural inputs, indicating that females have equal access to 
agricultural inputs. These findings confirm the positive side of agricultural 
feminisation of Chinese agriculture, roughly consistent with the analysis of de 
Brauw et al. (2012). Based on the specific circumstances of Hu Village, this is 
not difficult to explain. As discussed in Chapter 6 the agricultural input market 
has been well developed, so access to agricultural inputs for rural women is 
equally convenient and cannot be an obstacle to agricultural production. In 
addition, the human capital advantages in terms of age and education of 
female farmers probably help to maintain and even enhance agricultural 
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productivity (see also Croll and Huang, 1997; de Brauw et al., 2012).  
Although this research, together with other studies, reveals that 
agricultural feminisation in China is not affecting agricultural production in 
negative fashions, the hard and tough works included in farming, raising 
children, caregiving to the elderly and housework, has brought considerable 
workloads to middle-aged women (Murphy, 2004; Ye and Wu, 2008). In 
addition, as agriculture has been increasingly perceived as a low status 
occupation, women’s long-term engagement in agriculture may cause intra-
household inequalities and injustice towards themselves in future discursive 
practices. Constrained by institutional regulations like the Hukou and land 
tenure systems (Mu and van der Walle, 2011); labour market failure, like 
gendered labour markets (Fan, 2003); the phenomenon of left-behind women 
and agricultural feminisation by middle-aged women will probably continue in 
rural China.  
Nonetheless, many left-behind women in Hu Village subjectively don’t 
think the division mode of ‘male-outside, female-inside’ is unfair or unjust, but 
instead, they think it is a collective household strategy cooperated jointly by 
them and their husbands.  This same perspective has also been found in 
another village in Guangxi Province (Zuo, 2004). They understand the 
hardship of their husbands outside, and they think that they are also 
undertaking important family jobs, without which the family cannot maintain 
itself. In this sense, the issue of feminised agriculture and spilt households 
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can be seen as the outcome of interactions between farmers’ agency and 
external structures. Lastly, the potential negative aspects that agricultural 
feminisation may bring to rural women deserve additional research.  
7.3.2 Inter-generational labour division: geriatrification of 
farming? 
The geriatrification of farming in Hu Village 
Apart from gender, another important dimension within households is inter-
generational divisions and relations. As similarly found in other countries (e.g. 
Rigg et al., 2012 for Asian countries), a tendency towards an increasingly 
aged farming population in China has recently been identified by researchers 
(Mao and Liu, 2009; Huang, 2012). The dramatic economic diversification, 
especially rural-urban migration, has given rise to not only a large scale of left-
behind women, but also on a similar or even larger scale of left-behind elderly. 
As estimated by Ye and his research team, there are more than 20 million left-
behind elderly in China (Ye and He, 2008). Regarding Hu Village, as Chapter 
5 has demonstrated, individually, almost 70% of old residents (60 years old 
above) are the principal farmers in their households. Additionally, if dividing 
the sample according to the age of full-time farming labour into three 
household groups: 16-40, 41-60 and 60 above, there are only 30 households 
with farming labour aged 16-40, 107 households with farming labour aged 41-
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60, and 77 with farming labour aged 60 above. If excluding the 11 households 
that did not undertake farming in 2011 from the sample, the three household 
groups occupy 14%, 50% and 36% of the 214 sample households 
respectively, indicating that almost four out of ten households’ agriculture is 
principally undertaken by people aged 60 years above. This pronounced 
phenomenon points to the sharp inter-generational division within rural 
households, with younger generations more likely to migrate or undertake 
other non-farm activities and the older generation being more likely to retreat 
home for caregiving to children and agricultural production. This form of 
generational division is a collective and rational household strategy for 
maximising household social security and labour efficiency.  As an old farmer 
typically commented,  
For us, this arrangement (adult children work out and the elderly stay 
behind) is the best option. We are too old to migrate or do other non-
farm jobs, and have to return to agriculture, and take care of children. 
They are young (adult children), and they should and also have to work 
in more lucrative sectors because the whole family is dependent on their 
income. We do farming to provide essential food for the whole family. We 
take care of grandchildren to release the young women to migrate or do 
other jobs. Both sides are important, not dispensable.  
His words also point to the structural constraints that rural migrant families 
have to face. The imperfect rural labour market in transitional China is 
unfavourable to aged people. Farmers aged over 60 are very unlikely to find 
non-farm jobs whether locally or in cities. As they explained,  
They don’t want to take risks on employing old people because old 
people are weak and easy to get hurt or ill. We have to retreat to 
agriculture and stay home to take care of our grandchildren, releasing 
our adult children to work outside.  
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Therefore, the phenomenon of an increasingly aged workforce in agriculture is 
also an outcome of family division strategy and structural constraints.   
Table 7.4 shows the intra-household division of ten households with old 
family members in Hu Village. It shows that besides the migrant households, 
even for households with adult children working locally, the same intra-
generational division mode applies. For households specialised on pig 
farming, generally the young household head exclusively concentrates on the 
livestock sector, leaving crop cultivation to old people as Households 5 and 10 
show. In addition, the household division of the ten cases also manifests the 
distinct gender division within elderly agriculture, that male elderly (aged 
above 60) take more agricultural responsibility and female elderly more 
housework. Referring to the 75 female-farming households with women 
predominantly aged 40-60 discussed in last section, so far the basic 
demographic structure of Hu Village agriculture has been roughly identified 
from the lens of gender and generational division. For contemporary Hu 
Village farming households, those dominated by middle-aged women and 
aged men constitute the largest majority (36.1% and 36% respectively, and 
72.1% in total), with the remainder (27.9%) constituted by young age farmers 
or middle aged male farming households. This pattern of Hu Village farming 
households is also roughly consistent with the national pattern as Mao and Liu 
(2009) concluded through analysing a set of national data.   
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Table 7.4 Ten Cases of Household Division in Hu Village in 2011 
Household 
Head 
       Husband               Wife Male elderly Female elderly 
 Age       Job       Age Job       Age Job Age Job 
H1:Mr Z 44 M 42 M 67 F G 65 H G 
 
H2:Mr S 
36 S 33 S C 61 S  F 60 H F 
 
H3: Mr W 
25 M 26 M - - 65 H F 
 
H4: Mr J 
31 M - - 70 F H 68 H F 
 
H5: Mr H 
40 P 38 P C - - 65 H F 
 
H6:Mr I 
46 M 45 M 73 F G 71 H F 
 
H7:Mr P 
44 M 40 L 78 F G 65 H F 
 
H8: Mr S 
38 L 40 L 63 M 65 H F 
 
H9:Mr J 
35 M 35 M 64 F G 68 H F G 
H10:Mr S 43 P 38 M - - 67             H F 
Source: Author Interview 
* M=Migration; H=Housework; C= Children caregiving; F=Farming work; G= Grandchildren 
care; L=Local factory employment; P=Pig farming; S=Self-employed enterprise.  
The performance of geriatrified agriculture  
Another important issue of concern about geriatrified agriculture is whether 
the aged farming population affects agricultural production in negative ways. 
Within the relevant studies, the conclusion is often contradictory (see Li and 
Zhao, 2009; Lin and Deng, 2012; Nie and Yang, 2013). Regarding Hu Village, 
through comparing agricultural performance among households with different 
age groups of principal farming labourers as Table 7.5 shows, it is found that 
old farmers are equally productive as younger farmers, and they undertake 
significantly more agricultural sidelines than young farmers aged under 40 do 
(p=0.005), although with significantly lower levels of education (p=000). As for 
agricultural inputs, old farmers invest at almost the same level as young 
farmers, and particularly, they use manure significantly more intensely 
   
309 
 
(p=0.006), suggesting that geriatrified agriculture tends to use more 
environmentally-friendly inputs. Therefore, it seems that instead of influencing 
agricultural production in negative ways in Hu Village, which is consistent with 
Lin and Deng (2012) and Nie and Yang (2013), old farmers’ inclination to use 
organic fertilizers can be seen as a potential advantage in terms of agricultural 
sustainability in the long run.  
Table 7.5 Comparison among Households with Different Age Groups of 
Principal Farming Labours of Hu Village, 2011 
 
Househol
d 16-40 
House
hold 41-60 
House
hold 60+ 
K-W 
Test (p) 
Average 
education (year) 
5.48 5.10 3.39 000 
 
Rice productivity 
(kg/ha) 
6770 6767 6726 0.764 
Rape productivity 
(kg/ha) 
2066 2085 2217 0.202 
Crop  gross 
productivity (Yuan/ha) 
15060 15015 14820 0.849 
Crop diversity 5.71 6.41 6.62 0.125 
Agricultural 
diversity 
3.05 3.63 3.82 0.005 
MCI 1.91 1.98 1.95 0.835 
Agricultural 
income (Yuan) 
 
20567 24039 22307 0.264 
Chemical input        
(Yuan/ha) 
4535 4313 4517 0.378 
Machinery input 
(Yuan/ha) 
1140 1223 1145 0.974 
Traditional 
technology 
3.55 3.69 3.70 0.868 
Manure intensity 
 
6.08    6.86 7.38 0.006 
No. of cases 30 107 77  
Source: Author Questionnaire  
These explanations are multi-faceted. The well-developed agricultural 
input markets, standardised farming practices and increasing mechanisation 
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all enable old farmers to operate farming more easily than before. From 
another angle, the low pay-off of agriculture greatly discourages young 
farmers’ incentives, so that many of them don’t take agriculture seriously, 
keeping production at a low level. As the village head, who is a young farmer 
aged 33, commented, “If young people devote to farming, we will definitely do 
better than old people. But even though we do well on farming, we still cannot 
get much profit. That is why young farmers never take agriculture seriously.” 
Her words also echo with the observation in Hu Village that even for those 
who are the principal farming labourer for their household, they still keep 
attempting to find other paid jobs locally, rather than exclusively focusing on 
land.  
Therefore, behind the similar production performance among all 
households is the overall tendency of agricultural “deactivation” as Ploeg 
(2008) puts it, which is a process in which “levels of agricultural production are 
actively contained or reduced” (2008:7). In Hu Village, most farmers tend to 
keep agricultural production at the level of subsistence, given the absence of 
incentives to invest more labour or capital.  
Although old farmers can basically handle farming work at a decent 
productivity level as discussed above, this does not mean that there are no 
negative impacts on aged people. After adult children migrating out, the 
elderly have to shoulder all the family responsibilities, including grandchildren 
caregiving, agricultural production and other community issues, all of which 
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bring them substantial workloads and physiological stress (Ye and He, 2008). 
This uneven generational division, and the older generation’s dedication to 
their family, has developed into an “exploitive generational relationship” within 
the household as He (2010) argued, with particular disadvantages for the 
elderly. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the elderly, they often view their 
dedication as a family obligation, and to give more space to their adult 
children to pursue non-farm employments is one of the obligations. To fulfill 
family obligations is also one of the local moral norms to be “good farmers” as 
discussed earlier. Besides education, good farmers must work as long as 
possible and take family responsibilities to reduce the burden of their children.  
Therefore, instead of deeming as this to be “exploitation”, the elderly 
subjectively accept and comply with the mode of generational division, 
viewing it as an essential procedure for family reproduction. Furthermore, this 
confirms again that the increasingly geriatrified form of agriculture is a 
collective family strategy with constant coordination and cooperation between 
generations within the household.  In this sense, a household as a social unit 
does exist in contemporary China (see also Chen and Korinek, 2010).  
7.3.3 Family life course and agriculture   
In the context of the market imperfections of developing countries, to adapt to 
uncertain markets, rural households often act collectively rather than 
individually (Stark, 1991). The life course of rural families, namely, the 
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demographic and structural transitions of family, is an important determining 
force on household livelihood diversification as has been revealed widely (e.g. 
Rigg, 2001 for southeast Asia and 2006 for the Rural South generally; Chen 
and Korinek 2010 for China). As discussed above, the allocation of family 
farming labour to middle-aged women and aged family members in Hu Village 
and other parts of China has manifested that households at different life 
stages have different labour availability, economic demands and thus different 
labour division strategies for economic diversification.  
Typically, as Table 7.6 demonstrates, the majority of the young 
generation, who are generally aged under 30 and may just get married, yearn 
for development, modernity, or specifically urban lifestyles. They also 
practically bear great family responsibilities, including family economic 
accumulation, children’s education and so forth. A consensus is reached 
within family that the young generation, both men and women, ought to 
pursue development, which definitely lies outside of agriculture and rural 
communities. The parents of the young generation are basically aged around 
40-60 and still well within labour age. To support the development of the 
younger generation, the middle-aged generation often has to adjust their 
labour allocation and leave one family member to take care of the younger 
generation’s children as well as the elderly dependents, if any, to emancipate 
the young couple, especially, the young woman from family care. Most 
frequently, middle-aged women are left behind, with their husbands working in 
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non-farm sectors, locally or in cities. It is in this case that agricultural 
feminisation by middle-aged women occurs. If the elderly are in a healthy 
condition, the middle-aged couple may well both seek non-farm employments 
and leave the elderly for housekeeping, agricultural production, and caregiving 
to grandchildren, then leading to a geriatrification of farming. Over time, the 
young generation becomes the middle-aged generation, and the middle-aged 
generation becomes the elderly, and the cooperation and collabouration 
among family members continue to stretch across the cycle of family life. 
Furthermore, it is manifest that the pursuit of development for the young 
generation is treated as a family priority and family arrangements centring on 
this priority, indicating a one-way mode of household cooperation. In other 
words, the general mode of family arrangements across life courses is based 
on the dedication of the older generation towards the younger generation. 
This general family life course mode is abstracted from Hu Village, but has 
been similarly revealed in other parts of China in the context of dramatic 
socio-economic transformation (Ye and Wu, 2008; Ye and He, 2008; He, 
2010).   
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Table 7.6 Different Situations of Different Family Life Stages in Hu 
Village 
 Young 
generation 
Middle-aged 
generation 
Elderly 
generation 
Life situation 
Aged under 30, 
unmarried or 
married recently, 
on education, 
having little kids. 
Aged between 
40-60; have 
married or 
schooling 
younger 
generation; some 
have 
grandchildren; 
elderly 
dependents to 
support 
Aged above 60; 
grandchildren 
have been 
married or still on 
education; 
physically weak 
Family ideals 
Development, 
modernity, urban 
life 
Ensure family get 
along; support 
young 
generations 
Hope family get 
along; decent and 
peaceful elderly 
life 
Family    
obligations 
Accumulate for 
family 
development like 
education, 
personal career, 
modernity 
acquirement 
Family 
expenditure, 
children’s 
education, 
support elderly; 
plan own elderly 
life; ensure family 
get long 
Support younger 
generations, 
taking care of 
responsibilities of 
grandchildren 
caregiving; do 
farming, or 
completely leisure 
get support from 
adult children. 
Labour 
allocation 
Both male and 
female on non-
farm 
employments in 
cities or 
specialised 
livestock farming 
in rural 
communities 
Male working in 
non-farm sector; 
female work 
together or stay 
for housekeeping, 
taking care of 
children or 
grandchildren  
and agriculture 
Leaving simple 
lives, or male 
working on 
agriculture, 
females on 
housekeeping, 
both taking care 
of grandchildren 
Future 
Urban  or rural 
communities 
Rural 
communities 
Rural 
communities 
Source: Author Interview 
Additionally, cooperation across the family life course does not 
necessarily occur in one exactly-defined family, but often stretches across 
different families. In many cases, younger generations have divided from the 
extended family with independent family budgets. Family division is an 
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important landmark in the process of family life cycle in China as the younger 
generation splits from the extended family and young adult couples live 
individually (Cohen, 1992). As Yan (1997, 2003, 2006) argued, driven by 
modernisation and the market economy, private life, the risen conjugal relation 
and the power of the young have been potential drivers of family division. 
However, given livelihood diversification, especially rural-urban migration, this 
becomes a norm in contemporary rural China, splitting the family between the 
rural and the urban has been a major ordering factor in family arrangements 
(Fan, 2008). Even having divided from their parental families actually or 
nominally, the younger generation still rely on their parental generation to fulfill 
the family responsibility of caregiving to children, leading to a special family 
form—“left-behind” families.  In addition, the strong values of family obligation 
and loyalty borne in the mind of the middle-aged and elderly generations 
mobilise and motivate the dedication of older generations towards younger 
generations, as similarly found in other parts of China by He (2010), although 
they often live independently with separate budgets. One instance of this in 
Hu Village is that in many cases the older generation takes care of 
grandchildren with their own budgets, and the young generation often doesn’t 
remit back fees on children’s living and education. In addition, in Hu Village, 
many migrant families still live together under the same roof with their parents 
because they only return occasionally or for important festivals, although they 
have been divided economically which is a form of “division without division” 
   
316 
 
as He (2010:97) termed. Therefore, it seems increasingly difficult to define the 
inclusion of family division and family structure, particularly as the line 
between household and family is also blurry, leading to a “disembedding of 
households and families” as similarly revealed by Rigg et al. (2012) in other 
Asian countries.   
Besides, the external structural constraints that rural families face in 
contemporary China are also important forces that mould the special family 
arrangements. For instance, the Hukou system impedes rural residents’ ability 
to migrate to cities with their whole families as well as creating shortages in 
the rural old-age insurance system which is still dominated by family support.  
These are important institutional constraints that induce rural migrants to 
adopt “split” or “left-behind” family patterns to achieve security and fulfill family 
responsibilities. As Xiang (2007:187) concluded,  
Being left behind in China is not only a family matter of practical 
consideration for the migrants and their family members, but is also 
related to fundamental institutional arrangements and unequal social 
relations.   
Thus, under the contemporary political-economic environments of transitional 
China, rural families are adopting these family divisions to achieve household 
resilience, flexibility and livelihood security as a result of structuration between 
rural actors’ agency and structural constraints (Fan, 2008). As long as the 
structural constraints are not altered, the trends of agricultural gentrification as 
well as feminisation may well continue in the future.  
Lastly, apart from the typical life course mode for migrant households 
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which dominates Hu Village, others rural families take another route that all 
the family generations are based on local communities. As presented in 
Chapter 5, about 30% of the sample is non-migrant households. These 
households build their family livelihoods on a local basis and often attach 
more importance to agriculture than migrant households do. As one farmer 
stated, “For us who don’t go out, we lay stress on both non-farm jobs and 
agriculture. We take root in the village”. The young generation of these 
households mainly work in local factories or operate their own private 
enterprises and come back every day or every several days, with smaller 
wages than those working in big cities. The young women often take care of 
their children at home or leave them to their parents and work together with 
their husbands. They often help do farming work in peak times, like harvesting 
and transplanting, leaving nonetheless the major farming management work 
to their parents.  
The middle-aged generation of these households is dominant in terms 
of household agricultural production, often without a sharp gender division on 
farm and non-farm activities. Although men are more likely to spend more time 
on local non-farm actives and women more on housekeeping and land, men 
also do almost an equivalent amount or even more agricultural work than 
women, especially the heavy agricultural work, like manure carrying, land 
preparation and so on. The elderly in these households are more relaxed than 
their counterparts in migrant households, as they don’t have such heavy 
   
318 
 
farming and family care burdens. This mode of family course is greatly 
determined by local economic opportunities as Chen and Korinek (2010) 
similarly revealed. As Qingshen is still under-developed in terms of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, local employment and business 
opportunities for rural residents are fewer than those in coastal provinces of 
China, so that only a small proportion of households can arrange their 
household livelihoods locally. Evidently, locally-based rural households are 
more conducive to agricultural and rural sustainability; therefore, to promote 
local economic development rather than exclusively concentrate on large 
cities should be a favourable development strategy for contemporary China 
(see also Kirkby et al., 2006).   
7.4 Community socio-cultural changes and agriculture  
This section will examine at community level how community cultural factors 
affect agriculture. Chinese rural communities have experienced no less 
dramatic a transformation in terms of socio-cultural aspects than in economic 
aspects in the proceeding of “China’s state-sponsored quest for modernity” 
(Yan, 2010). Socio-cultural changes in rural communities are multi-faceted 
and this research primarily explores those that are related with agriculture 
directly or indirectly, based on observation in Hu Village.  
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7.4.1 Modernity quest: rural community as “backward” space 
There is a consensus that the predominant driver for the socio-cultural 
transformation of rural China is the penetration of modernity brought by a 
market economy. However, China’s quest for modernity is not making neutral 
or even progress, but is based on a comprehensive and substantial divide 
between the rural and the urban (Knight and Song, 1999; Griffiths et al. 2010; 
Riley, 2013). Regardless of the huge economic disparities, rural villages have 
been constructed as backward geographical space that bestows less 
modernisation than the urban does through cultural practices. As Ngai has 
written, the “Rural world has come to be imagined as a deficient reality that 
cannot give birth to complete human beings or modern subjects” (2003:487, 
see also Lei, 2003). Just recently, Riley also argued, “Material differences 
between rural and urban are pronounced but they are bolstered and 
deepened by an ideological divide that sees rural as lesser: backward, 
unenlightened, and incapable of contributing to China’s position in the modern 
world” (2013:11). Better job opportunities, modern environments and cultural 
progresses signified by the urban are very attractive to rural individuals, as 
since the 1980s, mobility of rural farmers has been permitted and has kept 
thriving so far. Especially the rural youth yearn for the modernised life of cities, 
viewing the “urban as paradise” (Riley, 2013) and despising the backward, 
hopeless world of their home towns. The uneven development of rural and 
urban has caused the one-way mobility of rural individuals: from rural to 
   
320 
 
urban, instead of the opposite. As Xiang (2007) concluded, “far more 
important than being physically left behind by migrants, rural communities as 
a whole have been left behind economically and socially” (2007:187). This 
cultural construction towards rural communities in the process of the Chinese 
modernity quest lays down the ideological foundation for rural residents’ 
attitudes and actions towards agriculture and rural community.  
In Hu Village, most respondents expressed aspirations to participate in 
urban life, especially the youth who often have migration experience and have 
to come back for marriage, giving birth or other reasons. But their hopes, 
dreams and imagined future lie in cities rather than in the remote agricultural 
village. Their repudiation is not just towards agriculture as discussed earlier, 
but towards the whole rural space. As a 26-years old lady reported,  
There are no better opportunities for us to develop in villages, even in 
the county. The local salaries are low, infrastructures are poor, and 
people are traditional. I feel kind of left behind from my friends who is 
working in Shanghai. After a while, I will go out again. There is no hope 
in villages. 
She returned from Beijing in 2008 because she was going to give birth. Now 
her little son is about 4 years old and her parents-in-law can take care of him, 
which enables the young lady to go to cities again. Her story just echoes the 
argument of Ngai (2003:480) when she told a similar story of a rural migrant 
and notes: “What arrests us in this story is that Chinese migrant workers do 
not feel ‘at home’ as long as they remain at home. Rather, they desire to leave 
‘home’ to become wage-workers”.  
In addition, what many young people are thinking is to buy an 
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apartment in the city, whether in county or in municipality, suggesting a strong 
desire to move out of the village. Especially, if rural young men have an 
apartment in cities, he also has substantial advantages on the marriage 
market, as more and more young women would like their spouses to enable 
them to live in cities. In Hu Village, as the village head estimated, about 20 
households have bought commercial apartments in Qingshen County or 
Meishan City and some even have apartments in Chengdu City.  
The cultural construction of rural communities may have profound 
repercussions on agriculture, although mainly in indirect ways. Firstly, as 
discussed in Section 7.2, agriculture will be further marginalised in the 
livelihood development of the rural youth. Secondly, without continuities from 
the youth, when the current farmers are too aged to farm, the issue of who will 
farm will become urgent as there is a need to provide for domestic food 
security. Various market actors, like entrepreneurs, businessmen, companies 
and so forth probably will take part in village agriculture as they have already 
emerged in Hu Village.  
7.4.2 Consumerism: “we have to go out” 
Along with the long-term penetration of modernity and the market economy, 
consumerist culture has also become increasingly prevalent in transitional 
rural China (Ngai, 2003; He, 2010; Fan, 2010; Chen and Huang, 2012). More 
importantly, consumption enthusiasm is also sponsored by the state in the 
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name of national development, including various national policies on 
stimulating domestic demands and peasants’ consumption rates, the “holiday 
economy” and so on (Npai,2003). In addition, long-term economic 
diversification has substantially enhanced the wealth level and living 
conditions of rural residents, and the massive propagation of an urban life 
style, with a modernised western culture through TV and other mass media 
has immensely stimulated farmers’ consumption desires. Conspicuous 
consumption and unrealistic comparisons of consumption patterns between 
people have been widely observed in rural China (He, 2010; Fan, 2010). 
Undoubtedly, these consumption motivations bring substantial cash pressure 
to rural families.   
In Hu Village, the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption is no less 
dramatic. One most telling example is the enthusiasm for house construction.  
Since the 1990s, Hu villagers have begun to build houses in modern styles 
rather than in traditional ways. So far, walking around Hu Village and looking 
at the beautiful, stylish, modern houses, one may well think that Hu Village is 
a very rich community. As one village cadre estimated, to build a house 
nowadays will cost about 300,000 Yuan while ten years ago, a new house 
only cost about 100,000 to 150,000 Yuan. As the author often had chances to 
enter farmers’ houses, many houses were built and decorated almost in the 
same fashions as city houses or apartments, with modern floor boards, fully-
equipped with appliances, modern lighting and a decorated bathroom. 
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Regardless of the increased prices of building materials, competition among 
farmers is one important factor underlying the ever-increasing house building 
cost. As this researcher was often told, “When others’ houses are beautiful, 
you want to build a better one, otherwise, you may lose face”, “everyone 
wants to build better houses than others, even on debt”. Another interesting 
phenomenon about houses is that many houses in Hu Village were only built 
and decorated on the outside, with a bland inside or dirty with firewood 
because the owners have migrated to cities and rarely return. They just built 
the house and made it look beautiful from the outside, leaving the inside 
empty for their later usage.   
Another example is that due to increasing income, many households 
have bought cars as a means of conveyance as well as “to be conspicuous”. 
There are about 30 cars in Hu Village, with various models and brands, 
ranging from 20,000 Yuan Alto to more than one million Yuan BMW or 
Mercedes-Benz.  Farmer Mr L who bought a 200,000 Yuan car still doesn’t 
think that he is successful enough because “those who have BMW are really 
successful”, and in the future, he will try hard to make money and change to a 
more expensive car. Other instances of ever-increasing consumption 
enthusiasm in Hu Village include excessive consumptions on weddings and 
funerals, fast-increasing cash gifts for various ceremonies and so on.  
All of these consumptions bring huge cash pressure to Hu Village 
families, and income deriving from land can hardly satisfy the cash demands. 
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This is how most respondents explained the dramatic non-farm diversification, 
especially migration, “If you don’t go outside to make money, your family 
cannot get along”. By “get along”, they did not refer that without non-farm 
employments they couldn’t survive or subsist but that they could not maintain 
an acceptable socio-cultural living standard. As well as middle-aged farmers, 
the rural young have also been driven by “desires to consume” within 
modernity and desperately hope to embrace urban life. As Ngai (2003: 482) 
has written about rural young migrant women,  
In rural China, the desire for the commodity is what drives these women 
to leave their homes to become exploited labour. The desiring machine 
of consumption rolls along so smoothly because a social lack produced 
by an unfathomable rural-urban divide has already provided a rail for it to 
run on.  
Therefore, farmers seem to be situated on a consumption spiral and 
constantly pushed to seek cash outside. The ever-increasing cash pressure 
brought about by popular consumerism explains why farmers have to migrate 
or seek other non-farm jobs, which also can be seen as a fundamental driving 
force for farmers’ inclination to move out of agriculture.       
7.4.3 Dissociating community cohesion and diminishing 
mutual help 
It is widely accepted in Chinese rural scholarship that the traditional rural 
village is an “acquaintance society” (Fei, 1998), where villagers are tightly 
interconnected within networks of family ties and geographical relations, with 
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strong community cohesion and frequent forms of reciprocity. With the long-
term penetration of modernity and a market economy, the village community 
has been gradually dissociated into a “semi-acquaintance society” (He, 2000; 
2010), an “atomised society” (Chen and Guo, 2007; He, 2011), or a society 
characterised by increasing individualism (Yan, 2010), where personal 
connections, interaction and trust have greatly diminished. Similar rural 
changes have also been identified in other countries. For instance, Rigg et al. 
(2012) conceptualised the tendency of rural Asian communities as 
“dissociation of the village community”, suggesting increasingly weakening 
community cohesion driven by the dramatic economic diversification of rural 
Asia. Dissociated community cohesion has substantial repercussions on 
various aspects of village life, including influences on village governance (He, 
2002), cultural life (He, 2010), family relationships and moral degradation 
(Yan, 2010).  With respects to agriculture, one significant repercussion is the 
diminishment of mutual help among villagers.    
In Hu Village, villagers have strong perceptions of the diminishment of 
mutual help and increasingly “strange” personal relations.  As the village head 
relayed, 
Now, the villagers are more and more like strangers with each other. 
Many migrants don’t return for so long time that when we meet, we don’t 
know how to chat, just with a simple greeting. In addition, in the past, we 
helped each other a lot. For example, this family wanted to build a 
house, then many villagers, relatives, and friends came here to help for 
free. And then another who wanted to build a house, or do other things 
could also receive voluntary help from villagers. This mutual help was 
very common. But now, it is rare. Everyone is thinking about economy, 
money, development; no one is willing to help others for free. Everything 
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is coupled with money. 
Her words clearly imply that there has been a dramatic decline of community 
cohesion and reciprocity; and that community relations have been more and 
more built on market rules. The deep penetration of the market economy as 
well as villagers’ integration with outside forms of development have greatly 
dissociated their personal relations. Because everything is referred to as an 
economic calculation, when encountering labour shortages in agricultural 
production, mutual help among villagers is now very rare in Hu Village.  As a 
respondent explained, “No one will help you for free. Nothing is free in current 
society. I don’t want to ask help. If it can be solved by money, I would rather 
spend more money than ask help from others.” To avoid embarrassment, 
many farmers are reluctant to ask for help from others, as they are aware that 
if someone comes to help, he/she must do it because of face-saving rather 
than willingness, which has become a consensus in Hu Village. Most mutual 
help in Hu Village is primarily offered by relatives. In Chapter 6, Table 6.11 has 
shown the pathways that Hu Village farmers used to deal with labour 
shortages in agricultural production in 2011. It is found that about 20% of the 
sample farmers gained labour from others. Here, as Hu villagers explained, 
labour exchange is different from mutual help, as the former requests labour 
inputs from both sides and the latter does not necessarily. Particularly for the 
elderly farmers, their physical condition is so poor that no younger farmers 
want to exchange labour with them and the ways for them to deal with labour 
shortage is to call the migrants back or ask help from their relatives, like 
   
327 
 
married daughters. Furthermore, due to the dramatic economic diversification, 
most adult relatives of the elderly also have often migrated out or conduct 
other non-farm occupations and are therefore unavailable for help. This is also 
why the elderly farmers are so eager to use agricultural machines, although 
calculating strictly, a combine harvester, for instance, is overly expensive for 
some farmers or some plots of land.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that in a sense, the loosening of community cohesion promotes agricultural 
capitalisation and commercialisation as almost every step of agricultural 
production has to be accomplished using cash.  
7.5 Conclusion   
This chapter has investigated the socio-cultural drivers of agricultural 
production in contemporary China based on the case of Hu Village. It argues 
that agriculture is not solely an economic activity for farmers, but that it also is 
interwoven with multi-faceted socio-cultural elements of rural space, 
especially in such a dramatically transformative era like that  of rural China.  
Firstly, it has become evident that agriculture is spurned 
unexceptionally by Chinese rural residents. Agriculture is a thankless 
occupation, in which, “blood and sweat are not a metaphor, but reality” to 
farmers (Fei, 2006:111). Especially in mountain or hilly areas where 
mechanisation is substantially constrained by the geography, as in most parts 
of Hu Village, farming is backbreaking work. Given the smallholder style of 
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agriculture found in China, one can never make much profit from land 
especially compared with prosperous opportunities in non-farm employment. 
Agriculture, thus, is often despised by farmers themselves. For contemporary 
farmers, to move out of agriculture is a norm, a responsibility of parents 
towards their children, and the fate of next rural generation. Education is the 
primary pathway in China to realise the dream of “deagriculturalisation”. Rural 
parents desperately attempt to provide their children with the best education, 
which has become the priority among priorities of rural families. It seems very 
unlikely that the next generation of rural Chinese in the future will conduct 
agricultural production.  
Secondly, since agriculture is thankless and rewardless, who farms in a 
family is never a neutral issue, but involves complex socio-cultural 
arrangements within households, including gender and generational divisions, 
and family life course. It is found that in Hu Village, due to family division as 
well as macro political-economic environments, a form of “left-behind” 
agriculture has emerged in Hu Village as well as in other parts of China, in 
which, middle-aged women and the elderly are mostly likely to undertake 
agriculture. The performances of feminised agriculture and geriatrified 
agriculture have basically maintained yields and in some cases, with 
feminised agriculture have been even more productive, suggesting once again 
that in an era of increasingly capitalised, commercialised, standardised 
agriculture, who farms has little difference on productivity any more. 
   
329 
 
Nonetheless, the physical and psychological wellbeing of the two groups 
deserve serious concern. In addition, the general life course of rural families 
projects an unfavourable future for the middle-aged women and the elderly. 
Overall, the “left-behind” agriculture is actually the best strategy that rural 
households can adopt to maximise households revenue and security with 
various structural constraints towards their urbanisation in contemporary 
China. Land, in this sense, bestows rural households a strategic security net.  
Lastly, changes of community socio-cultural norms and rules driven by 
the penetration of modernity and the market economy also have 
repercussions for agricultural production. Given the overwhelming national 
quest for modernity, rural community has been constructed and perceived by 
rural residents themselves as “backward” space, especially by the rural youth. 
To embrace the urban and the modern life is the primary pursuit of all rural 
residents, which lays the socio-cultural foundation for moving out of 
agriculture.  
In addition, consumerism brought about by market economy and the 
state development strategy has constantly driven farmers to pursue cash to 
satisfy the ever increasing consumption targets. Furthermore, community 
cohesion has substantially diminished, leading to an increasingly “dissociated 
community”, where frameworks of mutual help among villagers have been 
substantially weakened. Given the physically-constrained farming population, 
weak community cohesion can be a driver for “irrational” agriculture as many 
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farmers, especially elderly farmers, have to pay unusually high price for 
mechanisation, for example.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will conclude the whole research project. Through investigating 
the case of an agricultural village in southwest China, this research has 
elaborated the fundamental socio-economic forces that are underpinning 
contemporary Chinese smallholder agriculture. As has been noted throughout 
the thesis, the case of Hu Village, to a great degree, represents the overall 
state of affairs of Chinese agriculture. In addition, under China’s centralised 
political system and dominant top-down rural development approach (Long 
and Woods, 2011), Hu Village can be largely seen as an epitome or a window 
on the Chinese countryside. Based on the findings in Hu Village, this chapter 
will broaden the discussion into global scope and anchor the position of 
contemporary Chinese agriculture within the broader picture of world 
agricultural development, seeking to answer the following questions: How is it 
possible to understand contemporary Chinese agriculture internationally? How 
is Chinese agriculture distinctive and what aspects of Chinese agriculture are 
similarly found or have occurred in other countries, especially BRIC countries? 
Then, this chapter will summarise the findings of the research, and propose 
policy suggestions and further research directions.   
Specifically, Section 8.2 discusses the Chinese case within global 
backgrounds, to connect the findings of this research with international 
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literature. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, world agricultural development 
has been rather heterogeneous, and agriculture in the industrialised 
economies and agriculture in the transition countries has varied temporally 
and geographically (Wilson, 2007; Woods, 2010). This section will first discuss 
how to understand Chinese agriculture within the agricultural restructuring of 
the developed countries. Then, the discussion will turn to other transitional 
countries, specifically BRICs, to explore the convergence and divergence 
between China and other developing countries. Section 8.3 summarises the 
key findings of the research through listing the four research objectives and 
answers. Building on Section 8.3, Section 8.4 presents some reflections 
regarding the approaches and the future of Chinese smallholder agriculture. 
Section 8.4 proposes relevant policy suggestions. Lastly, Section 8.5 points 
out several recommendations for further research based on the findings of this 
research.     
8.2 Discussion  
This discussion will first link the Chinese case that Hu Village has represented 
to that of the developed countries which have experienced dramatic 
transformations in agricultural and rural arenas.  The experiences of the global 
North echo with the Chinese case in some ways but also differ substantially in 
other ways. Then, the discussion will put China into the context of the BRICs, 
to reveal what convergences and divergences the four countries have 
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experienced in terms of agricultural development.   
8.2.1 Agricultural and rural restructuring of the global North 
and the Chinese road  
From productivism to a multifunctional agricultural regime 
Since the mid-twentieth century (after World War II), agriculture in the 
advanced economies, especially the UK and other Western European 
countries has entered the era of “productivism”, as termed by rural 
researchers (Marsden et al., 1993; Ilbery and Bowler, 1998; Wilson, 2001, 
2007). As Wilson (2007) amply illustrated, productivist agriculture as an 
overarching development regime involved an array of inter-related political, 
socio-economic, cultural and environmental dimensions. With regard to the 
organisational forms of agricultural production, industrialisation, 
commercialisation, intensification, specialisation and concentration are all 
prominent characteristics of productivist agriculture (Ilbery and Bowler, 1998; 
Wilson, 2001, 2007). Over about four decades, productivist agriculture has 
boosted the production capacity and successfully achieved the goal of 
national self-sufficiency in developed countries, and by the end of the 1970s, 
agricultural produce in the global North had outstripped the market demands 
which eventually resulted in increased agricultural over-production (Wilson, 
2001; Robinson, 2004; Woods, 2010). Subsequently, pressed by surplus 
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production and fiscal restraints in state expenditure on agricultural subsidies, 
as well as increasing public concerns about the environment (Woods, 2010), a 
transition or a reorientation towards a new agricultural regime has been 
embarked upon since the 1990s across the global North.  
From the beginning of the 1990s, the “post-productivist transition” has 
been identified as a new direction that moves away from the productivist 
agricultural regime (Marsden et al., 1993; IIbery and Bowler, 1998).  However, 
the notion of a post-productivist transition has caused intensive academic 
debate as the concept of “post-productivism” was “theoretically weak” and 
“poorly defined” (Woods, 2010:79). Multifunctional agriculture was introduced 
as an alternative to post-productivism to conceptualise the multi-stranded rural 
and agricultural change (Wilson, 2001; 2007). Although varied in different 
localities, there is little doubt that multifunctional agriculture has gained 
increasing socio-economic ground in the global North, representing an 
alternative logic to productivist agriculture. Rather than singularly dominated 
by one form of production as productivism represented, a new multifunctional 
agriculture regime in the global North accommodates the coexistence of multi-
faceted logics of agricultural production, including productivist, environmental, 
residential, leisure and so forth (Wilson, 2007; Woods, 2010).   
Moreover, as a part of the rural economy, agricultural development has 
also been embedded in the general rural development strategies and the 
transition towards a multifunctional agriculture regime in the global North, 
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which to a great degree has been paralleled by the reorientation of rural 
development strategies from the modernisation paradigm towards the 
integrated rural development paradigm since the 1990s (Ploeg et al., 2000; 
Woods, 2010). Before the 1980s, rural development of the developed world 
had been dominated by modernisation paradigm which generally involved four 
inter-linked processes (Woods, 2010): agricultural modernisation, which 
included agricultural commercialisation, mechanisation, industrialisation, 
specialisation and integration within the agri-food sector; economic 
modernisation, which transformed traditional rural industries to modernised 
ones; infrastructure modernisation, including electrification and water supply, 
road and telecommunication networks construction; and social modernisation, 
which “challenged the superstition and traditional folk cultures of rural 
societies…instead promoted modern rationality and aesthetics, education and 
social emancipation…” (2010:133). By the 1980s, the limitations of 
modernisation paradigm had been critiqued by researchers for “over-
production, environmental degradation and spatial inequality” (Woods, 
2010:139), and a “new rural development paradigm” eventually emerged 
(Ploeg et al., 2000). As Ploeg et al.(2000) argued, rural development is a 
multi-level, multi-actor and multi-faceted process, within which, the 
development approach has been shifted from top-down planning to a bottom-
up model. Woods (2010) argued the new rural development paradigm 
discursively suggests that the rural also have distinctive social, cultural and 
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environmental resources which can trigger particular development paths, 
rather than relying on external support and guidance.   
The Chinese road of agricultural and rural development 
Admittedly, the concepts of productivism, post-productivism, and 
multifunctionality have been largely built on the circumstances of advanced 
economies, especially the UK and some other Western European countries. 
But as Wilson and Rigg (2003:681) amply illustrated, “post-productivism and 
the developing world are not necessarily ‘discordant concepts’” and 
similarities can be found between situations occurring in developing countries 
and what used to occur or what is occurring in the global North. Regarding 
China, irrespective of her special socio-economic and political institutions, 
Chinese agricultural production is fundamentally productivist (see Wilson and 
Rigg, 2003), and agricultural modernisation has been the most steadfast 
principle of agricultural development strategies since 1978 (Long and Woods, 
2011). Until the present, the promotion of modernised agriculture has still 
been listed as the priority among priorities in terms of both agricultural and 
rural development by the central government (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, 
political concern for national food security has endowed Chinese agriculture 
with unparalleled strategic importance, which is especially clear as the state 
has begun to subsidise farmers since 2005. In addition, agricultural 
industrialisation, specialisation, and commercialisation have been 
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enthusiastically promoted by the state as a principle strategy to realise 
agricultural modernisation (see Chapter 4). At the individual level, as Hu 
Village shows, farmers have been endeavouring to maximise agricultural 
productivity through applying various external commercial inputs like 
biotechnologies, mechanisation and commercial fodders, but they are facing a 
“growing squeeze on agriculture” (Ploeg et al., 2000:395) and are caught in an 
agricultural “treadmill” (Ward, 1993). It can be seen that many aspects of 
contemporary Chinese agriculture to a great extent resonate with the 
productivist agricultural regime that once dominated the global North.  
In addition, contemporary Chinese rural development strategy has also 
been dominated by the modernisation paradigm through a top-down 
approach. As Woods (2010:133) has similarly argued, “the modernisation 
paradigm…remains significant in guiding rural development in several 
(developing) countries, including Brazil, China and India”.  Since the reform, 
Chinese rural development has been principally driven by an over-arching 
focus on the modernisation paradigm, including agricultural modernisation, 
rural industrialisation, infrastructure and rural market development, education 
modernisation and so on. The National Rural Economic Development Twelfth 
Five-Year Master Plan (2010-2015) continues to position “developing modern 
agriculture” as the top priority of rural development, and by 2015, China plans 
to add 2.5 million hectares of  irrigated farmland,  maintain grain output above 
540 million tons, enhance mechanisation rates to above 60%, steadily 
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strengthen agricultural specialisation, standardisation, intensification, large-
scale production and informatisation, solve water supply problems for 300 
million people, fully electrify the rural areas and build 1 million km rural roads 
(NDRCC, 2011). It is worth mentioning that the road construction and irrigation 
facility restoration of Hu Village in recent years are just parts of national 
development projects initiated by the Plan. Contemporary Chinese rural 
development is overtly in line with the modernisation paradigm which used to 
be the dominant approach in the global North. Under the modernisation 
paradigm, Chinese rural areas have been discursively constructed as a 
backward, traditional and unattractive space, and rural residents, especially 
young generations, cannot wait to move out of agriculture, out of the 
countryside, to embrace a modern, urban life.  
However, although there are many similarities with the productivism 
regime and the rural modernisation paradigm developed originally in the 
context of western countries, Chinese agriculture and rural development have 
also exhibited distinctive features which seemingly do not entirely fit the 
western models. For most Chinese farmers, agricultural production is not the 
core of their income but a supplement to their livelihoods. Driven by the over-
arching national progresses of modernisation, industrialisation and 
urbanisation, the rural population has been attracted by off-farm opportunities 
in the urban or industrial sectors, substantially marginalising agriculture within 
household arrangements and the rural economy. This scenario is different 
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from that which used to be found in western countries where the productivist 
regime in agriculture was often the mainstay of farmers’ livelihoods and of the 
rural economy. Due to an array of institutional barriers like the Hukou system, 
Chinese rural migrants can hardly settle in urban areas as legal citizens and 
thus have to dwell on the characterised model of “semi-worker, semi-farmer”, 
in a sense leading to the persistence of smallholder agriculture. In the global 
North, productivist agriculture caused substantial declines in agricultural 
labour inputs (Wilson, 2007), leading to a dominant trend of depopulation of 
rural communities (Woods, 2010). Although with dramatic outmigration, 
depopulation of rural communities has not occurred in China as most rural 
migrants remain agricultural and with rural status officially, as their livelihoods 
still rely on the combination of migration to the urban and agriculture in the 
rural (Huang, 2010). On the other hand, the persistence of smallholder 
agriculture has increasingly become an obstacle to further agricultural 
modernisation, specialisation and scale production as frequently claimed by 
governments. As observed in Hu Village, even farmers themselves are eager 
to transfer their land for large-scale production. Small scale land cultivation 
can only enable agriculture to be maintained at subsistence level for most 
households, and with ever-increasing input costs, the profit potential of 
smallholder agriculture is further squeezed. Therefore, whether from the case 
of Hu Village or other regions of China, it can be seen that Chinese 
smallholder agriculture has arrived at the threshold of capitalist agriculture 
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which requires free land transfer markets and capitalisation of agricultural 
production. This scenario directly urged an array of national policies 
encouraging land transfer market development, fostering new forms of 
agricultural organisation, like professional entrepreneurs, farm cooperatives 
and newly proposed “family farms”, which are based on family labour to 
conduct agricultural large scale production, intensification and 
commercialisation, with agriculture being the primary family income source 
(No. One Document of PRC, 2013).   
Another important issue is related to livelihood diversification. Rural-
urban migration and other buoyant off-farm economies have enabled Chinese 
peasants to diversify their livelihood portfolios to an unprecedented extent, 
which apparently coincides with the diversification and pluriactivity of rural 
families in contemporary western countries (Wilson and Rigg, 2003; Wilson, 
2007). Nevertheless, they are driven by completely different forces. The 
livelihood diversification of Chinese farmers is primarily driven by the over-
arching modernisation process, embracing industrialisation, urbanisation and 
marketisation, while the pluriactive farm household pathways in western 
countries are more associated with the consumption of the countryside which 
has been largely propelled by counter-urbanisation and environmental 
concerns (Marsden, 2003). The economic diversification of rural China (as 
well as other Southern countries) often indicates further marginalisation of 
farming within the household, leading to a tendency towards deagrarianisation  
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(see also Bryceson 1996 for Africa and Rigg 2001 for Asia),  while Ploeg 
(2008) observed in Europe that rural pluriactivity could be supportive to 
farming, witnessing a repeasantisation of agriculture. In other words, the 
diversification of rural China is oriented towards the urban, the industrial, and 
the modern, mostly external to the rural, which is “a transition towards the 
thorough-going restructuring of farming and rural areas” (Wilson and Rigg, 
2003:698). In a European context, the diversification represents a localisation 
or “re-grounding” process of agricultural production based on growing niche 
markets (Ploeg et al., 2012). Therefore, diversification in China, as Wilson and 
Rigg (2003) recommend, is more appropriate to be understood in the context 
of the process of deagrarianisation rather than the post-productivist agriculture 
regime.  
In addition, the newly launched rural development campaign by the 
Chinese government since 2006, “Building a New Countryside” not only 
continues to stress the priority of developing modern agriculture, but also 
relates to social, economic and environmental improvements, adopting a more 
holistic approach to enhance the attractiveness of rural areas. This new rural 
development strategy “contains elements that resonate with aspects of the 
‘new rural development paradigm’ in Europe and elsewhere” (Long and 
Woods, 2011:75; see also Ploeg et al., 2012). However, the effectiveness of 
this government-dominated rural development strategy still remains to be 
seen. Lastly, as argued above, agricultural and rural development in China 
   
342 
 
have exhibited both similar and distinctive experiences and contemporary 
scenarios as the  global North, which is associated with the character of 
Chinese socio-economic patterns, political institutions and specific socio-
cultural norms and history.    
8.2.2 Agricultural development of the BRICs: How China is 
special? 
It is unrealistic to portray the agricultural sector of every southern country and 
make a comparison with China here. While acknowledging the heterogeneity 
of southern countries, the following discussion will be particularly based on the 
experiences of BRIC countries to further understand contemporary Chinese 
agriculture within the context of the global South. Acknowledging that multi-
dimensional differences including social, economic, political and historical 
aspects exist among BRIC countries, this discussion only focuses on some 
broad aspects of agricultural development of the referred countries. As a 
background, a brief review of agrarian changes of the BRICs was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
Putting four countries together, there are convergences and 
divergences in terms of the agricultural development pathways that can be 
identified. The first fundamental common ground of BRIC countries is that all 
are dominated by an agricultural modernisation regime (Woods, 2010), 
whether through the agribusiness model or by embracing smallholder farming. 
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All four countries are still on the pathway towards productivist agriculture, with 
maximisation of productivity and output as the primary goal. Second, 
historically, all four countries have embarked on market-led (or neo-liberal) 
economic domestic reform roughly from the 1980s, and agriculture has been 
progressively embedded in a market-based system and transformed 
dramatically by increasing liberalisation and globalisation. Although the 
concrete transition trajectories in different countries differ significantly, 
agriculture in the four countries has been increasingly integrated into both 
domestic and international markets. Especially with accession to WTO, all four 
counties are facing challenges and opportunities from globalisation processes. 
Third, due to uncompleted reform agendas, agriculture of all four countries 
faces institutional obstacles. For instance, insecure land property rights exist 
in all four countries to varying degrees, which greatly hinders the development 
of land markets. Lastly, the dynamic tension between the agribusiness model 
and the smallholder family farming model forms the most fundamental 
agricultural development scenario in all four countries. As illustrated above, 
although the four countries are dominated by different agricultural 
organisations, the interaction between industrialised large-scale agricultural 
production and small-scale peasant family farming will determine the direction 
of agriculture in the future.   
Several divergences of agricultural development in the four countries 
can also be identified, which are not commonly shared by all due to 
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differences in socio-economic, political and historical contexts. First, 
agribusiness gains different development features and powers in the four 
countries. Particularly agriculture in Brazil and Russia is primarily driven by 
large-scale commercial agribusiness, especially Brazilian agriculture which is 
export-oriented and plays an important role in global agrifood markets. 
Peasant farming in the two countries represents a minor portion of agriculture 
and largely produces for subsistence. India and China are both dominated by 
smallholder agriculture, which has increasingly been in crisis in the transition 
to an industrialised and urbanised society.  
Since urban economies absorb rural labourers inadequately, the rural-
urban migration in India is much less dramatic than in China, and hence 
Indian rural labour is mostly employed in rural areas rather than in cities, 
which is fundamentally different from the situation found in rural China. 
Regarding rural outmigration, Russia faces similar issues to China, as 
researchers have observed that rural communities in Russia are severely 
short on young, educated populations due to outmigration (Wegren, 2008).  
Second, numbers of landless farmers in Brazil and India are 
considerable, which has triggered long-lasting social movements towards land 
rights in the countries. This phenomenon is not stark in Russia and China. 
Interestingly, peasants in Russia and China are even reluctant to expand their 
land property as in Russia, unfavourable market conditions and social 
institutions regarding small scale farming is widespread, and in China, as this 
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thesis has discussed, dramatic non-farm employment opportunities and the 
market squeeze on agriculture has greatly frustrated smallholders’ farming 
incentives. Third, the primary challenges that the four countries’ agriculture 
faces in the future are different. As argued above, Brazil is concerned 
primarily about environmental sustainability and social inequality; Russia 
about further institutional reforms and rural depopulation, India about 
smallholder agriculture and rural poverty, China about agricultural labour 
decline and institutional reforms on land and agriculture. It can be seen that 
the differences in future challenges are certainly based on their specific 
contexts. Further examination of the differences constitutes another research 
agenda.  
Lastly, through the comparison of BRIC countries, we gain a better 
understanding of contemporary Chinese agriculture in the international 
context. It can be argued that the most pronounced scenario of contemporary 
Chinese agriculture is that driven by dramatic livelihood diversification and 
market squeeze, smallholder agriculture seemingly is approaching its limits 
and is progressively deserted by peasants themselves, to such an extent that 
the vast majority of farmers are eager to hand their land over to emerging 
agricultural enterprises or other market operators. In this sense, Chinese 
agriculture is arguably coming to a historic crossroads, where agriculture as 
the implicit and natural occupation of peasants which has lasted thousands of 
years is being reconsidered, and the options of agricultural pathways between 
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smallholder agriculture and large-scale, productivist agriculture are urgently 
awaited to be chosen by Chinese policy makers. 
8.3 Key findings 
Through focusing on the agricultural production of a rural community in 
southwest China as a case study, this thesis has  investigated the “structures” 
and “agencies” that are framing and shaping contemporary Chinese 
smallholder agriculture, and addressed a research gap on Chinese 
smallholder agriculture research, as well as providing an understanding of 
Chinese experiences within global contexts. Four objectives were set to 
achieve the research aim, and the key findings of this research are 
summarised below.  
Objective one: To reveal the macro socio-economic “structures” in which Hu 
Village agriculture is embedded in contemporary China, embracing both 
overall socio-economic development, agricultural changes and development 
polices at different geographical levels.     
It was found that the agricultural production of Hu Village is embedded 
in the over-arching socio-economic transformation of China (see Chapter 4). 
Irrespective of a focus on the nation, the province or the county, a similar 
transition from agriculture-based economy and rural society to industry-based 
economy and urban society has been underway. Industrialisation and 
urbanisation have been set as the development priorities by both the whole 
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country and local governments. Agricultural modernisation is the dominant 
paradigm that all-level governments are enthusiastically propelling. Numerous 
relevant policies and projects are designed and implemented from national to 
local levels, primarily through a top-down approach, and these policies and 
projects set the parameters for local farmers’ agency.      
Objective two: To demonstrate the demographic characteristics of the 
farmers in agricultural production under the transitional background, and to 
reveal the demographic changes taking place in rural communities and the 
implication of the demography for agricultural production.  
The findings revealed that, consistent with rural demographic 
tendencies at the regional and national levels, farming and the farming 
population were being marginalised in Hu Village, as the full-time farmers, 
who consisted mainly of the elderly and females, often with lower education, 
only makes up a small proportion of the whole population (see Chapter 5). 
Rural residents are differentiated by occupation. Migrants and dedicated 
farmers are the two major forms of employment for Hu Village farmers. The 
young and males, often those with higher education, are more likely to take 
part in migration and other off-farm jobs, while the elderly and females with 
poorer education are more likely to do farming work. However, different from 
impressions delivered by the mass media, this analysis has revealed that 
although there is a tendency of deagriculturalisation in terms of  occupations, 
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land/agricultural production was still strategically important to most rural 
families, as relevant institutions and policies on land tenure and social security 
were still incomplete in transition China (see Chapter 5).   
Objective three: To reveal economic drivers for agricultural production of the 
research village, and to identify which drivers are promoting or encumbering 
farmers’ initiatives to undertake agricultural production and how. 
Analysis revealed that economic diversification of rural households had 
become the most pronounced driving force of Chinese smallholder agriculture 
as similarly found in other developing countries (see Chapter 6). Different from 
the findings from other regions, like Africa, agricultural productivities in China 
have largely remained stable due to ample access to modern material inputs 
and the standardisation of farming practices. This said, most crop production 
and livestock sidelines have experienced gradual decline due to overall labour 
withdrawal. As similarly found in other countries, migration seems to affect 
agricultural production more prominently than other forms of non-farm 
employments, and tends to de-intensify land use and reduce agricultural 
diversity. Technologically, substitutions between labour and modern 
technologies, like fertilizers and machines, evidently exist, particularly for 
migrant households (see Chapter 6). 
Research also revealed that in Hu Village, agricultural markets of both 
products and inputs had been substantially extended and greatly promoted 
agricultural commercialisation, as well as integrating farmers with domestic 
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and international markets (see Chapter 6). However, the rising input prices 
and declining or slowly rising product prices are squeezing agricultural 
revenue and greatly reduce farmers’ incentive to farm, a trait which has been 
witnessed extensively at global scale. The dominant market-oriented 
agricultural development approach has catalysed various fashions of 
agricultural operation, for instance, contract farming and large-scale land 
contracting. However, the interests of farmers involved in these new 
agricultural forms are often not well protected due to imperfect institutions and 
poor implementation of projects. Farmers in Hu Village have a strong 
willingness to transfer out their land to release labour demand intensity, but a 
poorly developed land transfer market has rather encouraged informal 
transfers among farmers.  
It was found that economic policies have also been an important 
variable for Hu Village agriculture (see Chapter 6). Various agricultural 
subsidies, as well as modern agriculture and infrastructure projects have been 
launched and implemented to facilitate agricultural modernisation and to 
enhance farmers’ income. It was found that the effects of agricultural 
subsidies were insignificant to encourage agricultural production as similarly 
found by researchers in other parts of China. In the context of the Chinese 
ossified bureaucracy, various agricultural development projects with originally 
good intentions in many cases end up with disappointing consequences.  
Objective four: To reveal social drivers for the agricultural production of the 
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research village, and to identify which drivers are promoting or encumbering 
farmers’ initiatives to undertake agricultural production and how.  
It was revealed that agriculture was not merely an economic activity for 
farmers, but was also interwoven with multi-faceted socio-cultural elements of 
rural space as Ploeg (2006) similarly argued, especially in such a dramatically 
transforming era like in rural China (see Chapter 7). For contemporary 
farmers, to move out of agriculture is a cultural norm and education is widely 
utilised as the primary pathway to realise the movement. Rural young 
generations are unlikely to conduct agricultural production in the future. A 
similar mentality has also been widely observed in other countries and 
throughout southeast Asia (Rigg, 2001). It was also found that the labour 
division of rural households had resulted in the tendencies of feminised and 
geriatrified agriculture, or “left-behind” agriculture. At the community level, 
changes of community socio-cultural norms and rules driven by the 
penetration of modernity and the market economy have also contributed to the 
contemporary agricultural situation in Hu Village (see Chapter 7).  
8.4 Research reflections: some thoughts regarding 
Chinese smallholder agriculture 
Through conducting this research project, the author has an excellent 
opportunity to observe and discuss the state of contemporary Chinese 
smallholder agriculture. The following provides some reflections regarding the 
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contemporary situation and the future development of Chinese smallholder 
agriculture deriving from the fieldwork of this project.   
Regarding Chinese agricultural production, or more broadly, “Sannong” 
problem, the state has set two principal goals: to ensure food security of the 
country and, simultaneously, to enhance the economic incomes of rural 
households (see the central government No.1 documents from 2004 to 2013). 
The first goal requires sound farming practices from farmers (e.g. ensuring 
adequate labour and material inputs), while the second goal often forces the 
state to diversify their income streams, which more often than not leads to 
massive labour withdrawal from agriculture. The low earnings from agriculture 
also push farmers to leave their home villages. It is under this mismatch of the 
two different tendencies that contemporary Chinese smallholder agriculture is 
situated. On the one hand, the state keeps strengthening investments in 
agriculture and more broadly, rural communities in the name of agricultural 
modernisation. On the other hand, however, even with all the favourable 
policies and projects, this still cannot keep the farmers farming, and thus 
cannot address the labour shortage in agriculture. As this research has 
argued, a compromised strategy is the so called “left-behind” agriculture, or 
“perfunctory agriculture”, in which land is not treated as carefully and diligently 
as before. Although with high inputs of modern technologies, the productivity 
can be maintained, the socio-cultural norms regarding “valuing land” and 
environmental aspects regarding long-term land preservation have been 
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largely eroded. This can be viewed then as the   characteristic modernisation 
pathway of Chinese smallholder agriculture, or sometimes referred to 
“capitalization without proletarianization” (Huang, et al. 2012).   
One prescription made by the state, to deal with the circumstances of 
contemporary smallholder agriculture, is to promote large-scale, market-
based, capitalist agri-business, or so called, “modern agriculture”. This is 
illustrated at the local level, as Hu Village presents, in the encouragement to 
develop various forms of contract farming. There is no denying that contract 
farming can bridge the gap between farmers and external markets, and some 
contract farming indeed creates more profit from contemporary Chinese 
smallholder agriculture and brings economic benefits to farmers. Moreover, 
during the fieldwork, almost all the farmers expressed their eager demands for 
contract farming, suggesting that farmers still hope that they can make more 
return from their small areas of land. However, on the one hand, market 
imperfections regarding contract farming in China are still widespread, farmers 
do not have a say in the whole process so that farmers’ rights and interests 
cannot be formally secured. On the other, contract farming is still largely 
based on the existing “left-behind” agriculture. It has very limited potential to 
attract the most knowledgeable and competent farmers, who often have gone 
outside for non-farm employments. Therefore, how far contract farming can 
contribute to the contemporary smallholder agriculture deserves serious 
consideration.  
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Another treatment from the state is large-scale land transfer based on 
the existing land tenure system. Now that smallholder agriculture faces labour 
shortages and rural youth does not want to farm, to transfer the land from 
those who do not want to farm to those who do, seems reasonable and 
appropriate. However, as long as social insurance for farmers is still absent in 
contemporary China, land serves as the security net for most rural 
households. Once land is transferred, the landless farmers will rely entirely on 
market and cash, which undoubtedly will expose them to more risks. Hence, 
the implementation of land transfer requires matched social reforms, for 
instance, social insurance and the reform of the Hukou system, to safeguard 
the wellbeing of landless farmers. So, this is not just an agricultural or land 
issue, but has implications in the entire socio-economic sphere, for which 
China is not yet ready. In addition, as the Hu Village case has illustrated, the 
agricultural production of large-scale land transfer often does not perform as 
well as smallholder agriculture due to managerial and other reasons. The 
monoculture brought by large-scale farming may cause environmental harm 
and land degradation in the long run. That said, most farmers are still willing to 
hand their land over to large-scale farming contractors, which suggests that 
most households are not dependent on land any more but on non-farm 
employment. Nonetheless, there is still a small proportion of farmers (around 
30% according to the Hu Village case) who want to continue their smallholder 
agriculture, and are unwilling to hand their land over. This group of farmer, 
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often termed ‘the middle farmer class’ (He, 2010), has become an important 
“stabiliser” of contemporary rural China. In this group, the husband and wife 
often stay in the village for various reasons, and build their livelihoods on the 
land and around the community. They often receive some land from relatives, 
neighbours, or friends, and expand their land to a medium scale, although still 
around one hectare, allowing them to acquire a greater profit from their 
farming. As He (2010) has argued, the new middle farmer class is of vital 
importance to the rural community and agriculture, as most of them are in 
middle-age, and have sufficient capabilities to build their livelihoods locally as 
well as participating in community governance, which is so necessary in the 
context of massive rural out-migration in China. However, the large-scale land 
transfer campaign is bound to threaten the survival of the middle farmer class, 
as their land scale will be reduced due to the favoured land transfer to large-
scale external actors. How to deal with the relationship between large-scale 
farming and the middle farmer class presents interesting challenges for future 
Chinese agriculture.          
Peasant farming or large-scale modernised farming: what will the future 
be? 
There have been heated debates surrounding what Chinese smallholder 
agriculture should be in the future, polarised into two camps: either favouring 
peasant farming or large-scale modernised farming. Both sides have their 
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justifications. Peasant farming can provide farmers more autonomy, and is 
more environment-friendly, more labour intensive, more diverse, and more 
productive. Large-scale modernised farming can liberalise rural population 
from land, and propel urbanisation progress, and it is more standardised, 
more efficient, more profitable, and more market-oriented.  Off course, both 
have advantages and disadvantages for contemporary China. On the one 
hand, there are arguments that one should not romanticise peasant or 
smallholder agriculture when agricultural production has been closely 
connected with the domestic and international capital economies. The 
smallholder agriculture seen today is not the ‘smallholder agriculture’ in the 
writing of Netting (1993), where land was the centre of rural households and 
rural community, and the future for all rural generations. Now to leave the 
land, or move out of agriculture has become the behavioural ideology of most 
rural residents. In this sense, there is an urgent need for large-scale land 
transfer. However, for farmers that still want to build their livelihood in the 
village and want to live a peasant-style life, this freedom should be available 
to them. Off course, both approaches can only come to reality alongside 
matched socio-economic reforms which guarantee that landless farmers can 
live a proper life afterwards. Under the political economy of contemporary 
China, it is safe to say that in the near future, neither side can be dominant, 
but rather they will represent a jigsaw of mixed and diverse forms of 
agricultural production. It will be a challenge for the policy makers to 
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coordinate the diverse forms of farming.  Whether this jigsaw is just a 
transition state towards a unified shape, or a permanent characteristic to 
satisfy the multi-faceted needs of stakeholders is beyond this discussion, but 
what is sure is that it depends on the comprehensive socio-economic reforms 
of China in the context of both domestic and global economies.   
8.5 Policy implications 
Based on the findings of this research, several policy suggestions can be 
proposed to address the unfavourable future that contemporary Chinese 
smallholder agriculture and farmers are facing.  
First, since the main body of agricultural labour is middle-aged females 
and the elderly whose physical and educational conditions are poor, facing 
increasing challenges with normal farming work, relevant public services 
should be promoted to maintain the performance of “left-behind” agriculture. 
For instance, as illustrated in previous chapters, labour shortages do exist in 
contemporary smallholder agriculture, and the spontaneous frameworks of 
mutual help among farmers have been dramatically weakened, so 
organisations like agricultural mutual aid groups could be sponsored by 
government or other formal institutions to release labour shortages for 
farming.  
Second, and linked to the above, due to poor education levels and lack 
of knowledge, many farmers are excessively applying various agricultural 
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inputs, especially chemicals, in many cases because they don’t have 
directions on quantities to stick to. The excessive use of chemical inputs not 
only damages the environment and farmers’ health, but also greatly raises 
farming costs, making agriculture less desirable. Since the trend of using 
modern inputs is irreversible at present, public services from government or 
other authoritative organisations regarding usage criteria of farming inputs 
(e.g. fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides) to guide farmers to scientifically use 
modern inputs  should be considered as a key policy agenda in the future.   
Third, as demonstrated before, various external actors have become 
actively engaged in contemporary smallholder agriculture, like contract 
farming, government modernisation projects, with more often than not 
disappointing effects to farmers themselves. The top-down approach utilised 
in these forms of agricultural production deprives farmers’ say in the process, 
and thus as similarly recommended by Gulati and Fan (2008) when 
comparing Chinese agriculture with Indian agriculture, a more participatory 
approach should be promoted to improve the status of smallholders in the 
process of market integration and government project implementation. In 
addition, agricultural enterprises own the competence and opportunities to 
connect with governments who also would like to collaborate with these 
enterprises to implement development projects. Consequently, large 
agricultural companies or entrepreneurs benefit most from various subsidy 
policies, while smallholders who occupy the vast majority of agricultural 
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population are easily bypassed. Hence, more balanced policy strategies 
should be adopted to protect the incentives of smallholder farmers. Relevant 
laws (e.g. contract law) should be further consummated and strictly 
implemented to protect smallholders’ interests when they deal with large 
agricultural enterprises.  
Lastly, judging from the contemporary situation in Hu Village, the out-
migration or non-farm diversification of rural households will be further 
strengthened in the future, not only by farmers themselves but also by the 
state. At the same time, agricultural production faces challenges in terms of 
labour availability and farmers will continue to dwell on the “semi-worker semi 
farmer” mode for the foreseeable future. The state faces a policy paradox 
regarding agricultural development. On the one hand, the state is 
enthusiastically promoting modernised, large scale agriculture, facilitating land 
consolidation and fostering new agricultural entrepreneurs, while on the other 
hand, the smallholders still greatly rely on their small plots as an important 
portion of their livelihoods.  Rigg et al. (2008) used to suggest that the best 
pathway forward for rural residents in the global South is to endow them with 
skills so that they can escape from land and the countryside. Yet with 
formidable institutional barriers in contemporary China, merely skills cannot 
enable farmers successfully to move out of agriculture. Since industrialisation 
and urbanisation will continue to be the national development strategies of 
China, rural populations will be further driven to migrate or diversify into non-
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farm sectors. Most importantly, to move out of agriculture is also what farmers 
themselves firmly persist in propelling themselves towards, therefore, an array 
of comprehensive socio-economic reforms embracing the Hukou system, land 
tenure, social welfare, education and so forth need to be taken account of, 
rather than focusing on one singular aspect. Only through comprehensive 
social reforms can the form of “left-behind” agriculture be terminated.  
8.6 Further research directions   
As highlighted by this thesis, agricultural production is not merely an economic 
activity for smallholders, but it is also associated with complete social and 
natural systems, more specifically, embracing socio-economic, political and 
environmental dimensions. Based on a case study, this thesis particularly 
highlighted the socio-economic processes framing smallholder agriculture in 
the context of contemporary transitional China. This also leaves many 
subjects for future research agendas. For instance, the roles of the state in 
agriculture were only selectively taken into account in this thesis, mainly in 
terms of economic policies and development projects, but there are clearly 
more concrete processes that the state and related sources of political power 
influence regarding agricultural production and these still remain unknown.  In 
the following sections, I suggest four future research themes.  
First, what political factors influence smallholder agriculture in China, 
and how?  This thesis has shown that political power plays a substantial part 
   
360 
 
in smallholder agriculture through the effects of agricultural policies and 
development projects. The political status of farmers in the community (e.g. 
whether they are party members or not), the role of village cadres and the 
policy and projects implementation process deserve deeper and more detailed 
exploration. Especially in the Chinese political system, politics decides 
everything and government makes substantial interventions in the economy 
and society. The political forces probably exert more influence on agriculture 
than any others. Due to methodological barriers and ethical challenges, this 
project restricts its research objectives within socio-economic domains.   
Second, the dynamics between the environment and rural livelihoods 
has attracted increasing research interests, for instance, the relationship 
between migration and the environment (Bilsborrow, 2002; Carr, 2009; Qin, 
2010). As presented in this thesis, Chinese smallholder agriculture is 
persistently capitalised, which may well have serious environmental 
repercussions. In turn, environmental degradation can become a force driving 
farmers out of agriculture, off the land and ultimately away from rural 
communities. In addition, the relationship between the environment and 
livelihood diversification is also an interesting research topic, which could 
investigate how environmental factors influence farmers’ livelihoods and how 
farmers’ livelihoods in turn impact the environment.    
Third, longitudinal studies are needed in the future to better interpret 
the tendencies and processes identified in this thesis. This research draws 
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largely on the cross-sectional data of Hu Village in 2011, which is limited for 
interpreting the social changes and tendencies. Hence, more dynamic, 
longitudinal data is needed, and for this reason, a follow-up study of Hu 
Village is going to be one of my research priorities in the future. In addition, in 
the future, the ethnography of Hu Village through an anthropological 
perspective can be favourable to understand the changes occurring in the 
agricultural arena. For instance, Rigg et al. (2012) conducted a longitudinal 
study of two villages to present the long-term changes and tendencies in the 
agriculture and rural society of southeast Asia.   
Fourth, comparative studies among transitional BRIC countries deserve 
more research efforts, in order to provide a better understanding of the 
agrarian transition taking place in individual countries through an international 
context. As briefly illustrated in Section 8.2, the agrarian transition trajectories 
of the four BRIC countries have both divergences and convergences.  A policy 
that represents a failure in one country can be a success in another. Through 
comparisons, the experiences and academic debates within Chinese 
agriculture can be finely articulated in the context of global experiences and 
debates, and may thus provide useful reform options for China. Comparative 
studies can involve various geographical scales, from national and regional 
level to community level, which all can provide valuable insights.  
  
   
362 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Chronological Stages of China’s Rural 
Transition 
 
Time Reform Policies Components and Consequences  
1949~1952 Land  Reform: 
People's Republic 
of China National 
Land Reform Act 
in 1950 
Land was confiscated by the government after 1949 
revolution, and redistributed equally among the 
farmers, which realised ‘land to the tiller’ and ended the 
feudal pattern of land tenure.(Gulati et al.,2005) 
1952~1957  The Socialist 
Transformation of 
Agriculture 
From 1952, the government adopted the collective 
mode of production along the lines of the Soviet model 
which encouraged farmers to “voluntarily” pool their 
land and other resources into larger production units 
called “cooperatives” (Gulati et al., 2005), and which, 
thus, transformed the individual ownership of land 
tenure to socialist collective ownership. In 1953, 
government created state-monopolies for the purchase 
and marketing of grain, and agricultural produce was 
subject to the fulfillment of compulsory quotas at fixed 
procurement prices (Gulati et al., 2005). 
1957-1960 Great Leap 
Forward and 
Communisation 
In 1958, China’s leaders proposed the guide line of 
The Great Leap Forward: “Going all out, aiming high 
and achieving greater, faster, better, and more 
economical results in building socialism”, and put 
forward a series of unrealistic tasks and targets. 
Simultaneously, government embarked on an even 
larger scale of production in agriculture. Advanced 
cooperatives were merged into “communes,” where 
peasants worked and dined together in collective halls. 
Worsened by droughts and floods in most of China in 
1959, nearly 30 million people died of starvation 
(Becker 1996; Lin 1990; Lin and Yang 2000). This was 
one of the largest human tragedies in history that 
resulted from a combination of policy and natural 
failures (Gulati et al., 2005). 
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1961~1977  Economic 
Adjustments and 
Cultural 
Revolution 
After 1961, gigantic-scale agriculture was reorganised 
into smaller units called “production teams,” which 
were subunits of the commune and consisted of only 
20 to 30 neighboring families. During the decade of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–76) agricultural production 
and productivity growth were again depressed by 
policy failures (Gulati et al., 2005). No market 
transactions of major agricultural products were 
allowed outside the procurement system, and market 
exchanges of land between different production units in 
the commune system were outlawed (Gulati et al., 
2005). 
1978~1984  Implementation of 
Household 
Responsibility  
System(HRS) 
At the end of 1978, central government initiated rural 
reform, and the change from the collective system to 
the individual household-based farming system, now 
called the household-responsibility system, began in 
1979 and was essentially completed by the end of 
1983 (Lin, 1992). HRS is “Two-Tier” land tenure, which 
means that land was owned by the collective but use 
rights and production decisions were decentralised 
from the production teams to individual households. 
Farmers were free to decide what to cultivate and 
could sell the surplus in the market after they had met 
the state quotas, which were set at around 15–20 % of 
output (Yao, 2007). HRS promoted agricultural 
production greatly, accounting for half the output 
improvements from 1979 to 1984 (Lin, 1992). Another 
major step taken during this phase was the 
government decision to increase grain procurement 
prices (Gulati et al., 2005). In addition, this period also 
saw the implementation of a series of far-reaching 
market reforms aimed at reducing the scope of 
government planning and procurement while gradually 
expanding the role of free markets in the allocation of 
resources (Gulati et al., 2005). 
1985~1996 Consolidation 
and Improvement 
of Agricultural 
and Rural  
Reforms 
The procurement system was changed from a 
mandatory quota to a contract system in 1985, and as 
state procurement was steadily abandoned, the share 
of all farm produce sold at market prices soared (Gulati 
et al., 2005). During this period, central government 
encouraged the development of “village and township 
enterprises” (VTEs), whose rapid development 
contributed to the rural economy and farmers’ incomes 
(Oi, 1999). After 1992, the state has begun to establish 
and develop the socialist market economic system, 
and correspondingly, the state eased control of 
agricultural markets, reduced control of the prices of 
agricultural products and distribution channels (Duan, 
2009). 
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1997~2001 Entry into the 
WTO 
China was officially admitted into the WTO in 
December 2001. Exchanges of most agricultural 
commodities have gradually been removed from the 
monopoly of state agencies except for strategic crops 
such as grains and edible oils. Trade liberalisation 
benefited those engaged in the production of labour-
intensive products, favouring the diversification of 
agricultural output away from grains. On the other 
hand, less-developed areas in particular were 
penalised as they depended overwhelmingly on grain 
production (Gulati et al., 2005). 
2002~2011  Support Policies 
for ‘San 
Nong’(Agriculture, 
Rural Area, 
Farmer) 
In 2002, the Rural Land Contract Act was enacted, 
which entitled farmers to long-term and guaranteed 
land use rights. From 2004 to 2006, central 
government gradually abolished agricultural taxes and 
began to increase grain subsidies too, emancipating 
farmers entirely from the tax burden. In 2006, the state 
proposed a grand goal of Socialism New Countryside 
Construction which encompasses “developed 
production, affluent life, civilised countryside custom, 
clean village, democratic management”. In 2007, the 
First Document of central government gave priority to 
the development of modern agriculture, and 
emphasised construction of agricultural water 
conservancy, improvement of land quality, the 
development of rural clean energy and so on. In 2008, 
the First Document focused on construction of 
agricultural infrastructure and improvements to farmer 
income. In the same year, the third Plenum of the 17th 
Communist Party of China Central Committee 
encouraged farmers to transfer their land rights freely 
in order to develop scale agriculture. In 2009, the First 
Document emphasised an increase in the intensity of 
agricultural support and protection by investment and 
subsidies. In 2010, the First Document enlarged the 
scale of subsidies for forests, grazing, anti-drought and 
save-water machines, and also proposed bank 
services for “San Nong”. Most recently, in 2011, the 
First Document focused on the construction of 
agricultural water conservancy, and 10% of land 
transfer capital of local governments will be invested in 
water conservation (First Documents of China from 
2004 to 2011; Document of the third Plenum of the 17th 
Communist Party of China Central Committee, 2008 )   
Source: Various studies 
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Appendix B: Household Survey Questionnaire  
Introduction: 
Good morning /afternoon, my name is Zhanping Hu. I am a PhD student from 
Plymouth University, UK. I am conducting a research project about the way how 
differential socio-economic factors affect agricultural production in contemporary 
rural China. I am also interested in how farmers cope with these socio-economic 
forces in everyday life. I will greatly appreciate it if you can spare some time for an 
interview. This interview will last about one hour to one hour and a half.   
I can guarantee that your responses to this questionnaire will be strictly confidential. 
Your personal identification will never appear in any published material. You can 
refuse or stop the interview at any stage without claiming any reason. 
Survey Information 
Sample       ID: 
Household Head Name: 
Interviewer Name: 
Interview   Time: 
Interview Location:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zhanping Hu  
University of Plymouth 
UK 
Mobile: 07514296542; +8613810106075                 
Email: zhanping.hu@plymouth.ac.uk 
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1. Household Structure 
 
1.Name  
code 
2.Sex 
(1.Male 
2.Female) 
3.Age 
(Years) 
4.Educational 
level(years) 
5.Family 
member 
 
6.Position in 
household 
 
7.Marital 
Status  
 
8.Job 
holdings 
 
 
9.Migrant 
family or not  
(1 Yes 
2 No) 
10.Time duration of 
migrant work in the last 
year 
 
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
06          
07          
*Household refers to all the individuals living in the same dwelling house.All the individuals in a household share food, accommodation and other common resource. 
*Migrant family refers to at least one family member working in urban area at least 3 months in the last year. 
6. Position in the household                    7 Marital Status               8 Job holdings                                          10 Time Duration  
1 Household Head     8Sister                         1 Married                  1 Only farming                                         1 Less than three months 
2 Wife/Husband         9 Daughter in-law       2 Unmarried             2 Agricultural part-time workers             2 Three to six months 
3 Son                         10Grandmother            3 Divorced               3 Employees in local sectors                    3 Six to nine months 
4 Daughter                11 Grandfather              4 Widowed              4 Self-employed enterprises                     4 Nine to twelve months 
5 Farther                   12 Grandmother in-law 5 Other (Specify)     5 Governmental officials (including village cadres) 
6 Mother                   13 Grandfather in-law                                    6 Housewife 
         7 Brother                  14 Other (specify)                                          7 Other (specify) 
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2. Household Land 
11. How much land in total did your household cultivate in the last year: ______________(if you cultivated others’ land, please specify how much___________ and 
why_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________). 
12. For all your land, the land types and areas:  
paddy filed____________________________; upland field _______________________; forest land______________________; pond 
land___________________________; mulberry field______________________________; other_______________________.  
13. Did you rent any land from other villages in the last year? 
1. Yes, why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________;  
2. No, why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
14. Do you have a plan to lease your land to other villagers? 
1, Yes, why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________;  
2 No. 
15. Do you want to cultivate more land if possible? 
1. Yes why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________;  
2.No, why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
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3. Land Tenure and Agricultural Production 
16. Since you contracted the land, have your land area changed in scale? 
1. Yes, how_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
2. No. 
3. No idea. 
17. Do you want to enlarge your farming land? 
1. Yes, why_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
2. No, why________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
3. No idea.  
18. If you want to enlarge your farming land, what will you cultivate on your enlarged land? 
1. Cultivating rice  2. Cultivating cash crops  3. Planting trees  4. Doing other activities, specify__________________________________________________.  
19. If you want to enlarge your farming land, through which way do you think you can achieve it? 
1. Renting from other villagers  2. Cultivating others’ land for free   3. Renting village collective land  4. Transforming maintain land into farming land. 5. No idea  6 
Others, specify_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
20. If some come to rent your land, are you willing to rent out your land? 
1. Yes2. No3. No idea 
21. Please explain why you are willing or aren’t willing to rent out your land ? 
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
22. If you are willing to rent out your land, how much rent per ha do you accept? And why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
23. If you are willing to rent out your land, how much land do you want to rent out? 
1. All the land  2. Some part of the land 3. No idea  4 Other, specify____________________________________________________________________________. 
24. If you are willing to rent out your land, how long would you like to rent out? 
1. One year  2 More than one year and less than three year  3 More than three year   4 Forever  5 Depending on the lessee  6 No idea  7 Other, 
specify____________________________________________________________________________. 
25. If you are willing to rent out your land, how do you think will renting out your land benefit your household?  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
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4. Crop Production 
For the last year, what did you cultivate on your land?  
Crops 
 
 
Items 
Rice Rape Maize Sweet potato Vegetables Fruit trees Others 
Cultivation Area (mu) 
 
 
      
Total Production (kg) 
 
 
      
Self -Consumption (kg) 
 
 
      
Livestock Fodder (kg) 
 
 
      
Sold (kg) 
 
 
      
Price for the sold (Yuan/kg) 
 
 
      
In Store (kg) 
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5. Technology and Agricultural Cultivation 
 5.1 Machinery inputs 
Crops 
 
Farming 
Process 
Rice Rape Maize Sweet potato Vegetables Fruit trees Others 
C 
Machinery 
Inputs 
O C O C O C O C O C O C O C 
Land 
preparation 
              
Transplanting 
 
 
             
Harvesting 
 
 
             
Carrying 
 
 
             
Threshing 
 
 
             
Others 
 
 
             
*O refers to ownership; C refers to cost (in Yuan) 
**Ownership refers to: 1. Own; 2 Hired. Payment refers to the money paid to hired machinery work. 
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5.2 Material inputs  
Crops 
 
Farming 
Materials 
Rice 
 
 
Rape Maize Sweet Potato Vegetables Fruit Trees Others 
Material inputs Q C Q C Q C Q C Q C Q C Q C 
Seeds 
Purch
ased 
              
Own  
 
 
            
Manure  
 
 
            
Chemical 
Fertilizers 
              
Insecticide               
Herbicide  
 
 
            
Others  
 
 
            
*Q refers to quantity (kg/mu); C refers to cost (in Yuan).  
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4.3 Machinery Possession  
26. Do you have tractors? 
1 Yes, quantity___________ usage_______________________________________________________________________________________________________; 
2. No. 
27. Do you have farming buffaloes? 
1.Yes, quantity___________ usage______________________________________________________________________________________________________;  
2. No. 
28. Do you have rice threshers? 
1. Yes, quantity____________ usage__________________________________________________________________________________________________; 
2.No. 
29. Do you harvest rice with combine harvester? 
1. Yes;  
2. No. why________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
30. Who, do you think in your household, is the most skillful and experienced for farming? 
1. Household head; 2. Housewife; 3. The male elderly; 4. The female elderly; 5. The male youth.6 the female youth; 7 Others, specify_______________________. 
31. How long did the most skilful and experienced person work on agricultural production last year?  
1. All the time; 2. More than six month; 3. Less than six month; 4. Occasionally; 5. Not at all.  
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32. What do you think are traditional agricultural technologies? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
33. Is your household still using traditional agricultural technologies? 
1. Yes, specify ____________________________ and why____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. No, why___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
34. What do you think will agricultural production become if you don’t use modern agricultural technologies? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
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6. Livestock  
Livestock of your household in the last year 
 Pig Buffalo Sheep Chicken Duck Rabbit Silkworm Fish Others 
Number          
Purpose          
Cash Investment          
Cash Income          
Cash Income Distribution          
Manure Usage          
*Purpose refers to the principle aims of raising livestock: 1. For sale; 2. For self-consumption; 3; Both 1 and 2; 4. For farming land; 5, Others, specify. 
**Cash Investment refers to all the cash input in raising the livestock in the last year, including purchasing, veterinary inputs, water, dip fees, drugs, feed supplements 
and so on. Capital income refers to all the cash obtained from the sale of the livestock. Cash income distribution refers to which aspect was the cash earned from 
livestock primarily spent in the last year? 1. Investment in farming; 2. Investment in livestock; 2. Education; 3. Food and Clothes; 4. Purchasing domestic appliances; 
5. Medical care; 6. Others, Specify. 
***Manure usage refers to how did the household dispose the manure of the livestock in the last year? 1. Fertilized the land; 2. Sold them; 3. In store; 4. Giving to 
others; 5. Others, specify.  
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7. Off-Farm Economic Activities 
Basic information about off-farm economic activities of your household in the last year 
 Agricultural worker 
Employees in local 
sector 
Self-employed 
enterprise 
Governmental official Migrant Remittance Others 
Income 
 
 
 
 
    
Working 
place 
      
 *Working place refers to the geographical place where household members work, including: 1 Hu Village; 2. Other villages in BaiGuo township; 3 BaiGuo town 4 
Nearby Township; 5. Qing Shen County; 6; Meishan City; 7 Chengdu City; 8 Other cities in Sichuan Province; 89 Other province; 10Overseas; 11. Others, specify.  
With the income from various sources, how did you distribute your income in everyday life in the last year? 
Consumption 
items  
Framing 
Input 
Education Medical 
Care 
Living Fee Wedding and 
Funeral Gifts 
Investment in off-
farming economic 
activities 
Entertainment Saving Others 
Quantity   
 
        
35. Will you change your household job holding this year or later? And why?  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
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8. Migration and Agricultural Production (for migrant family) 
36. Did the migrant family member remit back last year?  
1. Yes;  
2 No, why_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
37. If your household received remittance from the migrant family members, what was the remittance frequency? 
1. Every month; 2. Every season; 3. One year; 4. No fixed date; 5 Others   
38. What was the return frequency of your migrant family members in the last year? 
1. Every month; 2. Every season; 3. One year ; 4 No fixed date; 5 Others 
39. Why did the migrant members return home in the last year? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
40. Will they return more frequently or less frequently this year? And why? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
41. How did your household deal with the migrants’ land? 
1. Cultivated by other family member2. Cultivated by other family members; 3. Leave it to other villagers; 4.Leave it idle; 5 No idea; 6 Other, 
specify_____________________. 
42. With the remittance from migrant members, how did you spend them? 
1.Farming input; 2.Education; 3. Medical care; 4.Consumption and entertainment; 5. Other, specify______________________________________________. 
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43. What is the plan of the migrant members? 
1. Will come back to village after several years; 2. Will settle down in working areas and permanently reside there; 3. Keep current status; 4. No plan; 5. Other, 
specify________________________________________________________. 
44. Please explain why do they have the above choice? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
45. What do you think about how migration influences agricultural production? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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9. Commercial Projects 
46. Have you participated any commercial projects on agricultural production? 
1. Yes, specify________________________________________________________.2. No. .3 No idea 
47. Are you participating any commercial projects currently? 
1. Yes, specify_________________________________________________________.2. No.  3 No idea 
48. How do you benefit from the projects? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
49. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the projects that you have participated? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
50. Do you want more projects from outside companies? Why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
51. List some projects that you want to participate in the future? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 
   
380 
 
Appendix C: Guidelines for Interviews 
For farmers 
 Can you please describe the bibliography of your family (demographic information of family members, livelihoods, relevant changes and so 
on)?  
 What do you think is the biggest change that has happened on agricultural production of this village in the past decade? What factors have 
driven this change? Why?  
 What do you think about the changes on agricultural technologies in the past decade? What factors have impacted the changes? Why? 
 Do you still use traditional skills or techniques to farm? What are they? And why are you still using them?   
 What do you think about changes on agricultural labour in the past decade? What factors have impacted the changes? Why? 
 What do you think about changes on agricultural market in the past decade? What factors have impacted the changes? Why? 
 What do you think about changes on agricultural policies in the past decades? Have they been good or bad to farmers’ agricultural 
production?  
 What do you think about land transfer market? Do you want to rent out your land? Why? 
 What is your opinion to contemporary agriculture?  
 What people do you think are “good” farmers? Are you a good farmer? Why?  
 What do you think the challenges/opportunities for agricultural production of the village? 
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 What do you think how agriculture will develop in the future? Why? 
For migrants 
 Can you please describe the bibliography of your migration experiences? 
 Why do you migrate or return?  
 How often do you return your hometown? 
 How do you take care of your land in the village?  
 What do you think did your migration influence the agriculture of your family? Why? 
 Do you remit to your parents or other family members? What do you expect to them how to spend the remittance? 
 What do you think are “good” farmers? Are you a good farmer? Why? 
 What is your opinion to contemporary agriculture?  
 What do you think about land transfer? Do you want to rent out your land? Why? 
 What do think about agricultural production of the village? The challenges, problems, and opportunities? 
 Are you going to go back the village? Why? What is your plan of your future? Why? 
For village cadres 
 What is your opinion to contemporary village agriculture?  Is it still important to rural households? Why?  
 What has happened on agricultural production of this village since you worked as a village cadre? Which one mostly impressed you? And 
why? 
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 What do you think are influencing contemporary agriculture?  What is the most pronounced factor? Why?  
 Can you describe the basic agricultural policies that are implemented on village agriculture? How about the effectiveness of these policies to 
agricultural production? Why?  
 What agricultural projects have been implemented in the village since you worked as village cadre?  How about the effect of these projects? 
Why? 
 What do you think about land transfer market development recently in the village? Is it conductive to agricultural production? Why? What is 
your opinion of land transfer in the future?  
 What socio-cultural changes has the village experienced in recent years? What implications of these changes may bring to agricultural 
production?  
 What do you think about the challenges/opportunities agricultural production of this village? 
 In the future, which direction do you think agricultural production of the village will develop into? Why? 
For government officials 
 What policies and project has been implemented on agricultural production in recent years?  
 What about the effect of these policies and projects on agricultural production? Why? 
 How do you implement these policies and projects? 
 What has changed on agricultural production since you began to work in the township? 
 What do you think the challenges/opportunities of agricultural production currently? 
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 What do you think how agricultural production will develop in the future? Why? 
For businessmen  
 Can you describe the bibliography of your business on agriculture please? 
 Why do you conduct this project in this village?  
 How do you cooperate with farmers? How does your business benefit farmers? 
 In your opinion, what is influencing agriculture most pronouncedly? Why? 
 What is your opinion of contemporary agriculture?  
 In the future, what do you think will agriculture become?    
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Appendix D: Summary of Data Collection  
Methods Number 
Questionnaires 225 
In-depth interviews 33 
Focus groups 7 
Participant observation Two dairy notebooks 
Secondary data 
More than 200 village 
pictures; 30 piece of new 
papers; 5 policy posters; 1 
village report; 1 village map. 
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